第14章

INthemoralattitudeofexperiencewesee，ononeside，consciousnessitselfproduceitsobjectinaconsciousway。Wefindthatneitherdoesitpickuptheobjectassomethingexternal，nordoestheobjectcomebeforeitinanunconsciousmanner。Rather，consciousnessthroughoutproceedsonanexplicitground，andfromthisestablishestheobjectivereality。Itthusknowsthisobjectiverealitytobeitself，foritisawareofitselfastheactiveagentproducingthisobject。Itseems，inconsequence，toattainhereitspeaceandsatisfaction，forthiscanonlybefoundwhereitdoesnotneedtogoanymorebeyonditsobject，becausethisobjectnolongergoesbeyondit。Ontheotherside，however，itreallyputstheobjectawayoutsideitself，assomethingbeyonditself。Butthislatterself-containedentityisatthesametimeputthereassomethingthatisnot，freefromself-consciousness，butreallythereonbehalfofandbymeansofit。

(1)TheContradictionsintheMoralViewoftheWorldThemoralattitudeis，therefore，infactnothingelsethanthedevelopedexpressionofthisfundamentalcontradictioninitsvariousaspects。Itis——touseaKantianphrasewhichisheremostappropriated“perfectnest“ofthoughtlesscontradictions。(2)Consciousness，indevelopingthissituation，proceedsbyfixingdefinitelyonemoment，passingthenceimmediatelyovertoanotheranddoingawaywiththefirst。But，assoonasithasnowsetupthissecondmoment，italso“shifts“

(verstellt)thisagain，andreallymakestheoppositetheessentialelement。Atthesametime，itisconsciousofitscontradictionandofitsshuffling，foritpassesfromonemoment，immediatelyinitsrelationtothisverymoment，rightovertotheopposite。Becauseamomenthasforitnorealityatall，itaffirmsthatverymomentasreal:or，whatcomestothesamething，inordertoassertonemomentasperseexistent，itassertstheoppositeastheperse，existent。Ittherebyconfessesthat，asamatteroffact，itisinearnestaboutneitherofthem。Thevariousmomentsofthisvertiginousfraudulentprocesswemustlookatmoreclosely。

Letus，tobeginwith，agreetoaccepttheassumptionthatthereisanactualmoralconsciousness，becausetheassumptionismadedirectlyandnotwithreferencetosomethingpreceding；andletusturntotheharmonyofmoralityandnature——thefirstpostulate。Itistobeimmanent，notexplicitlyforactualconsciouslife，notreallypresent；thepresentisrathersimplythecontradictionbetweenthetwo。Inthepresent，moralityistakentobesomethingathand，andactualrealitytobesosituatedor“placed“thatitisnotinharmonywithmorality。Theconcretemoralconsciousness，however，isanactiveone；thatispreciselywhatconstitutestheactualityofitsmorality。Intheveryprocessofacting，however，that“Place“orsemblanceisimmediately“displaced“，isdissembled；

foractionisnothingelsethantheactualizationoftheinnermoralpurpose，nothingbuttheproductionofanactualityconstitutedanddeterminedbythepurpose；inotherwords，theproductionoftheharmonyofmoralpurposeandrealityitself。Atthesametimetheperformanceoftheactionisaconsciousfact，itisthe“presence“ofthisunityofrealityandpurpose；andbecauseinthecompletedactconsciousnessrealizesitselfasagivenindividualconsciousness，orseesexistencereturnedintoitself——andinthisconsiststhenatureofenjoyment——thereis，eoipso，containedintherealizationofmoralpurposealsothatformofitsrealizationwhichiscalledenjoymentandhappiness。

Actionthus，asafact，fulfilsdirectlywhatitwasassortedcouldnottakeplaceatall，fulfilswhatwastobemerelyapostulate，wastoliemerely“beyond“。Consciousness，therefore，expressesthroughitsdeedthatitisnotinearnestinmakingthepostulate，sincethemeaningofactingisreallythatitmakesapresentfactofwhatwasnottobeinthepresent。And，sincetheharmonyispostulatedforthesakeoftheaction——forwhatistobecomeactualthroughactionmustbeimplicit，otherwisetheactualitywouldnotbepossible——theconnexionofactionwiththepostulateissoconstitutedthat，forthesakeoftheaction，i。e。forthesakeoftheactualharmonyofpurposeandreality，thisharmonyisputforwardasnotactual，asfaraway，as“beyond“。

Inthatactiontakesplace，thewantofadaptationbetweenpurposeandrealityisthusnottakenseriouslyatall。Actionitself，ontheotherhand，doesseemtobetakenseriously。But，asamatteroffact，theactualdeeddoneisonlytheactionofanindividualconsciousness，andsoisitselfmerelysomethingindividual，andtheresultcontingent。Theendofreason，however，beingtheall-comprehensiveuniversalend，isnothingshortoftheentireworld——afinalpurposewhichgoesfarbeyondthecontentofthisindividualact，andthereforeistobeplacedaltogetherbeyondanythingactuallydone。Becausetheuniversalbestoughttobecarriedout，nothinggoodisdone。

Inpointoffact，however，thenothingnessofactualactionandtherealityoftheentirepurposealone，whicharehereupheld——theseareonallhandsagain“shifted“ordissembled。Themoralactisnotsomethingcontingentandrestricted；itsessentialnatureliesinpureduty。Thispuredutyconstitutesthesoleentirepurpose；andtheact，whatevermaybethelimitationofthecontent，beingtheactualizationofthatpurpose，istheaccomplishmentoftheentireabsolutepurpose。Or，ifagainwetaketherealityinthesenseofnature，whichhaslawsofitsownandstandsoveragainstpureduty，andtakeitinsuchawaythatdutycannotrealizeitslawwithinnature，then，sincedutyassuchistheessentialelement，weare，whenacting，notinfactconcernedabouttheaccomplishmentofpuredutywhichisthewholepurpose；fortheaccomplishmentwouldthenratherhaveasitsendnotpureduty，buttheopposite，viz。reality。Butthereisagaina“shifting“

fromthepositionthatitisnotrealitywithwhichwehavetodo。Forbytheverynotionofmoralaction，puredutyisessentiallyanactiveconsciousness。Actionthusoughtcertainlytotakeplace，absolutedutyoughttobeexpressedinthewholeofnature，and“morallaw“tobecome“naturallaw“。

If，then，weallowthishighestgoodtostandfortheessentiallyreal，consciousnessisaltogethernotinearnestwithmorality。For，inthishighestgood，naturehasnotadifferentlawfromwhatmoralityhas。Moralactionitself，inconsequence，drops，foractiontakesplaceonlyundertheassumptionofanegativeelementwhichistobecancelledbymeansoftheact。Butifnatureconformstothemorallaw，thenassuredlythismorallawwouldbeviolatedbyacting，bycancellingwhatalreadyexists。

Onthatmodeofinterpretation，then，therehasbeenadmittedastheessentialsituationonewhichrendersmoralactionsuperfluousandinwhichmoralactiondoesnottakeplaceatall。Hencethepostulateoftheharmonybetweenmoralityandreality——aharmonypositedbytheverynotionofmoralaction，whichmeansbringingthetwointoagreement——findsonthisview，too，anexpressionwhichtakestheform:——“becausemoralactionistheabsolutepurpose，theabsolutepurposeis——thatmoralactiondonottakeplaceatall“。

Ifweputthesemomentstogether，throughwhichconsciousnesshasmovedinpresentingitsideasofitsmorallife，weseethatitcancelseachoneagaininitsopposite。Itstartsfromthepositionthat，forit，moralityandrealitydonotmakeaharmony；butitisnotinearnestwiththat，forinthemoralactitisconsciousofthepresenceofthisharmony。Butneitherisitinearnestwiththisaction，sincetheactionissomethingindividual；forithassuchahighpurpose，thehighestgood。

This，however，isoncemoremerelyadissemblanceoftheactualfact，fortherebyallactionandallmoralitywouldfalltotheground。Inotherwords，itisnotstrictlyinearnestwithmoralaction；onthecontrary，itreallyfeelsthat，whatismosttobewishedfor，theabsolutelydesirable，isthatthehighestgoodwerecarriedoutandmoralactionsuperfluous。

Fromthisresultconsciousnessmustgoonstillfurtherinitscontradictoryprocess，andmustofnecessityagaindissembletheabolitionofmoralaction。Moralityistheinherentlyessential(Ansich)；inorderthatitmayhaveplace，thefinalendoftheworldcannotbecarriedout；rather，themoralconsciousnessmustexistforitself，andmustfindlyingbeforeitanatureopposingit。Butitmustperse，becompleted。Thisleadstothesecondpostulateoftheharmonyofitselfandsensibility，the“nature“immediatelywithinit。Moralself-consciousnesssetsupitspurposeaspurepurpose，asindependentofinclinationsandimpulses，sothatthisbarepurposehasabolishedwithinitselftheendsofsensibility。Butthiscancellingoftheelementofsenseisnosoonersetupthanitisagaindissembled。Themoralconsciousnessacts，itbringsitspurposeintoreality；andself-conscioussensibility，whichshouldbedoneawaywith，ispreciselythemediatingelementbetweenpureconsciousnessandreality——istheinstrumentusedbytheformerfortherealizationofitself，oristheorgan，andwhatiscalledimpulse，inclinations。Itisthusnotreallyinearnestincancellinginclinationsandimpulses，forthesearejustself-consciousnessmakingitselfactual。

Moreover，theyoughtnottobesuppressed，butmerelytobeinconformitywithreason。Theyare，too，inconformitywithit；formoralactionisnothingelsethanself-realizingconsciousness——consciousnesstakingontheformofanimpulse，i。e。itisimmediatelytherealizedactuallypresentharmonyofimpulseandmorality。But，inpointoffact，impulseisnotonlythisemptyconsciousform，whichmightpossiblyhavewithinitselfaspringofactionotherthantheimpulseinquestion，andbedrivenonbythat。Forsensibilityisakindofnature，whichcontainswithinitselfitsownlawsandspringsofaction:consequently，moralitycannotseriouslymeantobetheincitingmotive(Triebfeder)forimpulses(Triebe)，theangleofinclinationforinclinations。For，sincetheselatterhavetheirownfixedcharacterandpeculiarcontent，theconsciousness，towhichtheyweretoconform，wouldratherbeinconformitywiththem——aconformitywhichmoralself-consciousnessdeclinestoadopt。Theharmonybetweenthetwoisthusmerelyimplicitandpostulated。

Inmoralactiontherealizedorpresentharmonyofmoralityandsensibilitywassetupjustnow，andisnowagain“displaced“。Theharmonyisinamistydistancebeyondconsciousness，wherenothingcananymorebeaccuratelydistinguishedorgrasped；for，tograspthisunity，whichwehavejusttriedtodo，hasprovedimpossible。

Inthismerelyimmanentorimplicitharmony，however，consciousnessgivesupitselfaltogether。

Thisimmanentstateisitsmoralcompletion，wherethestruggleofmoralityandsensibilityhasceased，andthelatterisinconformitytotheformerinawaywhichcannotbemadeout。Onthataccountthiscompletionisagainmerelyadissemblanceoftheactualcase；forinpointoffactmoralitywouldbereallygivingupitselfinthatcompletion，becauseitisonlyconsciousnessoftheabsolutepurposequapurepurpose，i。e。inoppositiontoallotherpurposes。Moralityisboththeactivityofthispurepurpose，andatthesametimetheconsciousnessofrisingabovesensibility，ofbeingmixedupwithsensibilityandofopposingandstrugglingwithit。Thatthismoralcompletionisnottakenseriouslyisdirectlyexpressedbyconsciousnessitselfinthefactthatitshiftsthiscompletionawayintoinfinity，i。e。assertsthatthecompletionisnevercompleted。

Thusitisreallyonlythemiddlestateofbeingincompletethatisadmittedtohaveanyvalue:astateneverthelesswhichatleastissupposedtobeoneofprogresstowardscompletion。Yetitcannotbeso；foradvancinginmoralitywouldreallymeanapproachingitsdisappearance。Forthegoalwouldbethenothingnessabovementioned，theabolitionofmoralityandconsciousnessitself:buttocomeevernearerandnearertonothingmeanstodecrease。Besides，“advancing“would，ingeneral，inthesamewayas“decreasing，“assumedistinctionsofquantityinmorality:butthesearequiteinadmissibleinsuchasphere。Inmoralityastheconsciousnesswhichtakestheethicalendtobepureduty，wecannotthinkatallofdifference，leastofallofthesuperficialdifferenceofquantity:thereisonlyonevirtue，onlyonepureduty，onlyonemorality。

Since，then，itisnotmoralcompletionthatistakenseriously，butratherthemiddlestate，i。e。asjustexplained，theconditionofnomorality，wethuscomebyanotherwaybacktothecontentofthefirstpostulate。Forwecannotperceivehowhappinessistobedemandedforthismoralconsciousnessonthegroundofitsworthinesstobehappy。Itiswellawareofitsnotbeingcomplete，andcannot，therefore，inpointoffact，demandhappinessasadesert，assomethingofwhichitisworthy。Itcanaskhappinesstobegivenmerelyasanactoffreegrace，i。e。itcanonlyaskforhappinessassuchandasasubstantiveelementbyitself；itcannotexpectitexceptastheresultofchanceandcaprice，notbecausethereisanyabsolutereasonoftheabovesort。Theconditionofnon-moralityhereinexpressesjustwhatitis——thatitisconcerned，notaboutmorality，butabouthappinessalone，withoutreferencetomorality。

Bythissecondaspectofthemoralpointofview，theassertionofthefirstaspect，whereindisharmonybetweenmoralityandhappinessispresupposed，isalsocancelled。Onemaypretendtohavefoundbyexperiencethatintheactualpresentthemanwhoismoraloftenfaresbadly，whilethemanwhoisnot，oftencomesoffhappily。Yetthemiddlestateofincompletemorality，theconditionwhichhasprovedtobetheessentialone，showsclearlythatthisperceptionthatmoralityfaresbadly，thissupposedexperienceofit，ismerelyadissemblanceoftherealfactsofthecase。

For，sincemoralityisnotcompleted，i。e。sincemoralityinpointoffactisnot，whatcantherebeinthe“experience“thatmoralityfaresbadly?

Since，atthesametime，ithasturnedoutthatthepointatissueconcernshappinessalone，itismanifestthat，inmakingthecriticism，“themanwithoutmoralitycomesoffwell，“therewasnointentiontoconveytherebythatthereissomethingwronginsuchacase……Thedesignationofanindividualasonedevoidofmoralitynecessarilyfallstotheground，whenmoralityingeneralisincomplete；suchacharacterizationrests，indeed，onpurecaprice。Hencethesenseandcontentofthatjudgmentofexperienceissimplythis，thathappinessassuchshouldnothavefallentosomewhohavegotit，i。e。thejudgmentisanexpressionofenvy，whichcoversitselfupinthecloakofmorality。Thereason，however，whywethinkgoodluck，aswecallit，shouldfalltothelotofothersisgoodfriendship，whichungrudginglygrantsandwishesthem，andwishesitselftoo，thisfavour，thisaccidentofgoodfortune。

(2)TheResolutionofMoralityintoitsOppositeMorality，then，inthemoralconsciousness，isnotcompleted。Thisiswhatisnowestablished。Butitsessenceconsistsinbeingonlywhatiscomplete，andsopuremorality:incompletemoralityis，therefore，impureinotherwords，isImmorality。Moralityitselfthusexistsinanotherbeingthantheactualconcreteconsciousness。Thisotherisaholymorallegislator。

Moralitywhichisnotcompletedinconsciousnessthemoralitywhichisthereasonformakingthosepostulates，means，inthefirstinstance，thatmorality，whenitissetupasactualinconsciousness，standsinrelationtosomethingelse，toanexistence，andthusitselfacquiresothernessordistinction，whencearisesamanifoldpluralityofmoralcommands。Themoralself-consciousnessatthesametime，however，looksonthesemanydutiesasunessential；foritisconcernedwithmerelytheonepureduty，andthispluralityofduties，sofarastheyaredeterminateduties，hasnotruerealityforself-consciousness。Theycanthushavetheirrealtruthonlyinanotherconsciousness，andare(whattheyarenotfortheactualmoralself-consciousness)sacredthroughaholylaw-giver。

Butthis，too，isagainmerelyadissemblingoftheactualfact。Formoralself-consciousnessistoitselftheabsolute，anddutyissimplyandsolelywhatitknowstobeduty。It，however，knowsonlypuredutyasduty:whatisnotsacredinitsviewisnotpersesacredatall，andwhatisnotperse，sacredcannotberenderedsobythebeingthatissacred。Moralconsciousness，further，isnotreallyseriousinallowingsomethingtobemadesacredbyanotherconsciousnessthanitsown。

For，onlythatiswithoutqualificationsacredinitseyeswhichismadesacredthroughitsownaction，andissacredwithinit。Itisthusjustaslittleinearnestintreatingthisotherbeingasaholybeing；forthiswouldmeanthat，withinthatholybeingsomethingwastoattainanessentialsignificance，which，forthemoralconsciousness，i。e。initself，hasnone。

Ifthesacredbeingwaspostulated，inorderthatdutymighthavebindingvaliditywithinthemoralconsciousness，notquapureduty，butasapluralityofspecificduties，thenthismustagainbedissembledandthisotherbeingmustbesolelysacredinsofarasonlypuredutyhasbindingvaliditywithinit。Puredutyhasalso，inpointoffact，bindingvalidityonlyinanotherbeing，notinthemoralconsciousness。Although，withinthelatter，puremoralityseemsalonetoholdgood，stillthismustbeputinanotherform，foritis，atthesametime，anaturalconsciousness。Moralityis，init，affectedandconditionedbysensibility，andthusisnotsomethingsubstantial，butacontingentresultoffreewill；init，however，quapurewill，moralityisacontingencyofknowledge。Takenbyitself，therefore，moralityisinanotherbeing，isself-completeonlyinanotherrealitythantheactualmoralconsciousness。

Thisotherbeing，then，ishereabsolutelycompletemorality，becauseinitmoralitydoesnotstandinrelationtonatureandsensibility。Yettherealityofpuredutyisitsactualizationinnatureandsensibility。Themoralconsciousnessaccountsforitsincompletenessbythefactthatmorality，initscase，hasapositiverelationtonatureandsensibility，sinceitholdsthatanessentialmomentofmoralityisthatmoralityshouldhavesimplyandsolelyanegativerelationtowardsnatureandsensibility。Thepuremoralbeing，ontheotherhand，becausefarabovethestrugglewithnatureandsense，doesnotstandinanegativerelationtothem。Thus，inpointoffact，thepositiverelationtothemaloneremainsinitscase，i。e。thereremainsjustwhatamomentagopassedfortheincomplete，forwhatwasnotmoral。Puremorality，however，entirelycutofffromactualrealitysoaslikewisetobeevenwithoutpositiverelationtoreality，wouldbeanunconsciousunrealabstraction，wheretheverynotionofmorality，whichconsistsinthinkingofpuredutyandinwillinganddoing，wouldbeabsolutelydoneawaywith。Thisotherbeing，sopurelyandentirelymoral，isagain，therefore，meredissemblanceoftheactualfact，andhastobegivenup。

Inthispurelymoralbeing，however，themomentsofthecontradiction，inwhichthissyntheticimaginativeprocessiscarriedon，comeclosertogether。So，likewise，dotheoppositestakenupalternately，nowthisandalsothat，andalsotheother，oppositeswhichareallowedtofollowoneaftertheother，theonebeingconstantlysupplantedbytheother，withouttheseideasbeingbroughttogether。Soclosedotheycome，thatconsciousnessherehastogiveupitsmoralviewoftheworldandretreatwithinitself。

Itknowsitsmoralityasincompletebecauseitisaffectedbyanopposingsensibilityandnature，whichpartlyperturbmoralityassuch，andpartlygiverisetoapluralityofduties，bywhich，inconcretecasesofrealaction，consciousnessfindsitselfembarrassed。Foreachcaseistheconcretefocusofmanymoralrelations，justasanobjectofperceptioningeneralisathingwithmanyqualities。Andsincethedeterminatedutyisitspurpose，ithasacontent；itscontentisapartofthepurpose，andsomoralityisnotpuremorality。Thislatter，then，hasitsrealexistenceinsomeotherbeing。Butsuchrealitymeansnothingelsethanthatmoralityishereself-complete，initselfandforitself——foritself，i。e。ismoralityofaconsciousness:initself，i。e。hasexistenceandactuality。

Inthatfirstincompleteconsciousness，moralityisnotrealizedandcarriedout。Itistheresomethingimmanentandimplicit，inthesenseofamerethought-entity；foritisassociatedwithnatureandsensibility，withtheactualityof[external]existenceandconsciouslife，whichconstitutesitscontent；

andnatureandsensibilityaremorallynothing。Inthesecond，moralityispresentascompleted，andnotintheformofanunrealizedthought-element。Butthiscompletionconsistsjustinthefactthatmoralityhasrealityinaconsciousness，aswellasfreereality，objectiveexistenceingeneral，isnotsomethingempty，butfilledout，fullofcontent。Thatistosay，thecompletionofmoralityisplacedinthis，thatwhatamomentagowascharacterizedasmorallynothingisfoundpresentinmoralityandinherentinit。Itisatonetimetohavevaliditysimplyandsolelyastheunrealizedthought-element，aproductofpureabstraction；but，ontheotherhand，isjustascertainlytohaveinthisformnovalidityatall:itstruenatureistoconsistinbeingopposedtoreality，detachedaltogethertherefrom，andempty，andthenagaintoconsistinbeingactualreality。

(3)TheTruthofMoralSelf-ConsciousnessThesyncretism，orfusion，ofthesecontradictions，whichisexpressedinextensointhemoralattitudeofexperience，collapsesinternally，sincethedistinctiononwhichitrests——，viz。theconceptionofsomethingwhichmustbethoughtandpositedasnecessary，andisyetatthesametimenotessential——passesintoonewhichdoesnotanylongerexisteveninwords。What，attheend，isaffirmedtobesomethingwithdifferentaspects，bothtobenothingandalsoreal，isoneandtheverysame——existenceandreality。Andwhatistobeabsoluteonlyassomethingbeyondactualexistenceandactualconsciousness，andatthesametimetobeonlyinconsciousnessandso，quabeyond，nothingatall——thisabsoluteispuredutyandtheknowledgethatpuredutyistheessentiallyreal。Theconsciousness，whichmakesthisdistinctionthatisnodistinction，whichannouncesactualitytobeatoncewhatisnothingandwhatisreal，pronouncespuremoralitytobeboththeultimatetruthandalsotobedevoidofalltruereality-suchaconsciousnessexpressestogetherinoneandthesamebreathideaswhichitformerlyseparated，anditselfproclaimsthatitisnotinearnestwiththischaracterizationandseparationofthemomentsofselfandinherentreality。

Itshows，onthecontrary，that，whatitannouncesasabsoluteexistenceapartfromconsciousness，itreallykeepsenclosedwithintheselfofself-consciousness；andthat，whatitgivesoutastheabsoluteobjectofthoughtorabsolutelyinherentandimplicit，itjustforthatreasontakestobesomethingwhichhasnotruthatall。

Itbecomescleartoconsciousnessthatplacingthesemomentsapartfromeachotheris“dis-placing“them，isadissemblance，anditwouldbehypocrisywereitreallytokeeptothis。

But，beingpuremoralself-consciousness，itfleesfromthisdiscordancebetweenitswayofimaginingandwhatconstitutesitsessentialnature，fleesfromthisuntruth，whichgivesoutastruewhatitholdstobeuntrue，and，turningawaywithabhorrence，ithastensbackintoitself。Theconsciousness，whichscornssuchamoralideaoftheworld，ispureConscience(Gewissen):itis，initsinmostbeing，simplyspiritconsciouslyassuredor“certain“(gewiss)ofitself，spiritwhichactsdirectlyinthelightofthisassurance，whichactsconscientiously(gewissenhaft)，withouttheinterventionofthoseideas，andfindsitstruenatureinthisdirectimmediacy。

While，however，thissphereofdissemblanceisnothingelsethanthedevelopmentofmoralself-consciousnessinitsvariousmomentsandisconsequentlyitsreality，sotoothisself-consciousness，byreturningintoitself，willbecome，initsinmostnature，nothingelse。Thisreturningintoitself，indeed，simplymeansthatithascometobeconsciousthatitstruthisapretendedtruth，amerepretence。Asreturningintoitselfitwouldhavetobealwaysgivingoutthispretendedtruthasitsrealtruth，foritwouldhavetoexpressanddisplayitselfasanobjectiveidea；

butitwouldknowallthesamethatthisismerelyadissemblance。Itwouldconsequentlybe，inpointoffact，hypocrisy，anditsabhorrenceofsuchdissemblancewouldbeitselfthefirstexpressionofhypocrisy。

1。Verstellung:ItisnotpossibletobringoutexactlybyanEnglishwordtheverbalplayinvolvedinHegel"sinterpretationofthestateofmindherediscussed。Hegelhas，inthecourseofhisanalysis，usedthemeaningimpliedinthegeneralterm“stellen“toexplainbycontrastthespecificnuanceofthepurelymoralattitudeconveyedbythetermverstellen。

2。AnexpressionusedbyKantofthe“cosmologicalproof“。

cConscience:

The“BeautifulSoul”:

EvilandtheForgivenessofitTheantinomyinthemoralviewoftheworld—viz。thatthereisamoralconsciousnessandthatthereisnone，orthatthevalidity，thebindingnessofdutyhasitsgroundbeyondconsciousness，andconverselyonlytakeseffectinconsciousness—thesecontradictoryelementshadbeencombinedintheidea，inwhichthenon-moralconsciousnessistopassformoral，itscontingentknowledgeandwilltobeacceptedasfullysufficing，andhappinesstobeitslotasamatterofgrace。Moralselfconsciousnesstookthisself-contradictoryideanotuponitself，buttransferredittoanotherbeing。Butthisputtingoutsideitselfofwhatitmustthinkasnecessaryisasmuchacontradictioninformastheotherwasincontent。Butthatwhichappearsascontradictory，andthatinthedivisionandresolutionofwhichliestheroundofactivitypeculiartothemoralattitude，areinherentlythesame:forpuredutyquapureknowledgeisnothingelsethantheselfofconsciousness，andtheselfofconsciousnessisexistenceandactuality；and，inthesameway，whatistobebeyondactualconsciousnessisnothingelsethanpurethought，is，infact，theself。Becausethisisso，self-consciousness，forusorperse，passesbackintoitself，andbecomesawarethatthatbeingisitsself，inwhichtheactualisatoncepureknowledgeandpureduty。Ittakesitselftobeabsolutelyvalidinitscontingency，tobethatwhichknowsitsimmediateindividualbeingaspureknowledgeandaction，asthetrueobjectiverealityandharmony。

ThisselfofConscience，themodeofspiritimmediatelycertainofitselfasabsolutetruthandobjectivebeing，isthethirdtypeofspiritualself。Itistheoutcomeofthethirdsphereofthespiritualworld，(1)andmaybeshortlycomparedwiththetwoformertypesofself。

Thetotalityoractualitywhichisrevealedasthetruthoftheethicalworld，theworldofthesocialorder，istheselfofaPerson[thelegalself]:itsexistenceliesinbeingrecognizedandacknowledged。Asthepersonistheselfdevoidofsubstance，thisitsexistenceisabstractrealitytoo。Thepersonhasadefinitestanding，andthatdirectlyandimmediately:itsselfisthepointinthesphereofitsexistencewhichisimmediatelyatrest。Thatpointisnottornawayfromitsuniversality；thetwo[theparticularfocusanditsuniversality]arethereforenotinarelationalprocesswithregardtooneanother:theuniversalisinitwithoutdistinction，andisneitherthecontentoftheself，noristheselffilledbyitself。

Thesecondselfisthetruthandoutcomeoftheworldofculture，isspiritthathasrecovereditselfafterandthroughdisruption，isabsolutefreedom。Inthisself，theformerimmediateunityofindividualexistenceanduniversalitybreaksupintoitscomponentelements。Theuniversal，whichremainsatthesametimeapurelyspiritualentity，thestateofrecognitionoruniversalwillanduniversalknowledge—theuniversalisobjectandcontentoftheself，anditsuniversalactuality。

Buttheuniversalhasnottheretheformofexistencedetachedfromtheself:inthismodeofselfitthereforegetsnofilling，nopositivecontent，noworld。

Moralself-consciousness，indeed，letsitsuniversalaspectgetdetached，sothatthisaspectbecomesanatureofitsown；andatthesametimeitretainsthisuniversalitywithinitselfinasupersededform。Butitismerelyagameofdissembling；itconstantlyinterchangesthesetwocharacteristics。IntheformofConscience，withitscertaintyofitself，itfirstfindsthecontenttofilltheformeremptinessofdutyaswellastheemptinessofrightandtheemptyuniversalwill。Andbecausethiscertaintyofselfisatthesametimeimmediacy，itfindsinconsciencedefiniteexistence。

Havingreachedthislevelofitstruth，moralself-consciousnessthenleaves，orrathersupersedes，thisstateofinternaldivisionandself-separation，whencearose“dissemblance“—theseparationofitsinherentbeingfromtheself，ofpureduty，quapurepurpose，fromrealityquaanatureandasensibilityopposedtopurepurpose。Itis，whenthusreturnedintoitself，concretemoralspirit，whichdoesnotmakeforitselfabareabstractstandardoutoftheconsciousnessofpureduty，astandardtobesetupagainstactualconsciouslife；onthecontrary，pureduty，asalsothesensuousnatureopposedtopureduty，aresupersededmoments。Thismodeofspirit，initsimmediateunity，isamoralbeingmakingitselfactual，andanactisimmediatelyaconcreteembodimentofmorality。

Givenacaseofaction；itisanobjectiverealityfortheknowingmind。Thelatter，quaconscience，knowsitinadirectconcretemanner；andatthesametimeitismerelyasconscienceknowsittobe。Whenknowledgeissomethingotherthanitsobject，itiscontingentincharacter。Spirit，however，whichissureofitsself，isnolongeranaccidentalknowledgeofthatkind，isnotawayofproducinginsideitsownbeingideasfromwhichrealityisdivorced。Onthecontrary；sincetheseparationbetweenwhatisessentialandselfhasbeengivenup，acaseofmoralactionfalls，justasitisessentially，directlywithinimmediateconsciouscertainty，thesensible[feeling]formofknowledge，anditisessentiallyonlyasitisinthisformofknowledge。

Action，then，quarealization，isinthiswaythepureformofwill—thebareconversionofrealityinthesenseofagivencase，intoarealitythatisenacted，theconversionofthebarestateofobjectiveknowledgeintooneofknowledgeaboutrealityassomethingproducedandbroughtaboutbyconsciousness。Justassensuouscertaintyisdirectlytakenup，orratherconverted，intotheessentiallifeandsubstanceofspirit，thisothertransformationisalsosimpleandunmediated，atransitionmadethroughthepureconceptionwithoutchangingthecontent，thecontentbeingconditionedbysomeinterestonthepartoftheconsciousnessknowingit。

Furtherconsciencedoesnotbreakupthecircumstancesofthecaseintoavarietyofduties。Itdoesnotoperateasthepositivegeneralmedium，inwhichthemanifoldduties，eachforitself，wouldacquireimmovablesubstantialexistence。Ifitdidso，eithernoactioncouldtakeplaceatall，becauseeachconcretecaseinvolvesoppositioningeneral，and，inthespecificcaseofmorality，oppositionofduties—andhencetherewouldalwaysbeonesideinjured，onedutyviolated，bytheverynatureofconcreteaction:orelse，ifactiondoestakeplace，theviolationofoneoftheconflictingdutieswouldbetheactualresultbroughtabout。Conscienceisratherthenegativesingleunity，itistheabsoluteself，whichdoesawaywiththisvarietyofsubstantialmoralconstituents。Itissimpleactioninaccordancewithduty，actionwhichdoesnotfulfilthisorthatduty，butknowsanddoeswhatisconcretelyright。Itis，therefore，ingeneral，andforthefirsttimeinmoralexperience，moralactionasaction，andintothisthepreviousstageofmereconsciousnessofmoralitywithoutactionhaspassed。

Theconcreteshapewhichtheacttakesmaybeanalysedbyaconsciousprocessofdistinctionintoavarietyofproperties，i。e。inthiscaseintoavarietyofmoralrelationships；andthesemayeitherbeeachexpresslyheldtobeabsolute(aseachmustbeifitistobeduty)or，again，subjectedtocomparisonandcriticism。Inthesimplemoralactionarisingfromconscience，dutiesaresopiledandcommingledthattheisolatedindependenceofalltheseseparateentitiesisimmediatelydestroyed，andtheprocessofcriticallyconsideringandworryingaboutwhatourdutyis

Justaslittle，again，dowefindinconsciencethatfluctuatinguncertaintyofmind，whichputsnowso-called“pure“moralityawayfromitself，assigningittosomeotherholybeing，andtakesitselftobeunholy，andthenagain，ontheotherhand，putsthismoralpuritywithinitself，andplacesinthatothertheconnexionofthesensuouswiththemoralelement。

Itrenouncesallthesesemblancesanddissemblances(StellungenundVerstellungen)

characteristicofthemoralpointofview，whenitgivesupthinkingthatthereisacontradictionbetweendutyandactualreality。Accordingtothislatterstateofmind，IactmorallywhenIamconsciousofperformingmerelypuredutyandnothingelsebutthat:i。e。infact，whenIdonotact。

When，however，Ireallyact，Iamconsciousofan“other“，ofarealitywhichistherebeforeme，andonewhichIwanttobringabout；Ihaveadefiniteendandfulfiladefiniteduty。Thereissomethingelsethereinthanthepureduty，whichalonewassupposedtobekeptinview。

Conscience，ontheotherhand，isthesensethat，whenthemoralconsciousnessdeclarespuredutytobetheessenceofitsaction，thispurepurposeisadissemblanceoftheactualfact。Fortherealfactisthatpuredutyconsistsintheemptyabstractionofpurethought，andfindsitsrealityandcontentsolelyinsomedefiniteactualexistence，anactualitywhichisactualityofconsciousnessitself—notofconsciousnessinthesenseofathought-entity，butasanindividual。Conscienceforitsownpart，findsitstruthtolieinthedirectcertaintyofitself。Thisimmediateconcretecertaintyofitselfistherealessence。Lookingatthiscertaintyfromthepointofviewoftheoppositionwhichconsciousnessinvolves，theagent"sownimmediateindividualityconstitutesthecontentofmoralaction；andtheformofmoralactionisjustthisveryselfasapureprocess，viz。astheprocessofknowing，inotherwords，isprivateindividualconviction。

Lookingmorecloselyattheunityandthesignificanceofthemomentsofthisstage，wefindthatmoralconsciousnessconceiveditselfmerelyintheformoftheinherentprinciple，orasultimateessence；quaconscience，however，itlaysholdofitsexplicitindividualself-existence(Fürsichseyn)，oritsself。Thecontradictioninvolvedinthemoralpointofviewisresolved，i。e。thedistinction，whichlayatthebasisofitspeculiarattitude，provestobenodistinction，andmeltsintotheprocessofpurenegativity。Thisprocessofnegativityis，however，justtheself:asinglesimpleselfwhichisatoncepureknowledgeandknowledgeofitselfasthisindividualconsciouslife。Thisselfconstitutes，therefore，thecontentofwhatformerlywastheemptyessence；foritissomethingactualandconcrete，whichnolongerhasthesignificanceofbeinganaturealientotheultimateessence，anatureindependentandwithlawsofitsown。Asthenegativeelement，itintroducesdistinctionintothepureessence，adefinitecontent，andone，too，whichhasavalueinitsownrightasitstands。

Further，thisselfis，quapureself-identicalknowledge，theuniversalwithoutqualification，sothatjustthisknowledge，beingitsveryownknowledge，beingconviction，constitutesduty。Dutyisnolongertheuniversalappearingoveragainstandopposedtotheself；dutyisknowntohaveinthisconditionofseparationnovalidity。Itisnowthelawwhichexistsforthesakeoftheself，andnotthelawforthesakeofwhichtheselfexists。Thelawandduty，however，haveforthatreasonnotonlythesignificanceofexistingontheirownaccount，butalsoofbeinginherentandessential；forthisknowledgeis，invirtueofitsidentitywithitself，justwhatisinherentlyessential。Thisinherentbeinggetsalsoseparatedinconsciousnessfromthatdirectandimmediateunitywithself-existence:

socontrastedandopposed，itisobjectivebeing，itisbeingforsomethingelse。

Dutyitselfnow，quadutydesertedbytheself，isknowntobemerelyamoment；ithasceasedtomeanabsolutebeing，ithasbecomedegradedtosomethingwhichisnotaself，doesnotexistonitsownaccount，andisthuswhatexistsforsomethingelse。Butthisexisting-for-something-elseremainsanessentialmomentjustforthereasonthatself，quaconsciousness，constitutesandestablishestheoppositionbetweenexistence-for-selfandexistence-for-another；

andnowdutyessentiallymeanssomethingimmediatelyactual，andisnolongeramereabstractpureconsciousness。

Thisexistenceforsomethingelseis，then，theinherentlyessentialsubstancedistinguishedfromtheself。Consciencehasnotgivenuppureduty，theabstractimplicitessence:puredutyistheessentialmomentofrelatingitself，quauniversality，toothers。Conscienceisthecommonelementofdistinctself-consciousnesses；andthisisthesubstanceinwhichtheactsecuressubsistenceandreality，themomentofbeingrecognizedbyothers。Themoralself-consciousnessdoesnotpossessthismomentofrecognition，ofpureconsciousnesswhichhasdefiniteexistence；andonthataccountreallydoesnot“act“atall，doesnoteffectuallyactualizeanything。Itsinherentnatureisforiteithertheabstractunrealessence，orelseexistenceintheformofarealitywhichhasnospiritualcharacter。Theactualrealityofconscience，however，isonewhichisaself，i。e。anexistenceconsciousofitself，thespiritualelementofbeingrecognized。Doingsomethingis，therefore，merelythetranslationofitsindividualcontentintothatobjectiveelementwhereitisuniversalandisrecognized，andthisveryfact，thatthecontentisrecognized，makesthedeedanactuality。Theactionisrecognizedandtherebyreal，becausetheactualrealityisimmediatelyboundupwithconvictionorknowledge；or，inotherwords，knowledgeofone"spurposeisimmediatelyandatoncetheelementofexistence，isuniversalrecognition。Fortheessenceoftheact，duty，consistsintheconvictionconsciencehasaboutit。Thisconvictionisjusttheinherentprincipleitself；itisinherentlyuniversalself-consciousness—inotherwords，isrecognitionandhencereality。Theresultachievedunderconvictionofdutyisthereforedirectlyonewhichhassubstantialsolidexistence。Thus，wehearnothingmorethereaboutgoodintentionnotcomingtoanythingdefinite，oraboutthegoodmanfaringbadly。Whatisknownasdutyiscarriedoutcompletelyandbecomesanactualfact，justbecausewhatisdutifulistheuniversalforallself-consciousnesses，thatwhichisrecognized，acknowledged，andthusobjectivelyis。Takenseparatelyandalone，however，withoutthecontentofself，thisdutyisexistence-for-another，thetransparentelement，whichhasmerelythesignificanceofanunsubstantialessentialfactoringeneral。

Ifwelookbackonthespherewherespiritualrealityfirstmadeitsappearance，wefindthattheprincipleinvolvedwasthattheutteranceofindividualityistheabsolutelyreal，theultimatelysubstantial。Buttheshapewhich，inthefirstinstance，gaveexpressiontothisprinciple，wasthe“honestconsciousness“(2)whichwasoccupiedandconcernedwithabstract“factitself“。This“factitself“wasthereapredicate。Inconscience，however，itisforthefirsttimeaSubject，whichhasaffirmedwithinitallaspectsofconsciousness，andforwhichallthesemoments，substantialityingeneral，externalexistence，andessenceofthought，arecontainedinthiscertaintyofitself。The“factitself“hassubstantialityingeneralintheethicalorder(Sittlichkeit)，externalexistenceinculture，self-knowingessenceofthoughtinmorality；andinconscienceitistheSubject，whichknowsthesemomentswithinitself。Whilethe“honestconsciousness“isforevergraspingmerelythebareandempty“factitself“，conscience，ontheotherhand，securesthe“factitself“initsfullness，afullnesswhichconscienceofitselfsupplies。Consciencehasthispowerthroughitsknowingthemomentsofconsciousnessasmoments，andcontrollingthembecauseitistheirnegativeessentialprinciple。

Whenconscienceisconsideredinrelationtothesinglefeaturesoftheoppositionwhichappearsinaction，andwhenweconsideritsconsciousnessregardingthenatureofthosefeatures，itsattitudetowardstherealityofthesituationwhereactionhastotakeplaceis，inthefirstinstance，thatofknowledge。Sofarastheaspectofuniversalityispresentinsuchknowledge，itisthebusinessofconscientiousactionquaknowledge，tocompasstherealitybeforeitinanunrestrictedexhaustivemanner，andthustoknowexactlythecircumstancesofthecase，andgivethemdueconsideration。

Thisknowledge，however，sinceitisawareofuniversalityasamoment，isinconsequenceakindofknowledgeofthesecircumstanceswhichisconsciousallthewhileofnotembracingthem，isconsciousofnotbeingconscientiousinitsprocedure。Thegenuinelyuniversalandpurerelationofknowledgewouldbeonetowardssomethingnotopposed，arelationtoitself。Butactionthroughtheoppositionessentiallyimpliedinactionisrelatedtowhatnegatesconsciousness，toarealityexistingperse。Thisreality—being，ascontrastedwiththesimplenatureofpureconsciousness，theabsoluteother，multiplicityperse—isasheerpluralityofcircumstanceswhichbreaksupindefinitelyandspreadsinalldirections—backwardsintotheirconditions，sidewardsintheirassociations，forwardsin>

Transferinterrupted！

scientiousmindisawareofthisnature，of“thefact“andofitsrelationthereto，andknowsitisnotacquaintedtothefullandcompleteextentrequirewiththesituationinwhichitsactiontakesplace，andknowsthatitspretenceofconscientiouslyweighingandconsideringallthecircumstancesisfutile。Thisacquaintancewithandconsiderationofallthecircumstances，however，arenotentirelyabsent:buttheyaremerelypresentasamoment，assomethingwhichisonlyforothers:andtheconscientiousmindholdsitsincompleteknowledgetobesufficientandcomplete，becauseitisitsownknowledge。

Inasimilarwaytheprocessisconstitutedinconnexionwiththeuniversalityoftheessentialprinciple，thatis，withthecharacterizationofthecontentasdeterminedthroughpureconsciousness。Conscience，whenitgoesontoact，takesuparelationtothevarioussidesofthecase。Thecasebreaksupintoseparateelements，andtherelationofpureconsciousnesstowardsitdoesthesame:wherebythemultiplicitycharacteristicofthecasebecomesamultiplicityofduties。

Conscienceknowsthatithastoselectanddecideamongstthem；fornoneofthemspecifically，initscontent，isanabsoluteduty；onlypuredutyisso。Butthisabstractentityhas，initsrealization，cometodenoteself-consciousego。Spiritcertainofitselfisatrestwithinitselfintheformofconscience，anditsrealuniversality，itsduty，liesinitspureconvictionconcerningduty。Thispureconvictionassuchisasemptyaspureduty，pureinthesensethatnothingwithinit，nodefinitecontent，isduty。Action，however，hastotakeplace，theindividualmustdeterminetodosomethingorother；andspiritwhichiscertainofitself，inwhichtheinherentprinciplehasattainedthesignificanceofself-consciousego，knowsithasthisdetermination，thisspecificcontent，intheimmediatecertaintyofitsownself。Thiscertainty，beingadeterminationandacontent，is“natural“

consciousness，i。e。thevariousimpulsesandinclinations。

(1)Conscienceasthefreedomoftheselfwithinitself；TheRealityofDuty:

convictionConscienceadmitsnocontentasabsoluteforit，becauseitisabsolutenegativityofallthatisdefinite。Itdeterminesfromitselfalone。Thecircleoftheself，however，withinwhichdeterminatenessassuchfalls，isso-called“sensibility“:inordertogetacontentoutoftheimmediatecertaintyofself，thereisnootherelementtobefoundexceptsensibility。

Everythingthatinpreviousmodesofexperiencewaspresentedasgoodorbad，lawandright，issomethingotherthanimmediatecertaintyofself；itisauniversal，whichisnowarelativeentity，anexistence-for-another。Or，lookedatotherwise，itisanobjectwhich，whileconnectingandrelatingconsciousnesswithitself，comesbetweenconsciousnessanditsownpropeltruth，andinsteadofthatobjectbeingtheimmediacyofconsciousness，itrathercutsconsciousnessofffromitself。

Forconscience，however，certaintyofselfisthepure，direct，andimmediatetruth:andthistruthisthusitsimmediatecertaintyofselfpresentedascontent；i。e。itstruthisaltogetherthecapriceoftheindividual，andtheaccidentalcontentofhisunconsciousnaturalexistence[hissensibility]。

Thiscontentatthesametimepassesforessentialmoralreality，forduty。Forpureduty，aswasfoundwhentestingandexamininglaws，(3)isutterlyindifferenttoeverycontent，andgetsalongwithany。Hereithasatthesametimetheessentialformofself-existence，ofexistingonitsownaccount:andthisformofindividualconvictionisnothingelsethanthesenseoftheemptinessOfpureduty，andtheconsciousnessthatthisismerelyamoment，thatitssubstantialityisapredicatewhichfindsitssubjectintheindividual，whosecapricegivespuredutycontent，canconnecteverycontentwiththisform，andattachitsfeelingofconscientiousnesstoanycontent。

Anindividualincreaseshispropertyinacertainway。Itisadutythateachshouldseetothemaintenanceofhimselfandfamily，andnolessensurethepossibilityofhisbeingserviceabletohisneighboursandofdoinggoodtothosestandinginneed。Theindividualisawarethatthisisaduty，forthiscontentisdirectlycontainedinthecertaintyhehasofhimself。Heperceives，further，thathefulfilsthisparticulardutyinthisparticularcase。Otherpeoplepossiblyconsiderthespecificwayheadoptsasfraud:theyholdbyothersidesoftheconcretecasepresented，whileheholdsfirmlytothisparticularsideofitbythefactofhisbeingconsciousthattheincreaseofpropertyisapureandabsoluteduty。

Inthesamewaythereisfulfilledbytheindividual，asaduty，whatotherpeoplecallviolenceandwrong-doing—thedutyofassertingone"sindependenceagainstothers:and，again，thedutyofpreservingone"slife，andthepossibilityofbeingusefultoone"sneighbours。Otherscallthiscowardice，butwhattheycallcouragereallyviolatesboththeseduties。Butcowardicemustnotbesostupidandclumsyasnottoknowthatthemaintenanceoflifeandthepossibilityofbeingusefultoothersareduties—soineptasnottobeconvincedofthedutifulnessofitsaction，andnottoknowthatdutifulnessconsistsinknowledge。Otherwiseitwouldcommitthestupidityofbeingimmoral。Sincemoralityliesintheconsciousnessofhavingfulfilledone"sduty，thiswillnotbelackingwhentheactioniswhatiscalledcowardiceanymorethanwhenitiswhatiscalledcourage。Astheabstractioncalled“duty“iscapableofeverycontent，itisquiteequaltothatofcowardice。Theagentknowswhathedoestobeduty，andsinceheknowsthis，andconvictionastodutyisjustdutifulness，heisthusrecognizedandacknowledgedbyothers。Theacttherebybecomesacceptedasvalidandhasactualexistence。

(1)TheUniversalityofConscienceItisofnoavailtoobjecttothisfreedom—whichputsanyandeverykindofcontentintothisuniversalinertreceptacleofpuredutyandpureknowledge—byassertingthatanothercontentoughttohavebeenputthere。Forwhateverthecontentbe，eachcontenthasuponitthestainofdeterminatenessfromwhichpureknowledgeisfree，whichpureknowledgecandespisejustasreadilyasitcantakeupeverydeterminatenessinturn。Everycontent，throughitsbeingdeterminate，standsonthesamefootingwitheveryother，eventhoughitseemstohavepreciselythecharacterthattheparticularityinthecontentiscancelled。Itmaywellseem—sinceinconcretecasesdutybreaksregularlyintoopposition，and，bydoingso，sunderstheoppositesindividualityanduniversality—thattheduty，whosecontentistheuniversalassuch，containsonthataccount，ipsofacto，thenatureofpureduty，andthatthusformandcontentarehereentirelyinaccord。Onthisview，itmightseemthat，e。g。actingfortheuniversalgood，forwhatisthebestforall，istobepreferredtoactingforwhatisthebestfortheindividual。Butthisuniversaldutyispreciselywhatispresentasself-containedactualsubstance，intheformof[established]lawandright，andholdsgoodindependentlyoftheindividual"sknowledgeandconvictionaswellasofhisimmediateinterest。Itisthuspreciselythatagainsttheformofwhichmoralityasawholeisdirected。Asregardsitscontent，however，thistooisdeterminateincharacter，insofarasthe“universallybest“

isopposedtothe“individualbest“。Consequently，itslawisonefromwhichconscienceknowsitselftobeabsolutelyfree，anditgivesitselftheabsoluteprivilegetoaddandpare，toneglectaswellasfulfilit。

Then，again，theabovedistinctionofdutytowardstheindividualanddutytowardstheuniversalisnotsomethingfixedandfinal，whenwelookatthenatureoftheoppositioninquestion。Onthecontrary，whattheindividualdoesforhimselfistotheadvantageoftheuniversalaswell。Themorehelooksafterhisowngood，notonlyistherethegreaterpossibilityofhisusefulnesstoothers:hisveryrealityconsistsmerelyinhislivingandexistinginconnexionwithothers。Hisindividualenjoymentmeansultimatelyandessentiallyputtingwhatishisownatthedisposalofothers，andhelpingthemtosecuretheirenjoyment。Infulfillingdutytoindividuals，andhencedutytoself，dutytothegeneralthusalsogetsfulfilled。Weighing，considering，comparingduties，shouldthisappearhere，wouldtakethelineofcalculatingtheadvantagewhichthegeneralwouldgetfromanygivenaction。Buttherecanbenosuchprocess；partlybecausemoralitywouldtherebybehandedovertotheinevitablecontingencycharacteristicofmere“insight“；partlybecauseitispreciselythenatureofconsciencetohavedonewithallthiscalculatingandweighingofduties，andtodecidedirectlyfromitselfwithoutanysuchreasons。

Inthisway，then，conscienceactsandmaintainsitselfintheunityofitsessentialbeinganditsobjectiveexistenceforitself，intheunityofpurethoughtandindividuality:itisspiritcertainofitself，whichinherentlypossessesitsowntruth，withinitself，initsknowledge，aknowledgeinthesenseofknowledgeofitsduty。Itmaintainsitsbeingthereinbythefactthatthepositiveelementintheact，thecontentaswellasformofdutyandtheknowledgeofduty，belongtotheself，tothecertaintyofitself。What，however，seekstocomebeforetheselfwithaninherentbeingofitsownisheldtobenottrulyreal，merelyatranscendedelement，onlyamoment。Consequently，itisnotuniversalknowledgeingeneralthathasavalue，butwhatisknownofthecircumstances。Itputsintoduty，whichistheuniversalimmanentessence，thecontentwhichitderivesfromitsnaturalindividuality；forthecontentisonethatispresentinitsownbeing。Thiscontent，invirtueoftheuniversalmediumwhereinitexists，becomesthedutywhichitcarriesout，andemptypuredutyis，throughthisveryfact，affirmedtobesomethingtranscended，amoment。Thiscontentisitsemptiness，transcendedandcancelled，i。e。isthefulfillingofpureduty。

Butatthesametimeconscienceisdetachedfromeverypossiblecontent。Itabsolvesitselffromeveryspecificduty，whichwouldtrytopassforalaw。Inthestrengthofitscertaintyofitself，ithasthemajestyofabsoluteself-sufficiency，ofabsolutearpklatobindortoloose。Thisself-determinationisatonce，therefore，absoluteconformitytoduty。Dutyistheknowledgeitself；

thispureandsimpleselfhood，however，istheimmanentprincipleandessence；forthisinherentprincipleispureself-identity，andself-identityliesinthisconsciousness。

Thispureknowledgeisimmediatelyobjective，isexistence-for-another；for，quapureself-identity，itisimmediacy，itisobjectivebeing。Thisbeing，however，isatthesametimepureuniversality，theselfhoodofall:inotherwords，actionisacknowledged，andhenceactual。Thisbeingformstheelementbywhichconsciencedirectlystandsonafootingofequalitywitheveryself-consciousness；

andthisrelationmeansnotanabstractimpersonallaw，buttheselfofconscience。

Inthatthisrightwhichconsciencedoesisatthesametime，however，afactforothers，adisparityseemstoaffectconscience。Thedutywhichitfulfilsisadeterminatecontent；thatcontentis，nodoubt，theselfofconsciousness，andsoitsknowledgeofitself，itsidentitywithitsself。Butwhenfulfilled，whenplantedinthegeneralelementofexistence，thisidentityisnolongerknowledge，nolongerthisprocessofdistinctionwhichdirectlyandatthesametimedoesawaywithitsdistinctions。Rather，inthesphereofhedistinctionissetupassubsistent，andtheactisadeterminatespecificone，notidenticalwiththeelementofeverybody"sself-consciousness，andhencenotnecessarilyacknowledgedandrecognized。Bothaspects，consciencequaacting，andthegeneralconsciousnessacknowledgingthisacttobeduty，standequallyloosefromthespecificcharacterbelongingtothisdeed。Onaccountofthisfreedomanddetachment，therelationofthetwowithinthecommonmediumoftheirconnexionisratherarelationshipofcompletedisparity—

asaresultofwhich，theconsciousness，whichisawareoftheact，findsitselfincompleteuncertaintyregardingthespiritwhichdoestheactandis“certainofitself“。Thisspiritactsandplacesinexistenceadeterminatecharacteristic；othersholdtothisexistence，asitstruth，andarethereincertainofthisspirit；ithasthereinexpressedwhatittakestobeitsduty。Butitisdetachedandfreefromanyspecificduty；ithas，therefore，leftthepointwhereotherpeoplethinkitactuallytobe；andthisverymediumofexistenceanddutyasinherentlyexistingareheldbyittobemerelytransitorymoments。Whatitthusplacesbeforethem，italso“displaces“again，orratherhas，eoipso，immediately“displaced“。Foritsrealityis，forit，notthedutyanddeterminatecontentthusputforward，butratheristherealitywhichithasinitsabsolutecertaintyofitself。

Theotherself-consciousnessesdonotknow，then，whetherthisparticularconscienceismorallygoodoriswicked；or，rather，notmerelycantheynotknowthisconscience，buttheymusttakeittobealsowicked。Forjustasitstandsloosetothedeterminatecontentofduty，anddetachedfromdutyasinherentlyexisting，sodotheylikewise。Whatitplacesbeforethem，theythemselvesknowhowto“displace“ordissemble:itissomethingexpressingmerelytheselfofanotherindividual，nottheirown:theydonotmerelyknowthemselvestobedetachedandfreefromit，buthavetoresolveandanalyseitwithintheirownconsciousness，reduceittonothingnessbyjudgmentsandexplanationsinordertopreservetheirownself。

Buttheactofconscienceisnotmerelythisdeterminationofexistence，adeterminatecontentforsakenbythepureself。Whatistobebindingandtoberecognizedasduty，onlyissothroughknowledgeandconvictionastoitsbeingduty，byknowledgeofselfinthedeeddone。Whenthedeedceasestohavethisselfinit，itceasestobewhatisaloneitsessentialnature。Itsexistence，ifdesertedbythisconsciousnessofself，wouldbeanordinaryreality，andtheactwouldappeartousawayoffulfillingone"spleasureanddesire。Whatoughttoexisthashereessentialityonlybyitsbeingknowntobeindividualitygivingitselfexpression。Anditsbeingthusknowniswhatisacknowledgedandrecognizedbyothers，andisthatwhichassuchoughttohaveexistence。

Theselfentersexistenceasself。Thespiritwhichiscertainofitselfexistsassuchforothers；itsimmediateactisnotwhatisvalidandreal；whatisacknowledgedbyothersis，notthedeterminateelement，nottheinherentbeing，butsolelyandsimplytheselfknowingitselfassuch。Theelementwhichgivespermanenceandstabilityisuniversalself-consciousness。Whatentersthiselementcannotbetheeffectoftheact:thelatterdoesnotlastthere，andacquiresnopermanence:onlyself-consciousnessiswhatisrecognizedandgainsconcretereality。

Hereagain，(4)then，weseeLanguagetobetheforminwhichspiritfindsexistence。Languageisself-consciousnessexistingforothers；itisself-consciousnesswhichassuchisthereimmediatelypresent，andwhichinitsindividualityisuniversal。Languageisselfseparatingitselffromitself，whichasthepureegoidenticalwithegobecomesanobjecttoitself，whichatoncemaintainsitselfinthisobjectiveformasthisactualself，andatthesametimefusesdirectlywithothersandistheirself-consciousness。Theselfperceivesitselfatthesametimethatitisperceivedbyothers:andthisperceivingisjustexistencewhichhasbecomeaself。

Thecontent，whichlanguagehashereobtained，isnolongertheselfwefoundintheworldofculture，perverted，perverting，anddistraught。Itisspiritwhich，havingreturnedtoitself，iscertainofitself，certaininitselfofitstruth，orofitsownactofrecognition，andwhichisrecognizedasthisknowledge。Thelanguageoftheethicalspiritofsocietyislaw，andsimplecommandandcomplaint，whichisbutatearshedovernecessity。Moralconsciousness，ontheotherhand，remainsdumb，shutupwithinitsinnerlife；forselfhasnoexistenceasyetinitscase:ratherexistenceandselftherestandasyetonlyinexternalrelationtoeachother。Language，however，comesforwardmerelyasthemediatingelementonlybetweenself-consciousnessesindependentandrecognized；andtheexistentselfmeansimmediatelyuniversalrecognition，meansmanifoldrecognitionandinthisverymanifoldnesssimplerecognition。Whatthelanguageofconsciencecontainsistheselfknowingitselfasessentialreality。Thisaloneiswhatthatlanguageexpresses，andthisexpressionisthetruerealizationof“doing“，ofaction，andisthevalidationoftheact。

Consciousnessexpressesitsconviction:inthisconvictionaloneistheactionduty:itholdsgoodasduty，too，solelybytheconvictionbeingexpressed。Foruniversalself-consciousnessstandsdetachedfromthespecificactwhichmerelyexists:theactquaexistencemeansnothingtoit:whatitholdsofimportanceistheconvictionthattheactisaduty；andthisappearsconcretelyinlanguage。

Torealizetheactmeansherenottranslatingitscontentfromtheformofpurpose，orself-existence，intotheformofabstractreality:itmeanstranslatingitfromtheformofimmediatecertaintyofself，whichtakesitsknowledge，itsself-existence，tobetheessentialfact，intotheformoftheassurancethatconsciousnessisconvincedofitsduty，and，beingconscience，knowsofitselfwhatdutyis。Thisassurancethusguaranteesthatconsciousnessisconvincedofitsconvictionbeingtheessentialfact。

Whethertheassurance，thatitactsfromconvictionofduty，istrue，whetheritreallyisdutywhichisdone—thesequestionsordoubtshavenomeaningasdirectedagainstconscience。Inthecaseofthequestion，whethertheassuranceistrue，itwouldbeassumedthattheinnerattentionisdifferentfromtheoneputforward，i。e。thatthewillingoftheindividualselfcanbeseparatedfromduty，fromthewilloftheuniversalandpureconsciousness:thelatterwillwouldinthatcasebeamatterofwords，whiletheformerwouldbestrictlytherealmovingprincipleoftheact。Butsuchadistinctionbetweentheuniversalconsciousnessandtheindividualselfispreciselywhathasbeencancelled，andthesupersedingofitconstitutesconscience。Immediateknowledgeonthepartofselfwhichiscertainofitselfislawandduty。Itsintention，bybeingitsownintention，iswhatisright。Allthatisrequiredisthatitshouldknowthis，andstateitsconvictionthatitsknowledgeandwillaretheright。Theexpressionofthisassuranceipsofactocancelstheformofitsparticularity。Itrecognizestherebythenecessaryuniversalityoftheself。Inthatitcallsitselfconscience，itcallsitselfpureself-knowledgeandpureabstractwill，i。e。itcallsitselfauniversalknowledgeandwillwhichacknowledgesandrecognizesothers，islikethem—fortheyarejustthispureself-knowledgeandwill—andwhichisonthataccountalsorecognizedbythem。Inthewillingoftheselfwhichiscertainofitself，inthisknowledgeoftheselfastheessentialreality，liestheessenceoftheright。

Whenanyonesays，therefore，heisactingfromconscience，heissayingwhatistrue，forhisconscienceistheselfwhichknowsandwills。Butitisessentialheshouldsayso，forthisselfhastobeatthesametimeuniversalself。Itisnotuniversalinthecontentoftheact:forthiscontentisperseindifferentonaccountofitsbeingspecificanddeterminate。Theuniversalityliesintheformoftheact。Itisthisformwhichistobeaffirmedasreal:theformistheself，whichassuchisactualinlanguage，pronouncesitselftobethetruth，andjustbysodoingacknowledgesallotherselves，andisrecognizedbythem。

Conscience，then，initsmajesticsublimityaboveanyspecificlawandeverycontentofduty，putswhatevercontentitpleasesintoitsknowledgeandwilling。Itismoralgeniusandoriginality，whichknowstheinnervoiceofitsimmediateknowledgetobeavoicedivine；andsinceinsuchknowledgeitdirectlyknowsexistenceaswell，itisdivinecreativepower，whichcontainslivingforceinitsveryconception。Itisinitself，too，divineworship，“serviceofGod“，foritsactionisthecontemplationofthisitsownproperdivinity。

Thissolitaryworship，this“serviceofGod“insolitudeofsoul，isatthesametimeessentially“serviceofGod“ontheartofareligiouscommunity；andpureinwardself-knowledgeandperceptionofselfpasstobeingamomentofconsciousness。(5)Contemplationofitselfisitsobjectiveexistence，andthisobjectiveelementistheutteranceofitsknowledgeandwillasauniversal。Throughsuchexpressiontheselfbecomesestablishedandaccepted，andtheactbecomesaneffectivedeed，adeedcarryingoutadefiniteresult。Whatgivesrealityandsubsistencetoitsdeedisuniversalself-consciousness。When，however，consciencefindsexpression，thisputsthecertaintyofitselfintheformofpureselfandtherebyasuniversalself。

Otherslettheactholdasvalid，owingtotheexplicittermsinwhichtheselfisthusexpressedandacknowledgedtobetheessentialreality。Thespiritandthesubstanceoftheircommunityare，thus，themutualassuranceoftheirconscientiousness，oftheirgoodintentions，therejoicingoverthisreciprocalpurityofpurpose，thequickeningandrefreshmentreceivedfromthegloriousprivilegeofknowingandofexpressing，offosteringandcherishing，astatesoaltogetheradmirable。

Sofarasthissphereofconsciencestilldistinguishesitsabstractconsciousnessfromitsself-consciousness，itslifeismerelyhidinGod。Godisindeedimmediatelypresenttoitsmindandheart，toitsself。Butwhatisrevealed，itsactualconsciousnessandthemediatingprocessofthisconsciousness，is，toit，somethingotherthanthathiddeninnerlifeandtheimmediacyofGod"spresence。But，withthecompletionofconscience，thedistinctionbetweenitsabstractconsciousnessanditsself-consciousnessisdoneaway。Itknowsthattheabstractconsciousnessisjustthisself，thisindividualself-existencewhichiscertainofitself:thattheverydifferencebetweenthetermsisabolishedintheimmediatenessoftherelationoftheselftotheultimateBeing，which，whenplacedoutsidetheself，istheabstractessence，andaBeingconcealedfromit。Forarelationismediatewhenthetermsrelatedarenotoneandthesame，buteachisadifferenttermfortheother，andisoneonlywiththeotherinsomethirdterm:animmediaterelation，however，means，infact，nothingelsethantheunityoftheterms。Havingrisenabovethemeaninglesspositionofholdingthesedistinctions，whicharenotdistinctionsatall，tobestillsuch，consciousnessknowstheimmediatenessofthepresenceofultimateBeingwithinittobetheunityofthatBeinganditsself:itthusknowsitselftobethelivinginherentreality，andknowsitsknowledgetobeReligion，which，quaknowledgeviewedasanobjectorknowledgewithanobjectiveexistence，istheutteranceofthereligiouscommunionregardingitsownspirit。

Weseethen，here，self-consciousnesswithdrawnintotheinmostretreatsofitsbeing，withallexternality，assuch，goneandvanishedfromit—returnedintotheintuitionofegoasaltogetheridenticalwithego，anintuitionwherethisegoisallthatisessential，andallthatexists。Itisswampedinthisconceptionofitself；forithasbeendriventotheextremelimitofitsextremepositions，andinsuchawaythatthemomentsdistinguished，momentsthroughwhichitisrealorstillconsciousness，arenotmerelyforusthesebareextremes；ratherwhatitisforitself，andwhat，toit，isinherent，andwhatis，forit，existence—allthesemomentshaveevaporatedintoabstractions。Theyhavenolongerstability，nosubstantialexistenceforthisconsciousnessitself。

Everything，thatwashithertoforconsciousnessessential，hasrevertedintotheseabstractions。

Whenclarifiedtothisdegreeoftransparency，consciousnessexistsinitspoorestform，andthepoverty，constitutingitssoleandonlypossession，isitselfaprocessofdisappearance。Thisabsolutecertaintyintowhichthesubstancehasbeenresolvedisabsoluteuntruth，whichcollapseswithinitself；itisabsoluteself-consciousness，inwhichconsciousness[withitsrelationofselfandobject]issubmergedandgoesunder。

Lookingatthissubmergenceanddisappearancefromwithin，theinherentandessentialsubstanceis，forconsciousness，，knowledgeinthesenseofitsknowledge。Beingconsciousness，itissplitupintotheoppositionbetweenitselfandtheobject，whichis，forit，theessentiallyreal。Butthisveryobjectiswhatisperfectlytransparent，isitsself；anditsconsciousnessismerelyknowledgeofitself。Alllifeandallspiritualtruthhavereturnedintothisself，andhavelosttheirdifferencefromtheego。Themomentsofconsciousnessarethereforetheseextremeabstractions，ofwhichnoneholdsitsground，buteachlosesitselfintheotherandproducesit。Wehaveheretheprocessofthe“unhappysoul“，(6)inrestlesschangewithself；inthepresentcase，however，thisisaconsciousexperiencegoingoninsideitself，fullyconsciousofbeingthenotionofreason，whilethe“unhappysoul“abovespokenofwasonlyreasonimplicitly。Theabsolutecertaintyofselfthusfindsitself，quaconsciousness，converteddirectlyintoadyingsound，amereobjectificationofitssubjectivityorself-existence。Butthisworldsocreatedistheutteranceofitsownvoice，whichinlikemannerithasdirectlyheard，andonlytheechoofwhichreturnstoit。Thisreturndoesnotthereforemeanthattheselfisthereinitstruereality(anundfürsich):fortherealis，forit，notaninherentbeing，isnoperse，butitsveryself。Justaslittlehasconsciousnessitselfexistence，fortheobjectiveaspectdoesnotsucceedinbecomingsomethingnegativeoftheactualself，inthesamewayasthisselfdoesnotreachcompleteactuality。Itlacksforcetoexternalizeitself，thepowertomakeitselfathing，andendureexistence。Itlivesindreadofstainingtheradianceofitsinnerbeingbyactionandexistence。Andtopreservethepurityofitsheart，itfleesfromcontactwithactuality，andsteadfastlyperseveresinastateofself-willedimpotencetorenounceaselfwhichisparedawaytothelastpointofabstraction，andtogiveitselfsubstantialexistence，or，inotherwords，totransformitsthoughtintobeing，andcommititselftoabsolutedistinction[thatbetweenthoughtandbeing]。

Thehollowobject，whichitproduces，nowfillsit，therefore，withthefeelingofemptiness。Itsactivityconsistsinyearning，whichmerelylosesitselfinbecominganunsubstantialshadowyobject，and，risingabovethislossandfallingbackonitself，findsitselfmerelyaslost。Inthistransparentpurityofitsmomentsitbecomesasorrow-laden“beautifulsoul“，asitiscalled；itslightdimsanddieswithinit，anditvanishesasashapelessvapourdissolvingintothinair。(7)

Thissilentfusionofthepithlessunsubstantialelementsofevaporatedlifehas，however，stilltobetakenintheothersenseoftherealityofconscience，andinthewayitsprocessactuallyappears。

Consciencehastobeconsideredasacting。Theobjectivemomentinthisphaseofconsciousnesstookabovethedeterminateformofuniversalconsciousness。Theknowingofselfis，quathisparticularself，differentfromtheotherself。Languageinwhichallreciprocallyrecognizeandacknowledgeeachotherasactingconscientiously—thisgeneralequalitybreaksupintotheinequalityofeachindividualexistingforhimself；eachconsciousnessisjustasmuchreflectedoutofitsuniversalityabsolutelyintoitselfasitisuniversal。Bythismeanstherenecessarilycomesabouttheoppositionofindividualitytootherindividualsandtotheuniversal。Andthisrelationanditsprocesswehavetoconsider。

Or，again，thisuniversalityanddutyhavetheabsolutelyoppositesignificance；theysignifydeterminateindividuality，exemptingitselffromwhatisuniversal，individualitywhichlooksonpuredutyasuniversalitythathasappearedmerelyonthesurfaceandisturnedoutwards:“dutyismerelyamatterofwords“，andpassesforthatwhosebeingisforsomethingelse。Conscience，whichinthefirstinstancetakesupmerelyanegativeattitudetowardsduty，quaagivendeterminateduty，knowsitselfdetachedfromit。Butsinceconsciencefillsemptydutywithadeterminatecontentdrawnfromitsownself，itispositivelyawareofthefactthatit，quathisparticularself，makesitsowncontent。Itspureself，asitisemptyknowledge，iswithoutcontentandwithoutdefiniteness。Thecontentwhichitsuppliestothatknowledgeisdrawnfromitsownself，quathisdeterminateself，isdrawnfromitselfasanaturalindividuality。Inaffirmingtheconscientiousnessofitsaction，itisdoubtlessawareofitspureself，butinthepurposeofitsaction—apurposewhichbringsinaconcretecontent—itisconsciousofitselfasthisparticularindividual，andisconsciousoftheoppositionbetweenwhatitisforitselfandwhatitisforothers，oftheoppositionofuniversalityordutyanditsstateofbeingreflectedintoselfawayfromtheuniversal。

(3)EvilandForgivenessWhileinthiswaytheopposition，intowhichconsciencepasseswhenitacts，findsexpressioninitsinnerlife，theoppositionisatthesametimedisparityonitsouterside，inthesphereofexistence—

thelackofcorrespondenceofitsparticularindividualitywithreferencetoanotherindividual。Itsspecialpeculiarityconsistsinthefactthatthetwoelementsconstitutingitsconsciousness—viz。theselfandtheinherentnature(Ansich)—areunequalinvalueandsignificancewithinit；aninequalityinwhichtheyaresodeterminedthatcertaintyofselfistheessentialfactasagainsttheinherentnature，ortheuniversal，whichistakentobemerelyamoment。Overagainstthisinternaldeterminationtherethusstandstheelementofexistence，theuniversalconsciousness；forthislatteritisratheruniversality，duty，thatistheessentialfact，whileindividuality，whichexistsforitselfandisopposedtotheuniversal，hasmerelythevalueofasupersededmoment。ThefirstconsciousnessisheldtobeEvilbytheconsciousnesswhichthusstandsbythefactofduty，becauseofthelackofcorrespondenceofitsinternalsubjectivelifewiththeuniversal；andsinceatthesametimethefirstconsciousnessdeclaresitsacttobecongruencywithitself，tobedutyandconscientiousnessitisheldbythatuniversalconsciousnesstobeHypocrisy。

Thecoursetakenbythisoppositionis，inthefirstinstance，theformalestablishmentofcorrespondencebetweenwhattheevilconsciousnessisinitsownnatureandwhatitexpresslysays。Ithastobemademanifestthatitisevil，anditsobjectiveexistencethusmadecongruentwithitsrealnature；thehypocrisymustbeunmasked。Thisreturnofthediscordance，presentinhypocrisy，intothestateofcorrespondenceisnotatoncebroughttopassbythemerefactthat，aspeopleusuallysay，hypocrisyjustprovesitsreverencefordutyandvirtuethroughassumingtheappearanceofthem，andusingthisasamasktohideitselffromitsownconsciousnessnolessthanfromanother—asif，inthisacknowledgmentandrecognitioninitselfofitsopposite，eoipsocongruencyandagreementwereimpliedandcontained。Yeteventhenitisjustastrulydonewiththisrecognitioninwordsandisreflectedintoself；andintheveryfactofitsusingtheinherentandessentialrealitymerelyassomethingwhichhasasignificanceforanotherconsciousness，thereisreallyimplieditsowncontemptforthatinherentprinciple，andthedemonstrationoftheworthlessnessofthatrealityforall。Forwhatletsitselfbeusedasanexternalinstrumentshowsitselftobeathing，whichhaswithinitnoproperweightandworthofitsown。

Moreover，thiscorrespondenceisnotbroughtabouteitherbytheevilconsciousnesspersistingonesidedlyinitsownstate，orbythejudgmentoftheuniversalconsciousness。Iftheformerdeniesitselfasagainsttheconsciousnessofduty，andmaintainsthatwhatthelatterpronouncestobebaseness，tobeabsolutediscordancewithuniversality，isanactionaccordingtoinnerlawandconscience，then，inthisonesidedassuranceofidentityandconcord，therestillremainsitsdiscordancewiththeother，sincethisotheruniversalconsciousnesscertainlydoesnotbelievetheassuranceanddoesnotacknowledgeit。Inotherwords，sinceonesidedinsistenceononeextremedestroysitself，evilwouldindeedtherebyconfesstobeingevil，butinsodoingwouldatoncecancelitselfandceasetobehypocrisy，andsowouldnotquahypocrisybeunmasked。Itconfessesitself，infact，tobeevilbyassertingthat，whileopposingwhatisrecognizedasuniversal，itactsaccordingtoitsowninnerlawandconscience。Forwerethislawandconsciencenotthelawofitsindividualityandcaprice，itwouldnotbesomethinginward，somethingprivate，butwhatisuniversallyacceptedandacknowledged。When，therefore，anyonesaysheactstowardsothersfromalawandconscienceofhisown，heissaying，inpointoffact，thatheisabusingandwrongingthem。Butactualconscienceisnotthisinsistenceonaknowledgeandawillwhichareopposedtowhatisuniversal；theuniversalistheelementofitsexistence，anditsverylanguagepronouncesitsactiontoberecognizedduty。

Justaslittle，whentheuniversalconsciousnesspersistsinitsownjudgment，doesthisunmaskanddissipatehypocrisy。Whenthatuniversalconsciousnessstigmatizeshypocrisyasbad，base，andsoon，itappeals，inpassingsuchajudgment，toitsownlaw，justastheevilconsciousnessappealstoitslaw。Fortheformerlawmakesitsappearanceinoppositiontothelatter，andtherebyasaparticularlaw。Ithas，therefore，noantecedentclaimovertheotherlaw；ratheritlegitimizesthisotherlaw。Hencetheuniversalconsciousness，byitszealinabusinghypocrisy，doespreciselytheoppositeofwhatitmeanstodo:foritshowsthatitsso-called“trueduty“，whichoughttobeuniversallyacknowledged，issomethingnotacknowledgedandrecognized，andconsequentlyitgrantsotheranequalrightofindependentlyexistingonitsownaccount。

Thisjudgment[ofuniversalconsciousness]，however，has，atthesametime，anothersidetoit，fromwhichitleadsthewaytothedissolutionoftheoppositioninquestion。Consciousnessoftheuniversaldoesnotproceed，quarealandquaacting，todealwiththeevilconsciousness；forthislatter，rather，isthereal。Inopposingthelatter，itisaconsciousnesswhichisnotentangledintheoppositionofindividualanduniversalinvolvedinaction。Itstayswithintheuniversalityofthought，takesuptheattitudeofanapprehendingintelligence，anditsfirstactismerelythatofjudgment。

Throughthisjudgmentitnowplacesitself，aswasjustobserved，alongsidethefirstconsciousness，andthelatterthroughthislikenessbetweenthem，comestoseeitselfinthisotherconsciousness。

Fortheconsciousnessofdutymaintainsthepassiveattitudeofapprehension。Therebyitisincontradictionwithitselfastheabsolutewillofduty，astheselfthatdeterminesabsolutelyfromitself。Itmaywellpreserveitselfinitspurity，foritdoesnotact；itishypocrisy，whichwantstoseethefactofjudgingtakenfortheactualdeed，andinsteadofprovingitsuprightnessandhonestybyactsdoessobyexpressingfinesentiments。Itisthusconstitutedentirelyinthesamewayasthatagainstwhich。thereproachismadeofputtingitsphrasesinplaceofduty。Inbothaliketheaspectofrealityisdistinctfromtheexpressstatements—intheoneowingtotheselfishpurposeoftheaction，intheotherthroughfailuretoactatall，althoughthenecessityofactingisinvolvedintheveryspeakingofduty，fordutywithoutdeedsisaltogethermeaningless。

Theactofjudging，however，hasalsotobelookedatasapositiveactofthoughtandhasapositivecontent:thisaspectmakesthecontradictionpresentintheapprehendingconsciousness，anditsidentitywiththefirstconsciousness，stillmorecomplete。Theactiveconsciousnessdeclaresitsspecificdeedtobeitsduty，andtheconsciousnessthatpassesjudgmentcannotdenythis；fordutyassuchisformvoidofallcontentandcapableofany。Inotherwords，concreteaction，inherentlyimplyingdiversityinitsmanysidedness，involvestheuniversalaspect，whichisthatwhichistakenasduty，justasmuchastheparticular，whichconstitutestheshareandinteresttheindividualhasintheact。Nowthejudgingconsciousnessdoesnotstopattheformeraspectofdutyandrestcontentwiththeknowledgewhichtheactiveagenthasofthis，viz。thatthisishisduty，theconditionandthestatusofhisreality。Itholdsontotheotheraspect，divertstheactintotheinnerrealm，andexplainstheactfromselfishmotivesandfromitsinnerintention，anintentiondifferentfromtheactitself。Aseveryactiscapableoftreatmentinrespectofitsdutifulness，so，too，eachcanbeconsideredfromthisotherpointofviewofparticularity；forasanactitistherealityofanindividual。

Thisprocessofjudging，then，takestheactoutofthesphereofitsobjectiveexistence，andturnsitbackintotheinnersubjectivesphere，intotheformofprivateorindividualparticularity。Iftheactcarriesglorywithit，thentheinnersphereisjudgedasloveoffame。Ifitisaltogetherconformitywiththepositionoftheindividual，withoutgoingbeyondthisposition，andissoconstitutedthattheindividualityinquestiondoesnothavethepositionattachedtoitasanexternalfeature，butthroughitselfsuppliesconcretefillingtothisuniversality，andbythatveryprocessshowsitselftobecapableofahigherstation-thentheinnernatureoftheactisjudgedasambition；andsoon。Since，intheactingeneral，theindividualwhoactscomestoseehimselfinobjectiveform，orgetsthefeelingofhisownbeinginhisobjectiveexistenceandthusattainsenjoyment，thejudgmentontheactfindstheinnernatureofittobeanimpulsetowardspersonalhappiness，eventhoughthishappinessweretoconsistmerelyininnermoralvanity，theenjoymentofasenseofpersonalexcellence，andintheforetasteandhopeofahappinesstocome。

Noactcanescapebeingjudgedinsuchaway；for“dutyforduty"ssake“，thispurepurpose，issomethingunreal。Whatrealityithasliesinthedeedofsomeindividuality，andtheactiontherebyhasinittheaspectofparticularity。Noheroisaherotohisvalet，not，however，becausetheheroisnotahero，butbecausethevaletis—thevalet，withwhomtheherohastodo，notasahero，butasamanwhoeats，drinks，anddresses，who，inshort，appearsasaprivateindividualwithcertainpersonalwantsandideasofhisown。Inthesameway，thereisnoactinwhichthatprocessofjudgmentcannotopposethepersonalaspectoftheindividualitytotheuniversalaspectoftheact，andplaythepartofthe“moral“valettowardstheagent。(8)

Theconsciousness，thatsopassesjudgment，isinconsequenceitselfbaseandmean，becauseitdividestheactup，andproducesandholdstotheact"sself-discordance。Itis，furthermore，hypocrisy，becauseitgivesoutthiswayofjudging，notasanotherfashionofbeingwicked，butasthecorrectconsciousnessoftheact；setsitselfup，initsunreality，inthisvanityofknowingwellandbetter，farabovethedeedsitdecries；andwantstofinditsmerewordswithoutdeedstakenforanadmirablekindofreality。

Onthisaccount，then，puttingitselfonalevelwiththeagentonwhomitpassesjudgment，itisrecognizedbythelatterasthesameashimself。Thislatterdoesnotmerelyfindhimselfapprehendedassomethingaliento，anddiscordantwith，thatother:butratherfindstheotherinitspeculiarconstitutivecharacteridenticalwithhimself。Seeingthisidentityandgivingthisexpression，heopenlyconfesseshimselftotheother，andexpectsinlikemannerthattheother，havinginpointoffactputitselfonthesamelevel，willrespondinthesamelanguage，willthereingivevoicetothisidentity，andthatthusthestateofmutualrecognitionwillbebroughtabout。Hisconfessionisnotanattitudeofabasementorhumiliationbeforetheother，isnotthrowinghimselfaway。Fortogivethematterexpressioninthiswayhasnottheone-sidedcharacterwhichwouldfixandestablishhisdisparitywiththeother:onthecontrary，itissolelybecauseofseeingtheidentityoftheotherwithhimthathegiveshimselfutterance。Inmakinghisconfessionheannounces，fromhisside，theircommonidentity，anddoessoforthereasonthatlanguageistheexistenceofspiritasanimmediateself。Hethusexpectsthattheotherwillmakeitsowncontributiontothismannerofexistence。