第8章

17。Cohesionofsolidpartsandimpulse，theprimaryideaspeculiartobody。Theprimaryideaswehavepeculiartobody，ascontradistinguishedtospirit，arethecohesionofsolid，andconsequentlyseparable，parts，andapowerofcommunicatingmotionbyimpulse。These，Ithink，aretheoriginalideasproperandpeculiartobody；forfigureisbuttheconsequenceoffiniteextension。

18。Thinkingandmotivitytheprimaryideaspeculiartospirit。

Theideaswehavebelongingandpeculiartospirit，arethinking，andwill，orapowerofputtingbodyintomotionbythought，and，whichisconsequenttoit，liberty。For，asbodycannotbutcommunicateitsmotionbyimpulsetoanotherbody，whichitmeetswithatrest，sothemindcanputbodiesintomotion，orforbeartodoso，asitpleases。Theideasofexistence，duration，andmobility，arecommontothemboth。

19。Spiritscapableofmotion。Thereisnoreasonwhyitshouldbethoughtstrange，thatImakemobilitybelongtospirit；forhavingnootherideaofmotion，butchangeofdistancewithotherbeingsthatareconsideredasatrest；andfindingthatspirits，aswellasbodies，cannotoperatebutwheretheyare；andthatspiritsdooperateatseveraltimesinseveralplaces，Icannotbutattributechangeofplacetoallfinitespirits:(foroftheInfiniteSpiritIspeaknothere)。Formysoul，beingarealbeingaswellasmybody，iscertainlyascapableofchangingdistancewithanyotherbody，orbeing，asbodyitself；andsoiscapableofmotion。Andifamathematiciancanconsideracertaindistance，orachangeofthatdistancebetweentwopoints，onemaycertainlyconceiveadistance，andachangeofdistance，betweentwospirits；andsoconceivetheirmotion，theirapproachorremoval，onefromanother。

20。Proofofthis。Everyonefindsinhimselfthathissoulcanthink，will，andoperateonhisbodyintheplacewherethatis，butcannotoperateonabody，orinaplace，anhundredmilesdistantfromit。NobodycanimaginethathissoulcanthinkormoveabodyatOxford，whilstheisatLondon；andcannotbutknow，that，beingunitedtohisbody，itconstantlychangesplaceallthewholejourneybetweenOxfordandLondon，asthecoachorhorsedoesthatcarrieshim，andIthinkmaybesaidtobetrulyallthatwhileinmotion:orifthatwillnotbeallowedtoaffordusaclearideaenoughofitsmotion，itsbeingseparatedfromthebodyindeath，I

think，will；fortoconsideritasgoingoutofthebody，orleavingit，andyettohavenoideaofitsmotion，seemstomeimpossible。

21。Godimmoveable，becauseinfinite。Ifitbesaidbyanyonethatitcannotchangeplace，becauseithathnone，forthespiritsarenotinloco，butubi；Isupposethatwayoftalkingwillnotnowbeofmuchweighttomany，inanagethatisnotmuchdisposedtoadmire，orsufferthemselvestobedeceivedbysuchunintelligiblewaysofspeaking。Butifanyonethinksthereisanysenseinthatdistinction，andthatitisapplicabletoourpresentpurpose，I

desirehimtoputitintointelligibleEnglish；andthenfromthencedrawareasontoshowthatimmaterialspiritsarenotcapableofmotion。IndeedmotioncannotbeattributedtoGod；notbecauseheisanimmaterial，butbecauseheisaninfinitespirit。

22。Ourcomplexideaofanimmaterialspiritandourcomplexideaofbodycompared。Letuscompare，then，ourcomplexideaofanimmaterialspiritwithourcomplexideaofbody，andseewhethertherebeanymoreobscurityinonethanintheother，andinwhichmost。Ourideaofbody，asIthink，isanextendedsolidsubstance，capableofcommunicatingmotionbyimpulse:andourideaofsoul，asanimmaterialspirit，isofasubstancethatthinks，andhasapowerofexcitingmotioninbody，bywilling，orthought。These，Ithink，areourcomplexideasofsoulandbody，ascontradistinguished；andnowletusexaminewhichhasmostobscurityinit，anddifficultytobeapprehended。Iknowthatpeoplewhosethoughtsareimmersedinmatter，andhavesosubjectedtheirmindstotheirsensesthattheyseldomreflectonanythingbeyondthem，areapttosay，theycannotcomprehendathinkingthing，whichperhapsistrue:butIaffirm，whentheyconsideritwell，theycannomorecomprehendanextendedthing。

23。Cohesionofsolidpartsinbodyashardtobeconceivedasthinkinginasoul。Ifanyonesaysheknowsnotwhatitisthinksinhim，hemeansheknowsnotwhatthesubstanceisofthatthinkingthing:Nomore，sayI，knowshewhatthesubstanceisofthatsolidthing。Further，ifhesaysheknowsnothowhethinks，Ianswer，Neitherknowshehowheisextended，howthesolidpartsofbodyareunited，orcoheretogethertomakeextension。Forthoughthepressureoftheparticlesofairmayaccountforthecohesionofseveralpartsofmatterthataregrosserthantheparticlesofair，andhaveporeslessthanthecorpusclesofair，yettheweightorpressureoftheairwillnotexplain，norcanbeacauseofthecoherenceoftheparticlesofairthemselves。Andifthepressureoftheaether，oranysubtilermatterthantheair，mayunite，andholdfasttogether，thepartsofaparticleofair，aswellasotherbodies，yetitcannotmakebondsforitself，andholdtogetherthepartsthatmakeupeverytheleastcorpuscleofthatmateriasubtilis。

Sothatthathypothesis，howingeniouslysoeverexplained，byshowingthatthepartsofsensiblebodiesareheldtogetherbythepressureofotherexternalinsensiblebodies，reachesnotthepartsoftheaetheritself；andbyhowmuchthemoreevidentitproves，thatthepartsofotherbodiesareheldtogetherbytheexternalpressureoftheaether，andcanhavenootherconceivablecauseoftheircohesionandunion，bysomuchthemoreitleavesusinthedarkconcerningthecohesionofthepartsofthecorpusclesoftheaetheritself:whichwecanneitherconceivewithoutparts，theybeingbodies，anddivisible，noryethowtheirpartscohere，theywantingthatcauseofcohesionwhichisgivenofthecohesionofthepartsofallotherbodies。

24。Notexplainedbyanambientfluid。But，intruth，thepressureofanyambientfluid，howgreatsoever，canbenointelligiblecauseofthecohesionofthesolidpartsofmatter。For，thoughsuchapressuremayhindertheavulsionoftwopolishedsuperficies，onefromanother，inalineperpendiculartothem，asintheexperimentoftwopolishedmarbles；yetitcanneverintheleasthindertheseparationbyamotion，inalineparalleltothosesurfaces。

Becausetheambientfluid，havingafulllibertytosucceedineachpointofspace，desertedbyalateralmotion，resistssuchamotionofbodies，sojoined，nomorethanitwouldresistthemotionofthatbodywereitonallsidesenvironedbythatfluid，andtouchednootherbody；andtherefore，iftherewerenoothercauseofcohesion，allpartsofbodiesmustbeeasilyseparablebysuchalateralslidingmotion。Forifthepressureoftheaetherbetheadequatecauseofcohesion，whereverthatcauseoperatesnot，therecanbenocohesion。Andsinceitcannotoperateagainstalateralseparation，(ashasbeenshown)，thereforeineveryimaginaryplane，intersectinganymassofmatter，therecouldbenomorecohesionthanoftwopolishedsurfaces，whichwillalways，notwithstandinganyimaginablepressureofafluid，easilyslideonefromanother。

Sothatperhaps，howclearanideasoeverwethinkwehaveoftheextensionofbody，whichisnothingbutthecohesionofsolidparts，hethatshallwellconsideritinhismind，mayhavereasontoconclude，Thatitisaseasyforhimtohaveaclearideahowthesoulthinksashowbodyisextended。For，sincebodyisnofurther，norotherwise，extended，thanbytheunionandcohesionofitssolidparts，weshallveryillcomprehendtheextensionofbody，withoutunderstandingwhereinconsiststheunionandcohesionofitsparts；

whichseemstomeasincomprehensibleasthemannerofthinking，andhowitisperformed。

25。Wecanaslittleunderstandhowthepartscohereinextension，ashowourspiritsperceiveormove。Iallowitisusualformostpeopletowonderhowanyoneshouldfindadifficultyinwhattheythinktheyeverydayobserve。Dowenotsee(willtheybereadytosay)thepartsofbodiesstickfirmlytogether？Isthereanythingmorecommon？Andwhatdoubtcantherebemadeofit？Andthelike，Isay，concerningthinkingandvoluntarymotion。Dowenoteverymomentexperimentitinourselves，andthereforecanitbedoubted？Thematteroffactisclear，Iconfess；butwhenwewouldalittlenearerlookintoit，andconsiderhowitisdone，thereIthinkweareataloss，bothintheoneandtheother；andcanaslittleunderstandhowthepartsofbodycohere，ashowweourselvesperceiveormove。

Iwouldhaveanyoneintelligiblyexplaintome，howthepartsofgold，orbrass，(thatbutnowinfusionwereasloosefromoneanotherastheparticlesofwater，orthesandsofanhour-glass)，comeinafewmomentstobesounited，andadheresostronglyonetoanother，thattheutmostforceofmen’sarmscannotseparatethem？A

consideringmanwill，Isuppose，behereatalosstosatisfyhisown，oranotherman’sunderstanding。

26。Thecauseofcoherenceofatomsinextendedsubstancesincomprehensible。Thelittlebodiesthatcomposethatfluidwecallwater，aresoextremelysmall，thatIhaveneverheardofanyone，who，byamicroscope，(andyetIhaveheardofsomethathavemagnifiedtotenthousand；nay，tomuchaboveahundredthousandtimes)，pretendedtoperceivetheirdistinctbulk，figure，ormotion；andtheparticlesofwaterarealsosoperfectlylooseonefromanother，thattheleastforcesensiblyseparatesthem。Nay，ifweconsidertheirperpetualmotion，wemustallowthemtohavenocohesiononewithanother；andyetletbutasharpcoldcome，andtheyunite，theyconsolidate；theselittleatomscohere，andarenot，withoutgreatforce，separable。Hethatcouldfindthebondsthattietheseheapsoflooselittlebodiestogethersofirmly；hethatcouldmakeknownthecementthatmakesthemsticksofastonetoanother，woulddiscoveragreatandyetunknownsecret:andyetwhenthatwasdone，wouldhebefarenoughfrommakingtheextensionofbody(whichisthecohesionofitssolidparts)intelligible，tillhecouldshowwhereinconsistedtheunion，orconsolidationofthepartsofthosebonds，orofthatcement，oroftheleastparticleofmatterthatexists。Wherebyitappearsthatthisprimaryandsupposedobviousqualityofbodywillbefound，whenexamined，tobeasincomprehensibleasanythingbelongingtoourminds，andasolidextendedsubstanceashardtobeconceivedasathinkingimmaterialone，whateverdifficultiessomewouldraiseagainstit。

27。Thesupposedpressurebroughttoexplaincohesionisunintelligible。For，toextendourthoughtsalittlefurther，thatpressurewhichisbroughttoexplainthecohesionofbodiesisasunintelligibleasthecohesionitself。Forifmatterbeconsidered，asnodoubtitis，finite，letanyonesendhiscontemplationtotheextremitiesoftheuniverse，andthereseewhatconceivablehoops，whatbondhecanimaginetoholdthismassofmatterinsocloseapressuretogether；fromwhencesteelhasitsfirmness，andthepartsofadiamondtheirhardnessandindissolubility。Ifmatterbefinite，itmusthaveitsextremes；andtheremustbesomethingtohinderitfromscatteringasunder。If，toavoidthisdifficulty，anyonewillthrowhimselfintothesuppositionandabyssofinfinitematter，lethimconsiderwhatlighthetherebybringstothecohesionofbody，andwhetherhebeeverthenearermakingitintelligible，byresolvingitintoasuppositionthemostabsurdandmostincomprehensibleofallother:sofarisourextensionofbody(whichisnothingbutthecohesionofsolidparts)frombeingclearer，ormoredistinct，whenwewouldinquireintothenature，cause，ormannerofit，thantheideaofthinking。

28。Communicationofmotionbyimpulse，orbythought，equallyunintelligible。Anotherideawehaveofbodyis，thepowerofcommunicationofmotionbyimpulse；andofoursouls，thepowerofexcitingmotionbythought。Theseideas，theoneofbody，theotherofourminds，everyday’sexperienceclearlyfurnishesuswith:butifhereagainweinquirehowthisisdone，weareequallyinthedark。

For，inthecommunicationofmotionbyimpulse，whereinasmuchmotionislosttoonebodyasisgottotheother，whichistheordinariestcase，wecanhavenootherconception，butofthepassingofmotionoutofonebodyintoanother；which，Ithink，isasobscureandinconceivableashowourmindsmoveorstopourbodiesbythought，whichweeverymomentfindtheydo。Theincreaseofmotionbyimpulse，whichisobservedorbelievedsometimestohappen，isyethardertobeunderstood。Wehavebydailyexperienceclearevidenceofmotionproducedbothbyimpulseandbythought；butthemannerhow，hardlycomeswithinourcomprehension:weareequallyatalossinboth。Sothat，howeverweconsidermotion，anditscommunication，eitherfrombodyorspirit，theideawhichbelongstospiritisatleastasclearasthatwhichbelongstobody。Andifweconsidertheactivepowerofmoving，or，asImaycallit，motivity，itismuchclearerinspiritthanbody；sincetwobodies，placedbyoneanotheratrest，willneveraffordustheideaofapowerintheonetomovetheother，butbyaborrowedmotion:whereasthemindeverydayaffordsusideasofanactivepowerofmovingofbodies；andthereforeitisworthourconsideration，whetheractivepowerbenottheproperattributeofspirits，andpassivepowerofmatter。Hencemaybeconjecturedthatcreatedspiritsarenottotallyseparatefrommatter，becausetheyarebothactiveandpassive。Purespirit，viz。God，isonlyactive；purematterisonlypassive；thosebeingsthatarebothactiveandpassive，wemayjudgetopartakeofboth。Butbethatasitwill，Ithink，wehaveasmanyandasclearideasbelongingtospiritaswehavebelongingtobody，thesubstanceofeachbeingequallyunknowntous；andtheideaofthinkinginspirit，asclearasofextensioninbody；andthecommunicationofmotionbythought，whichweattributetospirit，isasevidentasthatbyimpulse，whichweascribetobody。Constantexperiencemakesussensibleofboththese，thoughournarrowunderstandingscancomprehendneither。

For，whenthemindwouldlookbeyondthoseoriginalideaswehavefromsensationorreflection，andpenetrateintotheircauses，andmannerofproduction，wefindstillitdiscoversnothingbutitsownshort-sightedness。

29。Summary。Toconclude。Sensationconvincesusthattherearesolidextendedsubstances；andreflection，thattherearethinkingones:experienceassuresusoftheexistenceofsuchbeings，andthattheonehathapowertomovebodybyimpulse，theotherbythought；thiswecannotdoubtof。Experience，Isay，everymomentfurnishesuswiththeclearideasbothoftheoneandtheother。Butbeyondtheseideas，asreceivedfromtheirpropersources，ourfacultieswillnotreach。Ifwewouldinquirefurtherintotheirnature，causes，andmanner，weperceivenotthenatureofextensionclearerthanwedoofthinking。Ifwewouldexplainthemanyfurther，oneisaseasyastheother；andthereisnomoredifficultytoconceivehowasubstanceweknownotshould，bythought，setbodyintomotion，thanhowasubstanceweknownotshould，byimpulse，setbodyintomotion。Sothatwearenomoreabletodiscoverwhereintheideasbelongingtobodyconsist，thanthosebelongingtospirit。Fromwhenceitseemsprobabletome，thatthesimpleideaswereceivefromsensationandreflectionaretheboundariesofourthoughts；beyondwhichthemind，whatevereffortsitwouldmake，isnotabletoadvanceonejot；norcanitmakeanydiscoveries，whenitwouldpryintothenatureandhiddencausesofthoseideas。

30。Ourideaofspiritandourideaofbodycompared。Sothat，inshort，theideawehaveofspirit，comparedwiththeideawehaveofbody，standsthus:thesubstanceofspiritsisunknowntous；andsoisthesubstanceofbodyequallyunknowntous。Twoprimaryqualitiesorpropertiesofbody，viz。solidcoherentpartsandimpulse，wehavedistinctclearideasof:solikewiseweknow，andhavedistinctclearideas，oftwoprimaryqualitiesorpropertiesofspirit，viz。thinking，andapowerofaction；i。e。apowerofbeginningorstoppingseveralthoughtsormotions。Wehavealsotheideasofseveralqualitiesinherentinbodies，andhavethecleardistinctideasofthem；whichqualitiesarebutthevariousmodificationsoftheextensionofcoheringsolidparts，andtheirmotion。Wehavelikewisetheideasoftheseveralmodesofthinkingviz。believing，doubting，intending，fearing，hoping；allwhicharebuttheseveralmodesofthinking。Wehavealsotheideasofwilling，andmovingthebodyconsequenttoit，andwiththebodyitselftoo；for，ashasbeenshown，spiritiscapableofmotion。

31。Thenotionofspiritinvolvesnomoredifficultyinitthanthatofbody。Lastly，ifthisnotionofimmaterialspiritmayhave，perhaps，somedifficultiesinitnoteasilytobeexplained，wehavethereforenomorereasontodenyordoubttheexistenceofsuchspirits，thanwehavetodenyordoubttheexistenceofbody；

becausethenotionofbodyiscumberedwithsomedifficultiesveryhard，andperhapsimpossibletobeexplainedorunderstoodbyus。

ForIwouldfainhaveinstancedanythinginournotionofspiritmoreperplexed，orneareracontradiction，thantheverynotionofbodyincludesinit；thedivisibilityininfinitumofanyfiniteextensioninvolvingus，whetherwegrantordenyit，inconsequencesimpossibletobeexplicatedormadeinourapprehensionsconsistent；

consequencesthatcarrygreaterdifficulty，andmoreapparentabsurdity，thananythingcanfollowfromthenotionofanimmaterialknowingsubstance。

32。Weknownothingofthingsbeyondoursimpleideasofthem。Whichwearenotatalltowonderat，sincewehavingbutsomefewsuperficialideasofthings，discoveredtousonlybythesensesfromwithout，orbythemind，reflectingonwhatitexperimentsinitselfwithin，havenoknowledgebeyondthat，muchlessoftheinternalconstitution，andtruenatureofthings，beingdestituteoffacultiestoattainit。Andthereforeexperimentinganddiscoveringinourselvesknowledge，andthepowerofvoluntarymotion，ascertainlyasweexperiment，ordiscoverinthingswithoutus，thecohesionandseparationofsolidparts，whichistheextensionandmotionofbodies；wehaveasmuchreasontobesatisfiedwithournotionofimmaterialspirit，aswithournotionofbody，andtheexistenceoftheoneaswellastheother。Foritbeingnomoreacontradictionthatthinkingshouldexistseparateandindependentfromsolidity，thanitisacontradictionthatsolidityshouldexistseparateandindependentfromthinking，theybeingbothbutsimpleideas，independentonefromanother:andhavingasclearanddistinctideasinusofthinking，asofsolidity，Iknownotwhywemaynotaswellallowathinkingthingwithoutsolidity，i。e。immaterial，toexist，asasolidthingwithoutthinking，i。e。matter，toexist；especiallysinceitisnothardertoconceivehowthinkingshouldexistwithoutmatter，thanhowmattershouldthink。Forwhensoeverwewouldproceedbeyondthesesimpleideaswehavefromsensationandreflection，anddivefurtherintothenatureofthings，wefallpresentlyintodarknessandobscurity，perplexednessanddifficulties，andcandiscovernothingfurtherbutourownblindnessandignorance。Butwhicheverofthesecomplexideasbeclearest，thatofbody，orimmaterialspirit，thisisevident，thatthesimpleideasthatmakethemuparenootherthanwhatwehavereceivedfromsensationorreflection:andsoisitofallourotherideasofsubstances，evenofGodhimself。

33。OurcomplexideaofGod。ForifweexaminetheideawehaveoftheincomprehensibleSupremeBeing，weshallfindthatwecomebyitthesameway；andthatthecomplexideaswehavebothofGod，andseparatespirits，aremadeofthesimpleideaswereceivefromreflection:v。g。having，fromwhatweexperimentinourselves，gottheideasofexistenceandduration；ofknowledgeandpower；ofpleasureandhappiness；andofseveralotherqualitiesandpowers，whichitisbettertohavethantobewithout；whenwewouldframeanideathemostsuitablewecantotheSupremeBeing，weenlargeeveryoneofthesewithourideaofinfinity；andsoputtingthemtogether，makeourcomplexideaofGod。Forthatthemindhassuchapowerofenlargingsomeofitsideas，receivedfromsensationandreflection，hasbeenalreadyshown。

34。OurcomplexideaofGodasinfinite。IfIfindthatIknowsomefewthings，andsomeofthem，orall，perhapsimperfectly，I

canframeanideaofknowingtwiceasmany；whichIcandoubleagain，asoftenasIcanaddtonumber；andthusenlargemyideaofknowledge，byextendingitscomprehensiontoallthingsexisting，orpossible。ThesamealsoIcandoofknowingthemmoreperfectly；

i。e。alltheirqualities，powers，causes，consequences，andrelations，&c。，tillallbeperfectlyknownthatisinthem，orcananywayrelatetothem:andthusframetheideaofinfiniteorboundlessknowledge。Thesamemayalsobedoneofpower，tillwecometothatwecallinfinite；andalsoofthedurationofexistence，withoutbeginningorend，andsoframetheideaofaneternalbeing。Thedegreesorextentwhereinweascribeexistence，power，wisdom，andallotherperfections(whichwecanhaveanyideasof)tothatsovereignBeing，whichwecallGod，beingallboundlessandinfinite，weframethebestideaofhimourmindsarecapableof:allwhichisdone，I

say，byenlargingthosesimpleideaswehavetakenfromtheoperationsofourownminds，byreflection；orbyoursenses，fromexteriorthings，tothatvastnesstowhichinfinitycanextendthem。

35。Godinhisownessenceincognisable。Foritisinfinity，which，joinedtoourideasofexistence，power，knowledge，&c。，makesthatcomplexidea，wherebywerepresenttoourselves，thebestwecan，theSupremeBeing。For，thoughinhisownessence(whichcertainlywedonotknow，notknowingtherealessenceofapebble，orafly，orofourownselves)Godbesimpleanduncompounded；yetI

thinkImaysaywehavenootherideaofhim，butacomplexoneofexistence，knowledge，power，happiness，&c。，infiniteandeternal:

whicharealldistinctideas，andsomeofthem，beingrelative，areagaincompoundedofothers:allwhichbeing，ashasbeenshown，originallygotfromsensationandreflection，gotomakeuptheideaornotionwehaveofGod。

36。Noideasinourcomplexideasofspirits，butthosegotfromsensationorreflection。Thisfurtheristobeobserved，thatthereisnoideaweattributetoGod，batinginfinity，whichisnotalsoapartofourcomplexideaofotherspirits。Because，beingcapableofnoothersimpleideas，belongingtoanythingbutbody，butthosewhichbyreflectionwereceivefromtheoperationofourownminds，wecanattributetospiritsnootherbutwhatwereceivefromthence:andallthedifferencewecanputbetweenthem，inourcontemplationofspirits，isonlyintheseveralextentsanddegreesoftheirknowledge，power，duration，happiness，&c。Forthatinourideas，aswellofspiritsasofotherthings，wearerestrainedtothosewereceivefromsensationandreflection，isevidentfromhence，-That，inourideasofspirits，howmuchsoeveradvancedinperfectionbeyondthoseofbodies，eventothatofinfinite，wecannotyethaveanyideaofthemannerwhereintheydiscovertheirthoughtsonetoanother:

thoughwemustnecessarilyconcludethatseparatespirits，whicharebeingsthathaveperfecterknowledgeandgreaterhappinessthanwe，mustneedshavealsoaperfecterwayofcommunicatingtheirthoughtsthanwehave，whoarefaintomakeuseofcorporealsigns，andparticularsounds；whicharethereforeofmostgeneraluse，asbeingthebestandquickestwearecapableof。Butofimmediatecommunicationhavingnoexperimentinourselves，andconsequentlynonotionofitatall，wehavenoideahowspirits，whichusenotwords，canwithquickness，ormuchlesshowspiritsthathavenobodiescanbemastersoftheirownthoughts，andcommunicateorconcealthematpleasure，thoughwecannotbutnecessarilysupposetheyhavesuchapower。

37。Recapitulation。Andthuswehaveseenwhatkindofideaswehaveofsubstancesofallkinds，whereintheyconsist，andhowwecamebythem。Fromwhence，Ithink，itisveryevident，First，Thatallourideasoftheseveralsortsofsubstancesarenothingbutcollectionsofsimpleideas:withasuppositionofsomethingtowhichtheybelong，andinwhichtheysubsist:thoughofthissupposedsomethingwehavenocleardistinctideaatall。

Secondly，Thatallthesimpleideas，thatthusunitedinonecommonsubstratum，makeupourcomplexideasofseveralsortsofsubstances，arenootherbutsuchaswehavereceivedfromsensationorreflection。Sothateveninthosewhichwethinkwearemostintimatelyacquaintedwith，andthatcomenearestthecomprehensionofourmostenlargedconceptions，wecannotgobeyondthosesimpleideas。

Andeveninthosewhichseemmostremotefromallwehavetodowith，anddoinfinitelysurpassanythingwecanperceiveinourselvesbyreflection；ordiscoverbysensationinotherthings，wecanattaintonothingbutthosesimpleideas，whichweoriginallyreceivedfromsensationorreflection；asisevidentinthecomplexideaswehaveofangels，andparticularlyofGodhimself。

Thirdly，Thatmostofthesimpleideasthatmakeupourcomplexideasofsubstances，whentrulyconsidered，areonlypowers，howeverweareapttotakethemforpositivequalities；v。g。thegreatestpartoftheideasthatmakeourcomplexideaofgoldareyellowness，greatweight，ductility，fusibility，andsolubilityinaquaregia，&c。，allunitedtogetherinanunknownsubstratum:allwhichideasarenothingelsebutsomanyrelationstoothersubstances；andarenotreallyinthegold，consideredbarelyinitself，thoughtheydependonthoserealandprimaryqualitiesofitsinternalconstitution，wherebyithasafitnessdifferentlytooperate，andbeoperatedonbyseveralothersubstances。

ChapterXXIV

OfCollectiveIdeasofSubstances1。Acollectiveideaisoneidea。Besidesthesecomplexideasofseveralsinglesubstances，asofman，horse，gold，violet，apple，&c。，themindhathalsocomplexcollectiveideasofsubstances；whichI

socall，becausesuchideasaremadeupofmanyparticularsubstancesconsideredtogether，asunitedintooneidea，andwhichsojoinedarelookedonasone；v。g。theideaofsuchacollectionofmenasmakeanarmy，thoughconsistingofagreatnumberofdistinctsubstances，isasmuchoneideaastheideaofaman:andthegreatcollectiveideaofallbodieswhatsoever，signifiedbythenameworld，isasmuchoneideaastheideaofanytheleastparticleofmatterinit；itsufficingtotheunityofanyidea，thatitbeconsideredasonerepresentationorpicture，thoughmadeupofeversomanyparticulars。

2。Madebythepowerofcomposinginthemind。Thesecollectiveideasofsubstancesthemindmakes，byitspowerofcomposition，andunitingseverallyeithersimpleorcomplexideasintoone，asitdoes，bythesamefaculty，makethecomplexideasofparticularsubstances，consistingofanaggregateofdiverssimpleideas，unitedinonesubstance。Andasthemind，byputtingtogethertherepeatedideasofunity，makesthecollectivemode，orcomplexidea，ofanynumber，asascore，oragross，&c。，-so，byputtingtogetherseveralparticularsubstances，itmakescollectiveideasofsubstances，asatroop，anarmy，aswarm，acity，afleet；eachofwhicheveryonefindsthatherepresentstohisownmindbyoneidea，inoneview；andsounderthatnotionconsidersthoseseveralthingsasperfectlyone，asoneship，oroneatom。Norisithardertoconceivehowanarmyoftenthousandmenshouldmakeoneidea，thanhowamanshouldmakeoneidea；itbeingaseasytothemindtouniteintoonetheideaofagreatnumberofmen，andconsideritasone，asitistouniteintooneparticularallthedistinctideasthatmakeupthecompositionofaman，andconsiderthemalltogetherasone。

3。Artificialthingsthataremadeupofdistinctsubstancesareourcollectiveideas。Amongstsuchkindofcollectiveideasaretobecountedmostpartofartificialthings，atleastsuchofthemasaremadeupofdistinctsubstances:and，intruth，ifweconsiderallthesecollectiveideasaright，asarmy，constellation，universe，astheyareunitedintosomanysingleideas，theyarebuttheartificialdraughtsofthemind；bringingthingsveryremote，andindependentononeanother，intooneview，thebettertocontemplateanddiscourseofthem，unitedintooneconception，andsignifiedbyonename。Fortherearenothingssoremote，norsocontrary，whichthemindcannot，bythisartofcomposition，bringintooneidea；asisvisibleinthatsignifiedbythenameuniverse。

ChapterXXV

OfRelation1。Relation，what。Besidestheideas，whethersimpleorcomplex，thatthemindhasofthingsastheyareinthemselves，thereareothersitgetsfromtheircomparisononewithanother。Theunderstanding，intheconsiderationofanything，isnotconfinedtothatpreciseobject:itcancarryanideaasitwerebeyonditself，oratleastlookbeyondit，toseehowitstandsinconformitytoanyother。Whenthemindsoconsidersonething，thatitdoesasitwerebringitto，andsetitbyanother，andcarriesitsviewfromonetotheother-thisis，asthewordsimport，relationandrespect；andthedenominationsgiventopositivethings，intimatingthatrespect，andservingasmarkstoleadthethoughtsbeyondthesubjectitselfdenominatedtosomethingdistinctfromit，arewhatwecallrelatives；

andthethingssobroughttogether，related。Thus，whenthemindconsidersCaiusassuchapositivebeing，ittakesnothingintothatideabutwhatreallyexistsinCaius；v。g。whenIconsiderhimasaman，Ihavenothinginmymindbutthecomplexideaofthespecies，man。Solikewise，whenIsayCaiusisawhiteman，Ihavenothingbutthebareconsiderationofamanwhohaththatwhitecolour。ButwhenIgiveCaiusthenamehusband，Iintimatesomeotherperson；

andwhenIgivehimthenamewhiter，Iintimatesomeotherthing:inbothcasesmythoughtisledtosomethingbeyondCaius，andtherearetwothingsbroughtintoconsideration。Andsinceanyidea，whethersimpleorcomplex，maybetheoccasionwhythemindthusbringstwothingstogether，andasitweretakesaviewofthematonce，thoughstillconsideredasdistinct:thereforeanyofourideasmaybethefoundationofrelation。Asintheabove-mentionedinstance，thecontractandceremonyofmarriagewithSemproniaistheoccasionofthedenominationandrelationofhusband；andthecolourwhitetheoccasionwhyheissaidtobewhiterthanfree-stone。

2。Ideasofrelationswithoutcorrelativeterms，noteasilyapprehended。Theseandthelikerelations，expressedbyrelativetermsthathaveothersansweringthem，withareciprocalintimation，asfatherandson，biggerandless，causeandeffect，areveryobvioustoeveryone，andeverybodyatfirstsightperceivestherelation。Forfatherandson，husbandandwife，andsuchothercorrelativeterms，seemsonearlytobelongonetoanother，and，throughcustom，dosoreadilychimeandansweroneanotherinpeople’smemories，that，uponthenamingofeitherofthem，thethoughtsarepresentlycarriedbeyondthethingsonamed；andnobodyoverlooksordoubtsofarelation，whereitissoplainlyintimated。Butwherelanguageshavefailedtogivecorrelativenames，theretherelationisnotalwayssoeasilytakennoticeof。Concubineis，nodoubt，arelativename，aswellasawife:butinlanguageswherethisandthelikewordshavenotacorrelativeterm，therepeoplearenotsoapttotakethemtobeso，aswantingthatevidentmarkofrelationwhichisbetweencorrelatives，whichseemtoexplainoneanother，andnottobeabletoexist，buttogether。Henceitis，thatmanyofthosenames，which，dulyconsidered，doincludeevidentrelations，havebeencalledexternaldenominations。Butallnamesthataremorethanemptysoundsmustsignifysomeidea，whichiseitherinthethingtowhichthenameisapplied，andthenitispositive，andislookedonasunitedtoandexistinginthethingtowhichthedenominationisgiven；orelseitarisesfromtherespectthemindfindsinittosomethingdistinctfromit，withwhichitconsidersit，andthenitincludesarelation。

3。Someseeminglyabsolutetermscontainrelations。Anothersortofrelativetermsthereis，whicharenotlookedontobeeitherrelative，orsomuchasexternaldenominations:whichyet，undertheformandappearanceofsignifyingsomethingabsoluteinthesubject，doconcealatacit，thoughlessobservable，relation。Sucharetheseeminglypositivetermsofold，great，imperfect，&c。，whereofI

shallhaveoccasiontospeakmoreatlargeinthefollowingchapters。

4。Relationdifferentfromthethingsrelated。Thisfurthermaybeobserved，Thattheideasofrelationmaybethesameinmenwhohavefardifferentideasofthethingsthatarerelated，orthatarethuscompared:v。g。thosewhohavefardifferentideasofaman，mayyetagreeinthenotionofafather；whichisanotionsuperinducedtothesubstance，orman，andrefersonlytoanactofthatthingcalledmanwherebyhecontributedtothegenerationofoneofhisownkind，letmanbewhatitwill。

5。Changeofrelationmaybewithoutanychangeinthethingsrelated。Thenaturethereforeofrelationconsistsinthereferringorcomparingtwothingsonetoanother；fromwhichcomparisononeorbothcomestobedenominated。Andifeitherofthosethingsberemoved，orceasetobe，therelationceases，andthedenominationconsequenttoit，thoughtheotherreceiveinitselfnoalterationatall:v。g。

Caius，whomIconsiderto-dayasafather，ceasestobesoto-morrow，onlybythedeathofhisson，withoutanyalterationmadeinhimself。Nay，barelybythemind’schangingtheobjecttowhichitcomparesanything，thesamethingiscapableofhavingcontrarydenominationsatthesametime:v。g。Caius，comparedtoseveralpersons，maybetrulybesaidtobeolderandyounger，strongerandweaker，&c。

6。Relationonlybetwixttwothings。Whatsoeverdothorcanexist，orbeconsideredasonethingispositive:andsonotonlysimpleideasandsubstances，butmodesalso，arepositivebeings:thoughthepartsofwhichtheyconsistareveryoftenrelativeonetoanother:butthewholetogetherconsideredasonething，andproducinginusthecomplexideaofonething，whichideaisinourminds，asonepicture，thoughanaggregateofdiversparts，andunderonename，itisapositiveorabsolutething，oridea。Thusatriangle，thoughthepartsthereofcomparedonetoanotherberelative，yettheideaofthewholeisapositiveabsoluteidea。Thesamemaybesaidofafamily，atune，&c。；fortherecanbenorelationbutbetwixttwothingsconsideredastwothings。Theremustalwaysbeinrelationtwoideasorthings，eitherinthemselvesreallyseparate，orconsideredasdistinct，andthenagroundoroccasionfortheircomparison。

7。Allthingscapableofrelation。Concerningrelationingeneral，thesethingsmaybeconsidered:

First，Thatthereisnoonething，whethersimpleidea，substance，mode，orrelation，ornameofeitherofthem，whichisnotcapableofalmostaninfinitenumberofconsiderationsinreferencetootherthings:andthereforethismakesnosmallpartofmen’sthoughtsandwords:v。g。onesinglemanmayatoncebeconcernedin，andsustainallthesefollowingrelations，andmanymore，viz。father，brother，son，grandfather，grandson，father-in-law，son-in-law，husband，friend，enemy，subject，general，judge，patron，client，professor，European，Englishman，islander，servant，master，possessor，captain，superior，inferior，bigger，less，older，younger，contemporary，like，unlike，&c。，toanalmostinfinitenumber:hebeingcapableofasmanyrelationsastherecanbeoccasionsofcomparinghimtootherthings，inanymannerofagreement，disagreement，orrespectwhatsoever。For，asIsaid，relationisawayofcomparingorconsideringtwothingstogether，andgivingoneorbothofthemsomeappellationfromthatcomparison；andsometimesgivingeventherelationitselfaname。

8。Ourideasofrelationsoftenclearerthanofthesubjectsrelated。Secondly，Thisfurthermaybeconsideredconcerningrelation，thatthoughitbenotcontainedintherealexistenceofthings，butsomethingextraneousandsuperinduced，yettheideaswhichrelativewordsstandforareoftenclearerandmoredistinctthanofthosesubstancestowhichtheydobelong。Thenotionwehaveofafatherorbrotherisagreatdealclearerandmoredistinctthanthatwehaveofaman；or，ifyouwill，paternityisathingwhereofitiseasiertohaveaclearidea，thanofhumanity；andIcanmucheasierconceivewhatafriendis，thanwhatGod；becausetheknowledgeofoneaction，oronesimpleidea，isoftentimessufficienttogivemethenotionofarelation；buttotheknowingofanysubstantialbeing，anaccuratecollectionofsundryideasisnecessary。Aman，ifhecomparestwothingstogether，canhardlybesupposednottoknowwhatitiswhereinhecomparesthem:sothatwhenhecomparesanythingstogether，hecannotbuthaveaveryclearideaofthatrelation。Theideas，then，ofrelations，arecapableatleastofbeingmoreperfectanddistinctinourmindsthanthoseofsubstances。

Becauseitiscommonlyhardtoknowallthesimpleideaswhicharereallyinanysubstance，butforthemostparteasyenoughtoknowthesimpleideasthatmakeupanyrelationIthinkon，orhaveanamefor:

v。g。comparingtwomeninreferencetoonecommonparent，itisveryeasytoframetheideasofbrothers，withouthavingyettheperfectideaofaman。Forsignificantrelativewords，aswellasothers，standingonlyforideas；andthosebeingalleithersimple，ormadeupofsimpleones，itsufficesfortheknowingthepreciseideatherelativetermstandsfor，tohaveaclearconceptionofthatwhichisthefoundationoftherelation；whichmaybedonewithouthavingaperfectandclearideaofthethingitisattributedto。Thus，havingthenotionthatonelaidtheeggoutofwhichtheotherwashatched，IhaveaclearideaoftherelationofdamandchickbetweenthetwocassiowariesinSt。James’sPark；thoughperhapsI

havebutaveryobscureandimperfectideaofthosebirdsthemselves。

9。Relationsallterminateinsimpleideas。Thirdly，Thoughtherebeagreatnumberofconsiderationswhereinthingsmaybecomparedonewithanother，andsoamultitudeofrelations，yettheyallterminatein，andareconcernedaboutthosesimpleideas，eitherofsensationorreflection，whichIthinktobethewholematerialsofallourknowledge。Toclearthis，Ishallshowitinthemostconsiderablerelationsthatwehaveanynotionof；andinsomethatseemtobethemostremotefromsenseorreflection:whichyetwillappeartohavetheirideasfromthence，andleaveitpastdoubtthatthenotionswehaveofthemarebutcertainsimpleideas，andsooriginallyderivedfromsenseorreflection。

10。Termsleadingthemindbeyondthesubjectdenominated，arerelative。Fourthly，Thatrelationbeingtheconsideringofonethingwithanotherwhichisextrinsicaltoit，itisevidentthatallwordsthatnecessarilyleadthemindtoanyotherideasthanaresupposedreallytoexistinthatthingtowhichthewordsareappliedarerelativewords:v。g。aman，black，merry，thoughtful，thirsty，angry，extended；theseandthelikeareallabsolute，becausetheyneithersignifynorintimateanythingbutwhatdoesorissupposedreallytoexistinthemanthusdenominated；butfather，brother，king，husband，blacker，merrier，&c。，arewordswhich，togetherwiththethingtheydenominate，implyalsosomethingelseseparateandexteriortotheexistenceofthatthing。

11。Allrelativesmadeupofsimpleideas。Havinglaiddownthesepremisesconcerningrelationingeneral，Ishallnowproceedtoshow，insomeinstances，howalltheideaswehaveofrelationaremadeup，astheothersare，onlyofsimpleideas；andthattheyall，howrefinedorremotefromsensesoevertheyseem，terminateatlastinsimpleideas。Ishallbeginwiththemostcomprehensiverelation，whereinallthingsthatdo，orcanexist，areconcerned，andthatistherelationofcauseandeffect:theideawhereof，howderivedfromthetwofountainsofallourknowledge，sensationandreflection，I

shallinthenextplaceconsider。

ChapterXXVI

OfCauseandEffect，andotherRelations1。Whencetheideasofcauseandeffectgot。Inthenoticethatoursensestakeoftheconstantvicissitudeofthings，wecannotbutobservethatseveralparticular，bothqualitiesandsubstances，begintoexist；andthattheyreceivethistheirexistencefromthedueapplicationandoperationofsomeotherbeing。Fromthisobservationwegetourideasofcauseandeffect。Thatwhichproducesanysimpleorcomplexideawedenotebythegeneralname，cause，andthatwhichisproduced，effect。Thus，findingthatinthatsubstancewhichwecallwax，fluidity，whichisasimpleideathatwasnotinitbefore，isconstantlyproducedbytheapplicationofacertaindegreeofheatwecallthesimpleideaofheat，inrelationtofluidityinwax，thecauseofit，andfluiditytheeffect。

Soalso，findingthatthesubstance，wood，whichisacertaincollectionofsimpleideassocalled，bytheapplicationoffire，isturnedintoanothersubstance，calledashes；i。e。，anothercomplexidea，consistingofacollectionofsimpleideas，quitedifferentfromthatcomplexideawhichwecallwood；weconsiderfire，inrelationtoashes，ascause，andtheashes，aseffect。Sothatwhateverisconsideredbyustoconduceoroperatetotheproducinganyparticularsimpleidea，orcollectionofsimpleideas，whethersubstanceormode，whichdidnotbeforeexist，haththerebyinourmindstherelationofacause，andsoisdenominatedbyus。

2。Creation，generation，making，alteration。Havingthus，fromwhatoursensesareabletodiscoverintheoperationsofbodiesononeanother，gotthenotionofcauseandeffect，viz。thatacauseisthatwhichmakesanyotherthing，eithersimpleidea，substance，ormode，begintobe；andaneffectisthatwhichhaditsbeginningfromsomeotherthing；themindfindsnogreatdifficultytodistinguishtheseveraloriginalsofthingsintotwosorts:-

First，Whenthethingiswhollymadenew，sothatnopartthereofdideverexistbefore；aswhenanewparticleofmatterdothbegintoexist，inrerumnatura，whichhadbeforenobeing，andthiswecallcreation。

Secondly，Whenathingismadeupofparticles，whichdidallofthembeforeexist；butthatverything，soconstitutedofpre-existingparticles，which，consideredalltogether，makeupsuchacollectionofsimpleideas，hadnotanyexistencebefore，asthisman，thisegg，rose，orcherry，&c。Andthis，whenreferredtoasubstance，producedintheordinarycourseofnaturebyinternalprinciple，butsetonworkby，andreceivedfrom，someexternalagent，orcause，andworkingbyinsensiblewayswhichweperceivenot，wecallgeneration。Whenthecauseisextrinsical，andtheeffectproducedbyasensibleseparation，orjuxta-positionofdiscernibleparts，wecallitmaking；andsuchareallartificialthings。Whenanysimpleideaisproduced，whichwasnotinthatsubjectbefore，wecallitalteration。Thusamanisgenerated，apicturemade；andeitherofthemaltered，whenanynewsensiblequalityorsimpleideaisproducedineitherofthem，whichwasnottherebefore:andthethingsthusmadetoexist，whichwerenottherebefore，areeffects；andthosethingswhichoperatedtotheexistence，causes。Inwhich，andallothercases，wemayobserve，thatthenotionofcauseandeffecthasitsrisefromideasreceivedbysensationorreflection；andthatthisrelation，howcomprehensivesoever，terminatesatlastinthem。Fortohavetheideaofcauseandeffect，itsufficestoconsideranysimpleideaorsubstance，asbeginningtoexist，bytheoperationofsomeother，withoutknowingthemannerofthatoperation。

3。Relationsoftime。Timeandplacearealsothefoundationsofverylargerelations；andallfinitebeingsatleastareconcernedinthem。Buthavingalreadyshowninanotherplacehowwegetthoseideas，itmaysufficeheretointimate，thatmostofthedenominationsofthingsreceivedfromtimeareonlyrelations。Thus，whenanyonesaysthatQueenElizabethlivedsixty-nine，andreignedforty-fiveyears，thesewordsimportonlytherelationofthatdurationtosomeother，andmeannomorebutthis，Thatthedurationofherexistencewasequaltosixty-nine，andthedurationofhergovernmenttoforty-fiveannualrevolutionsofthesun；andsoareallwords，answering，HowLong？Again，WilliamtheConquerorinvadedEnglandabouttheyear1066；whichmeansthis，That，takingthedurationfromourSaviour’stimetillnowforoneentiregreatlengthoftime，itshowsatwhatdistancethisinvasionwasfromthetwoextremes；andsodoallwordsoftimeansweringtothequestion，When，whichshowonlythedistanceofanypointoftimefromtheperiodofalongerduration，fromwhichwemeasure，andtowhichwetherebyconsideritasrelated。

4。Someideasoftimesupposedpositiveandfoundtoberelative。

Thereareyet，besidesthose，otherwordsoftime，thatordinarilyarethoughttostandforpositiveideas，whichyetwill，whenconsidered，befoundtoberelative；suchasare，young，old，&c。，whichincludeandintimatetherelationanythinghastoacertainlengthofduration，whereofwehavetheideainourminds。Thus，havingsettledinourthoughtstheideaoftheordinarydurationofamantobeseventyyears，whenwesayamanisyoung，wemeanthathisageisyetbutasmallpartofthatwhichusuallymenattainto；

andwhenwedenominatehimold，wemeanthathisdurationisrunoutalmosttotheendofthatwhichmendonotusuallyexceed。Andsoitisbutcomparingtheparticularageordurationofthisorthatman，totheideaofthatdurationwhichwehaveinourminds，asordinarilybelongingtothatsortofanimals:whichisplainintheapplicationofthesenamestootherthings；foramaniscalledyoungattwentyyears，andveryyoungatsevenyearsold:butyetahorsewecalloldattwenty，andadogatsevenyears，becauseineachofthesewecomparetheiragetodifferentideasofduration，whicharesettledinourmindsasbelongingtotheseseveralsortsofanimals，intheordinarycourseofnature。Butthesunandstars，thoughtheyhaveoutlastedseveralgenerationsofmen，wecallnotold，becausewedonotknowwhatperiodGodhathsettothatsortofbeings。Thistermbelongingproperlytothosethingswhichwecanobserveintheordinarycourseofthings，byanaturaldecay，tocometoanendinacertainperiodoftime；andsohaveinourminds，asitwere，astandardtowhichwecancomparetheseveralpartsoftheirduration；and，bytherelationtheybearthereunto，callthemyoungorold；whichwecannot，therefore，dotoarubyoradiamond，thingswhoseusualperiodsweknownot。

5。Relationsofplaceandextension。Therelationalsothatthingshavetooneanotherintheirplacesanddistancesisveryobvioustoobserve；asabove，below，amiledistantfromCharing-cross，inEngland，andinLondon。Butasinduration，soinextensionandbulk，therearesomeideasthatarerelativewhichwesignifybynamesthatarethoughtpositive；asgreatandlittlearetrulyrelations。

Forherealso，having，byobservation，settledinourmindstheideasofthebignessofseveralspeciesofthingsfromthosewehavebeenmostaccustomedto，wemakethemasitwerethestandards，wherebytodenominatethebulkofothers。Thuswecallagreatapple，suchaoneasisbiggerthantheordinarysortofthosewehavebeenusedto；andalittlehorse，suchaoneascomesnotuptothesizeofthatideawhichwehaveinourmindstobelongordinarilytohorses；andthatwillbeagreathorsetoaWelchman，whichisbutalittleonetoaFleming；theytwohaving，fromthedifferentbreedoftheircountries，takenseveral-sizedideastowhichtheycompare，andinrelationtowhichtheydenominatetheirgreatandtheirlittle。

6。Absolutetermsoftenstandforrelations。Solikewiseweakandstrongarebutrelativedenominationsofpower，comparedtosomeideaswehaveatthattimeofgreaterorlesspower。Thus，whenwesayaweakman，wemeanonethathasnotsomuchstrengthorpowertomoveasusuallymenhave，orusuallythoseofhissizehave；whichisacomparinghisstrengthtotheideawehaveoftheusualstrengthofmen，ormenofsuchasize。Thelikewhenwesaythecreaturesareallweakthings；weakthereisbutarelativeterm，signifyingthedisproportionthereisinthepowerofGodandthecreatures。Andsoabundanceofwords，inordinaryspeech，standonlyforrelations(andperhapsthegreatestpart)whichatfirstsightseemtohavenosuchsignification:v。g。theshiphasnecessarystores。Necessaryandstoresarebothrelativewords；onehavingarelationtotheaccomplishingthevoyageintended，andtheothertofutureuse。Allwhichrelations，howtheyareconfinedto，andterminateinideasderivedfromsensationorreflection，istooobvioustoneedanyexplication。

ChapterXXVII

OfIdentityandDiversity1。Whereinidentityconsists。Anotheroccasionthemindoftentakesofcomparing，istheverybeingofthings，when，consideringanythingasexistingatanydeterminedtimeandplace，wecompareitwithitselfexistingatanothertime，andthereonformtheideasofidentityanddiversity。Whenweseeanythingtobeinanyplaceinanyinstantoftime，wearesure(beitwhatitwill)thatitisthatverything，andnotanotherwhichatthatsametimeexistsinanotherplace，howlikeandundistinguishablesoeveritmaybeinallotherrespects:andinthisconsistsidentity，whentheideasitisattributedtovarynotatallfromwhattheywerethatmomentwhereinweconsidertheirformerexistence，andtowhichwecomparethepresent。Forweneverfinding，norconceivingitpossible，thattwothingsofthesamekindshouldexistinthesameplaceatthesametime，werightlyconclude，that，whateverexistsanywhereatanytime，excludesallofthesamekind，andisthereitselfalone。Whenthereforewedemandwhetheranythingbethesameorno，itrefersalwaystosomethingthatexistedsuchatimeinsuchaplace，whichitwascertain，atthatinstant，wasthesamewithitself，andnoother。Fromwhenceitfollows，thatonethingcannothavetwobeginningsofexistence，nortwothingsonebeginning；itbeingimpossiblefortwothingsofthesamekindtobeorexistinthesameinstant，intheverysameplace；oroneandthesamethingindifferentplaces。That，therefore，thathadonebeginning，isthesamething；andthatwhichhadadifferentbeginningintimeandplacefromthat，isnotthesame，butdiverse。Thatwhichhasmadethedifficultyaboutthisrelationhasbeenthelittlecareandattentionusedinhavingprecisenotionsofthethingstowhichitisattributed。

2。Identityofsubstances。Wehavetheideasbutofthreesortsofsubstances:1。God。2。Finiteintelligences。3。Bodies。

First，Godiswithoutbeginning，eternal，unalterable，andeverywhere，andthereforeconcerninghisidentitytherecanbenodoubt。

Secondly，Finitespiritshavinghadeachitsdeterminatetimeandplaceofbeginningtoexist，therelationtothattimeandplacewillalwaysdeterminetoeachofthemitsidentity，aslongasitexists。

Thirdly，Thesamewillholdofeveryparticleofmatter，towhichnoadditionorsubtractionofmatterbeingmade，itisthesame。For，thoughthesethreesortsofsubstances，aswetermthem，donotexcludeoneanotheroutofthesameplace，yetwecannotconceivebutthattheymustnecessarilyeachofthemexcludeanyofthesamekindoutofthesameplace:orelsethenotionsandnamesofidentityanddiversitywouldbeinvain，andtherecouldbenosuchdistinctionsofsubstances，oranythingelseonefromanother。Forexample:couldtwobodiesbeinthesameplaceatthesametime；

thenthosetwoparcelsofmattermustbeoneandthesame，takethemgreatorlittle；nay，allbodiesmustbeoneandthesame。For，bythesamereasonthattwoparticlesofmattermaybeinoneplace，allbodiesmaybeinoneplace:which，whenitcanbesupposed，takesawaythedistinctionofidentityanddiversityofoneandmore，andrendersitridiculous。Butitbeingacontradictionthattwoormoreshouldbeone，identityanddiversityarerelationsandwaysofcomparingwellfounded，andofusetotheunderstanding。

Identityofmodesandrelations。Allotherthingsbeingbutmodesorrelationsultimatelyterminatedinsubstances，theidentityanddiversityofeachparticularexistenceofthemtoowillbebythesamewaydetermined:onlyastothingswhoseexistenceisinsuccession，suchasaretheactionsoffinitebeings，v。g。motionandthought，bothwhichconsistinacontinuedtrainofsuccession，concerningtheirdiversitytherecanbenoquestion:becauseeachperishingthemomentitbegins，theycannotexistindifferenttimes，orindifferentplaces，aspermanentbeingscanatdifferenttimesexistindistantplaces；andthereforenomotionorthought，consideredasatdifferenttimes，canbethesame，eachpartthereofhavingadifferentbeginningofexistence。

3。PrincipiumIndividuationis。Fromwhathasbeensaid，itiseasytodiscoverwhatissomuchinquiredafter，theprincipiumindividuationis；andthat，itisplain，isexistenceitself；whichdeterminesabeingofanysorttoaparticulartimeandplace，incommunicabletotwobeingsofthesamekind。This，thoughitseemseasiertoconceiveinsimplesubstancesormodes；yet，whenreflectedon，isnotmoredifficultincompoundones，ifcarebetakentowhatitisapplied:v。g。letussupposeanatom，i。e。acontinuedbodyunderoneimmutablesuperficies，existinginadeterminedtimeandplace；itisevident，that，consideredinanyinstantofitsexistence，itisinthatinstantthesamewithitself。For，beingatthatinstantwhatitis，andnothingelse，itisthesame，andsomustcontinueaslongasitsexistenceiscontinued；forsolongitwillbethesame，andnoother。Inlikemanner，iftwoormoreatomsbejoinedtogetherintothesamemass，everyoneofthoseatomswillbethesame，bytheforegoingrule:andwhilsttheyexistunitedtogether，themass，consistingofthesameatoms，mustbethesamemass，orthesamebody，letthepartsbeeversodifferentlyjumbled。Butifoneoftheseatomsbetakenaway，oronenewoneadded，itisnolongerthesamemassorthesamebody。Inthestateoflivingcreatures，theiridentitydependsnotonamassofthesameparticles，butonsomethingelse。Forinthemthevariationofgreatparcelsofmatteraltersnottheidentity:anoakgrowingfromaplanttoagreattree，andthenlopped，isstillthesameoak；andacoltgrownuptoahorse，sometimesfat，sometimeslean，isallthewhilethesamehorse:

though，inboththesecases，theremaybeamanifestchangeoftheparts；sothattrulytheyarenoteitherofthemthesamemassesofmatter，thoughtheybetrulyoneofthemthesameoak，andtheotherthesamehorse。Thereasonwhereofis，that，inthesetwocases-amassofmatterandalivingbody-identityisnotappliedtothesamething。

4。Identityofvegetables。Wemustthereforeconsiderwhereinanoakdiffersfromamassofmatter，andthatseemstometobeinthis，thattheoneisonlythecohesionofparticlesofmatteranyhowunited，theothersuchadispositionofthemasconstitutesthepartsofanoak；andsuchanorganizationofthosepartsasisfittoreceiveanddistributenourishment，soastocontinueandframethewood，bark，andleaves，&c。，ofanoak，inwhichconsiststhevegetablelife。Thatbeingthenoneplantwhichhassuchanorganizationofpartsinonecoherentbody，partakingofonecommonlife，itcontinuestobethesameplantaslongasitpartakesofthesamelife，thoughthatlifebecommunicatedtonewparticlesofmattervitallyunitedtothelivingplant，inalikecontinuedorganizationconformabletothatsortofplants。Forthisorganization，beingatanyoneinstantinanyonecollectionofmatter，isinthatparticularconcretedistinguishedfromallother，andisthatindividuallife，whichexistingconstantlyfromthatmomentbothforwardsandbackwards，inthesamecontinuityofinsensiblysucceedingpartsunitedtothelivingbodyoftheplant，ithasthatidentitywhichmakesthesameplant，andallthepartsofit，partsofthesameplant，duringallthetimethattheyexistunitedinthatcontinuedorganization，whichisfittoconveythatcommonlifetoallthepartssounited。

5。Identityofanimals。Thecaseisnotsomuchdifferentinbrutesbutthatanyonemayhenceseewhatmakesananimalandcontinuesitthesame。Somethingwehavelikethisinmachines，andmayservetoillustrateit。Forexample，whatisawatch？Itisplainitisnothingbutafitorganizationorconstructionofpartstoacertainend，which，whenasufficientforceisaddedtoit，itiscapabletoattain。Ifwewouldsupposethismachineonecontinuedbody，allwhoseorganizedpartswererepaired，increased，ordiminishedbyaconstantadditionorseparationofinsensibleparts，withonecommonlife，weshouldhavesomethingverymuchlikethebodyofananimal；withthisdifference，That，inananimalthefitnessoftheorganization，andthemotionwhereinlifeconsists，begintogether，themotioncomingfromwithin；butinmachinestheforcecomingsensiblyfromwithout，isoftenawaywhentheorganisinorder，andwellfittedtoreceiveit。

6。Theidentityofman。Thisalsoshowswhereintheidentityofthesamemanconsists；viz。innothingbutaparticipationofthesamecontinuedlife，byconstantlyfleetingparticlesofmatter，insuccessionvitallyunitedtothesameorganizedbody。Hethatshallplacetheidentityofmaninanythingelse，but，likethatofotheranimals，inonefitlyorganizedbody，takeninanyoneinstant，andfromthencecontinued，underoneorganizationoflife，inseveralsuccessivelyfleetingparticlesofmatterunitedtoit，willfindithardtomakeanembryo，oneofyears，madandsober，thesameman，byanysupposition，thatwillnotmakeitpossibleforSeth，Ismael，Socrates，Pilate，St。Austin，andCaesarBorgia，tobethesameman。

Foriftheidentityofsoulalonemakesthesameman；andtherebenothinginthenatureofmatterwhythesameindividualspiritmaynotbeunitedtodifferentbodies，itwillbepossiblethatthosemen，livingindistantages，andofdifferenttempers，mayhavebeenthesameman:whichwayofspeakingmustbefromaverystrangeuseofthewordman，appliedtoanideaoutofwhichbodyandshapeareexcluded。

Andthatwayofspeakingwouldagreeyetworsewiththenotionsofthosephilosopherswhoallowoftransmigration，andareofopinionthatthesoulsofmenmay，fortheirmiscarriages，bedetrudedintothebodiesofbeasts，asfithabitations，withorganssuitedtothesatisfactionoftheirbrutalinclinations。ButyetIthinknobody，couldhebesurethatthesoulofHeliogabaluswereinoneofhishogs，wouldyetsaythathogwereamanorHeliogabalus。

7。Ideaofidentitysuitedtotheideaitisappliedto。Itisnotthereforeunityofsubstancethatcomprehendsallsortsofidentity，orwilldetermineitineverycase；buttoconceiveandjudgeofitaright，wemustconsiderwhatideatheworditisappliedtostandsfor:itbeingonethingtobethesamesubstance，anotherthesameman，andathirdthesameperson，ifperson，man，andsubstance，arethreenamesstandingforthreedifferentideas；-forsuchasistheideabelongingtothatname，suchmustbetheidentity；which，ifithadbeenalittlemorecarefullyattendedto，wouldpossiblyhavepreventedagreatdealofthatconfusionwhichoftenoccursaboutthismatter，withnosmallseemingdifficulties，especiallyconcerningpersonalidentity，whichthereforeweshallinthenextplacealittleconsider。

8。Sameman。Ananimalisalivingorganizedbody；andconsequentlythesameanimal，aswehaveobserved，isthesamecontinuedlifecommunicatedtodifferentparticlesofmatter，astheyhappensuccessivelytobeunitedtothatorganizedlivingbody。

Andwhateveristalkedofotherdefinitions，ingeniousobservationputsitpastdoubt，thattheideainourminds，ofwhichthesoundmaninourmouthsisthesign，isnothingelsebutofananimalofsuchacertainform。SinceIthinkImaybeconfident，that，whoevershouldseeacreatureofhisownshapeormake，thoughithadnomorereasonallitslifethanacatoraparrot，wouldcallhimstillaman；orwhoevershouldhearacatoraparrotdiscourse，reason，andphilosophize，wouldcallorthinkitnothingbutacatoraparrot；

andsay，theonewasadullirrationalman，andtheotheraveryintelligentrationalparrot。Arelationwehaveinanauthorofgreatnote，issufficienttocountenancethesuppositionofarationalparrot。

Hiswordsare:"Ihadamindtoknow，fromPrinceMaurice’sownmouth，theaccountofacommon，butmuchcreditedstory，thatIhadheardsooftenfrommanyothers，ofanoldparrothehadinBrazil，duringhisgovernmentthere，thatspoke，andasked，andansweredcommonquestions，likeareasonablecreature:sothatthoseofhistraintheregenerallyconcludedittobewitcheryorpossession；andoneofhischaplains，wholivedlongafterwardsinHolland，wouldneverfromthattimeendureaparrot，butsaidtheyallhadadevilinthem。Ihadheardmanyparticularsofthisstory，andasseveredbypeoplehardtobediscredited，whichmademeaskPrinceMauricewhattherewasofit。Hesaid，withhisusualplainnessanddrynessintalk，therewassomethingtrue，butagreatdealfalseofwhathadbeenreported。Idesiredtoknowofhimwhattherewasofthefirst。

Hetoldmeshortandcoldly，thathehadheardofsuchanoldparrotwhenhehadbeenatBrazil；andthoughhebelievednothingofit，anditwasagoodwayoff，yethehadsomuchcuriosityastosendforit:thatitwasaverygreatandaveryoldone；andwhenitcamefirstintotheroomwheretheprincewas，withagreatmanyDutchmenabouthim，itsaidpresently，Whatacompanyofwhitemenarehere！

Theyaskedit，whatitthoughtthatmanwas，pointingtotheprince。

Itanswered，SomeGeneralorother。Whentheybroughtitclosetohim，heaskedit，D’ouvenez-vous？Itanswered，DeMarinnan。ThePrince，Aquiestes-vous？TheParrot，AunPortugais。ThePrince，Quefais-tula？Parrot，Jegardelespoulles。ThePrincelaughed，andsaid，Vousgardezlespoulles？TheParrotanswered，Oui，moi；etjescaibienfaire；andmadethechuckfourorfivetimesthatpeopleusetomaketochickenswhentheycallthem。IsetdownthewordsofthisworthydialogueinFrench，justasPrinceMauricesaidthemtome。Iaskedhiminwhatlanguagetheparrotspoke，andhesaidinBrazilian。IaskedwhetherheunderstoodBrazilian；hesaidNo，buthehadtakencaretohavetwointerpretersbyhim，theoneaDutchmanthatspokeBrazilian，andtheotheraBrazilianthatspokeDutch；thatheaskedthemseparatelyandprivately，andbothofthemagreedintellinghimjustthesamethingthattheparrothadsaid。Icouldnotbuttellthisoddstory，becauseitissomuchoutoftheway，andfromthefirsthand，andwhatmaypassforagoodone；forIdaresaythisPrinceatleastbelievedhimselfinallhetoldme，havingeverpassedforaveryhonestandpiousman:Ileaveittonaturaliststoreason，andtoothermentobelieve，astheypleaseuponit；

however，itisnot，perhaps，amisstorelieveorenlivenabusyscenesometimeswithsuchdigressions，whethertothepurposeorno。"

Ihavetakencarethatthereadershouldhavethestoryatlargeintheauthor’sownwords，becauseheseemstomenottohavethoughtitincredible；foritcannotbeimaginedthatsoableamanashe，whohadsufficiencyenoughtowarrantallthetestimonieshegivesofhimself，shouldtakesomuchpains，inaplacewhereithadnothingtodo，topinsoclose，notonlyonamanwhomhementionsashisfriend，butonaPrinceinwhomheacknowledgesverygreathonestyandpiety，astorywhich，ifhehimselfthoughtincredible，hecouldnotbutalsothinkridiculous。ThePrince，itisplain，whovouchesthisstory，andourauthor，whorelatesitfromhim，bothofthemcallthistalkeraparrot:andIaskanyoneelsewhothinkssuchastoryfittobetold，whether，ifthisparrot，andallofitskind，hadalwaystalked，aswehaveaprince’swordforitthisonedid，-whether，I

say，theywouldnothavepassedforaraceofrationalanimals；butyet，whether，forallthat，theywouldhavebeenallowedtobemen，andnotparrots？ForIpresumeitisnottheideaofathinkingorrationalbeingalonethatmakestheideaofamaninmostpeople’ssense:butofabody，soandsoshaped，joinedtoit:andifthatbetheideaofaman，thesamesuccessivebodynotshiftedallatonce，must，aswellasthesameimmaterialspirit，gotothemakingofthesameman。

9。Personalidentity。Thisbeingpremised，tofindwhereinpersonalidentityconsists，wemustconsiderwhatpersonstandsfor；-which，Ithink，isathinkingintelligentbeing，thathasreasonandreflection，andcanconsideritselfasitself，thesamethinkingthing，indifferenttimesandplaces；whichitdoesonlybythatconsciousnesswhichisinseparablefromthinking，and，asitseemstome，essentialtoit:itbeingimpossibleforanyonetoperceivewithoutperceivingthathedoesperceive。Whenwesee，hear，smell，taste，feel，meditate，orwillanything，weknowthatwedoso。Thusitisalwaysastoourpresentsensationsandperceptions:andbythiseveryoneistohimselfthatwhichhecallsself:-itnotbeingconsidered，inthiscase，whetherthesameselfbecontinuedinthesameordiverssubstances。For，sinceconsciousnessalwaysaccompaniesthinking，anditisthatwhichmakeseveryonetobewhathecallsself，andtherebydistinguisheshimselffromallotherthinkingthings，inthisaloneconsistspersonalidentity，i。e。thesamenessofarationalbeing:andasfarasthisconsciousnesscanbeextendedbackwardstoanypastactionorthought，sofarreachestheidentityofthatperson；itisthesameselfnowitwasthen；anditisbythesameselfwiththispresentonethatnowreflectsonit，thatthatactionwasdone。

10。Consciousnessmakespersonalidentity。Butitisfurtherinquired，whetheritbethesameidenticalsubstance。Thisfewwouldthinktheyhadreasontodoubtof，iftheseperceptions，withtheirconsciousness，alwaysremainedpresentinthemind，wherebythesamethinkingthingwouldbealwaysconsciouslypresent，and，aswouldbethought，evidentlythesametoitself。Butthatwhichseemstomakethedifficultyisthis，thatthisconsciousnessbeinginterruptedalwaysbyforgetfulness，therebeingnomomentofourliveswhereinwehavethewholetrainofallourpastactionsbeforeoureyesinoneview，buteventhebestmemorieslosingthesightofonepartwhilsttheyareviewinganother；andwesometimes，andthatthegreatestpartofourlives，notreflectingonourpastselves，beingintentonourpresentthoughts，andinsoundsleephavingnothoughtsatall，oratleastnonewiththatconsciousnesswhichremarksourwakingthoughts，-Isay，inallthesecases，ourconsciousnessbeinginterrupted，andwelosingthesightofourpastselves，doubtsareraisedwhetherwearethesamethinkingthing，i。e。thesamesubstanceorno。Which，howeverreasonableorunreasonable，concernsnotpersonalidentityatall。Thequestionbeingwhatmakesthesameperson；andnotwhetheritbethesameidenticalsubstance，whichalwaysthinksinthesameperson，which，inthiscase，mattersnotatall:differentsubstances，bythesameconsciousness(wheretheydopartakeinit)beingunitedintooneperson，aswellasdifferentbodiesbythesamelifeareunitedintooneanimal，whoseidentityispreservedinthatchangeofsubstancesbytheunityofonecontinuedlife。For，itbeingthesameconsciousnessthatmakesamanbehimselftohimself，personalidentitydependsonthatonly，whetheritbeannexedsolelytooneindividualsubstance，orcanbecontinuedinasuccessionofseveralsubstances。Forasfarasanyintelligentbeingcanrepeattheideaofanypastactionwiththesameconsciousnessithadofitatfirst，andwiththesameconsciousnessithasofanypresentaction；sofaritisthesamepersonalselfForitisbytheconsciousnessithasofitspresentthoughtsandactions，thatitisselftoitselfnow，andsowillbethesameself，asfarasthesameconsciousnesscanextendtoactionspastortocome。andwouldbebydistanceoftime，orchangeofsubstance，nomoretwopersons，thanamanbetwomenbywearingotherclothesto-daythanhedidyesterday，withalongorashortsleepbetween:

thesameconsciousnessunitingthosedistantactionsintothesameperson，whateversubstancescontributedtotheirproduction。

11。Personalidentityinchangeofsubstance。Thatthisisso，wehavesomekindofevidenceinourverybodies，allwhoseparticles，whilstvitallyunitedtothissamethinkingconsciousself，sothatwefeelwhentheyaretouched，andareaffectedby，andconsciousofgoodorharmthathappenstothem，asapartofourselves；i。e。ofourthinkingconsciousself。Thus，thelimbsofhisbodyaretoeveryoneapartofHimself；hesympathizesandisconcernedforthem。Cutoffahand，andtherebyseparateitfromthatconsciousnesshehadofitsheat，cold，andotheraffections，anditisthennolongerapartofthatwhichishimself，anymorethantheremotestpartofmatter。Thus，weseethesubstancewhereofpersonalselfconsistedatonetimemaybevariedatanother，withoutthechangeofpersonalidentity；therebeingnoquestionaboutthesameperson，thoughthelimbswhichbutnowwereapartofit，becutoff。

12。Personalityinchangeofsubstance。Butthequestionis，Whetherifthesamesubstancewhichthinksbechanged，itcanbethesameperson；or，remainingthesame，itcanbedifferentpersons？

AndtothisIanswer:First，Thiscanbenoquestionatalltothosewhoplacethoughtinapurelymaterialanimalconstitution，voidofanimmaterialsubstance。For，whethertheirsuppositionbetrueorno，itisplaintheyconceivepersonalidentitypreservedinsomethingelsethanidentityofsubstance；asanimalidentityispreservedinidentityoflife，andnotofsubstance。Andthereforethosewhoplacethinkinginanimmaterialsubstanceonly，beforetheycancometodealwiththesemen，mustshowwhypersonalidentitycannotbepreservedinthechangeofimmaterialsubstances，orvarietyofparticularimmaterialsubstances，aswellasanimalidentityispreservedinthechangeofmaterialsubstances，orvarietyofparticularbodies:unlesstheywillsay，itisoneimmaterialspiritthatmakesthesamelifeinbrutes，asitisoneimmaterialspiritthatmakesthesamepersoninmen；whichtheCartesiansatleastwillnotadmit，forfearofmakingbrutesthinkingthingstoo。

13。Whetherinchangeofthinkingsubstancestherecanbeoneperson。Butnext，astothefirstpartofthequestion，Whether，ifthesamethinkingsubstance(supposingimmaterialsubstancesonlytothink)bechanged，itcanbethesameperson？Ianswer，thatcannotberesolvedbutbythosewhoknowwhatkindofsubstancestheyarethatdothink；andwhethertheconsciousnessofpastactionscanbetransferredfromonethinkingsubstancetoanother。Igrantwerethesameconsciousnessthesameindividualactionitcouldnot:butitbeingapresentrepresentationofapastaction，whyitmaynotbepossible，thatthatmayberepresentedtothemindtohavebeenwhichreallyneverwas，willremaintobeshown。Andthereforehowfartheconsciousnessofpastactionsisannexedtoanyindividualagent，sothatanothercannotpossiblyhaveit，willbehardforustodetermine，tillweknowwhatkindofactionitisthatcannotbedonewithoutareflexactofperceptionaccompanyingit，andhowperformedbythinkingsubstances，whocannotthinkwithoutbeingconsciousofit。Butthatwhichwecallthesameconsciousness，notbeingthesameindividualact，whyoneintellectualsubstancemaynothaverepresentedtoit，asdonebyitself，whatitneverdid，andwasperhapsdonebysomeotheragent-why，Isay，sucharepresentationmaynotpossiblybewithoutrealityofmatteroffact，aswellasseveralrepresentationsindreamsare，whichyetwhilstdreamingwetakefortrue-willbedifficulttoconcludefromthenatureofthings。Andthatitneverisso，willbyus，tillwehaveclearerviewsofthenatureofthinkingsubstances，bebestresolvedintothegoodnessofGod；who，asfarasthehappinessormiseryofanyofhissensiblecreaturesisconcernedinit，willnot，byafatalerroroftheirs，transferfromonetoanotherthatconsciousnesswhichdrawsrewardorpunishmentwithit。Howfarthismaybeanargumentagainstthosewhowouldplacethinkinginasystemoffleetinganimalspirits，Ileavetobeconsidered。Butyet，toreturntothequestionbeforeus，itmustbeallowed，that，ifthesameconsciousness(which，ashasbeenshown，isquiteadifferentthingfromthesamenumericalfigureormotioninbody)canbetransferredfromonethinkingsubstancetoanother，itwillbepossiblethattwothinkingsubstancesmaymakebutoneperson。Forthesameconsciousnessbeingpreserved，whetherinthesameordifferentsubstances，thepersonalidentityispreserved。

14。Whether，thesameimmaterialsubstanceremaining，therecanbetwopersons。Astothesecondpartofthequestion，Whetherthesameimmaterialsubstanceremaining，theremaybetwodistinctpersons；

whichquestionseemstometobebuiltonthis，-Whetherthesameimmaterialbeing，beingconsciousoftheactionofitspastduration，maybewhollystrippedofalltheconsciousnessofitspastexistence，andloseitbeyondthepowerofeverretrievingitagain:andsoasitwerebeginninganewaccountfromanewperiod，haveaconsciousnessthatcannotreachbeyondthisnewstate。Allthosewhoholdpre-existenceareevidentlyofthismind；sincetheyallowthesoultohavenoremainingconsciousnessofwhatitdidinthatpre-existentstate，eitherwhollyseparatefrombody，orinforminganyotherbody；andiftheyshouldnot，itisplainexperiencewouldbeagainstthem。Sothatpersonalidentity，reachingnofurtherthanconsciousnessreaches，apre-existentspiritnothavingcontinuedsomanyagesinastateofsilence，mustneedsmakedifferentpersons。SupposeaChristianPlatonistoraPythagoreanshould，uponGod’shavingendedallhisworksofcreationtheseventhday，thinkhissoulhathexistedeversince；

andshouldimagineithasrevolvedinseveralhumanbodies；asI

oncemetwithone，whowaspersuadedhishadbeenthesoulofSocrates(howreasonablyIwillnotdispute；thisIknow，thatintheposthefilled，whichwasnoinconsiderableone，hepassedforaveryrationalman，andthepresshasshownthathewantednotpartsorlearning；)-

wouldanyonesay，thathe，beingnotconsciousofanyofSocrates’sactionsorthoughts，couldbethesamepersonwithSocrates？Letanyonereflectuponhimself，andconcludethathehasinhimselfanimmaterialspirit，whichisthatwhichthinksinhim，and，intheconstantchangeofhisbodykeepshimthesame:andisthatwhichhecallshimself:lethimalsosupposeittobethesamesoulthatwasinNestororThersites，atthesiegeofTroy，(forsoulsbeing，asfarasweknowanythingofthem，intheirnatureindifferenttoanyparcelofmatter，thesuppositionhasnoapparentabsurdityinit)，whichitmayhavebeen，aswellasitisnowthesoulofanyotherman:buthenowhavingnoconsciousnessofanyoftheactionseitherofNestororThersites，doesorcanheconceivehimselfthesamepersonwitheitherofthem？Canhebeconcernedineitheroftheiractions？

attributethemtohimself，orthinkthemhisown，morethantheactionsofanyothermenthateverexisted？Sothatthisconsciousness，notreachingtoanyoftheactionsofeitherofthosemen，heisnomoreoneselfwitheitherofthemthanifthesoulorimmaterialspiritthatnowinformshimhadbeencreated，andbegantoexist，whenitbegantoinformhispresentbody；thoughitwereneversotrue，thatthesamespiritthatinformedNestor’sorThersites’bodywerenumericallythesamethatnowinformshis。ForthiswouldnomoremakehimthesamepersonwithNestor，thanifsomeoftheparticlesofmatterthatwereonceapartofNestorwerenowapartofthisman；thesameimmaterialsubstance，withoutthesameconsciousness，nomoremakingthesameperson，bybeingunitedtoanybody，thanthesameparticleofmatter，withoutconsciousness，unitedtoanybody，makesthesameperson。ButlethimoncefindhimselfconsciousofanyoftheactionsofNestor，hethenfindshimselfthesamepersonwithNestor。

15。Thebody，aswellasthesoul，goestothemakingofaman。

Andthusmaywebeable，withoutanydifficulty，toconceivethesamepersonattheresurrection，thoughinabodynotexactlyinmakeorpartsthesamewhichhehadhere，-thesameconsciousnessgoingalongwiththesoulthatinhabitsit。Butyetthesoulalone，inthechangeofbodies，wouldscarcetoanyonebuttohimthatmakesthesoultheman，beenoughtomakethesameman。Forshouldthesoulofaprince，carryingwithittheconsciousnessoftheprince’spastlife，enterandinformthebodyofacobbler，assoonasdesertedbyhisownsoul，everyoneseeshewouldbethesamepersonwiththeprince，accountableonlyfortheprince’sactions:butwhowouldsayitwasthesameman？Thebodytoogoestothemakingtheman，andwould，Iguess，toeverybodydeterminethemaninthiscase，whereinthesoul，withallitsprincelythoughtsaboutit，wouldnotmakeanotherman:buthewouldbethesamecobblertoeveryonebesideshimself。Iknowthat，intheordinarywayofspeaking，thesameperson，andthesameman，standforoneandthesamething。Andindeedeveryonewillalwayshavealibertytospeakashepleases，andtoapplywhatarticulatesoundstowhatideashethinksfit，andchangethemasoftenashepleases。Butyet，whenwewillinquirewhatmakesthesamespirit，man，orperson，wemustfixtheideasofspirit，man，orpersoninourminds；andhavingresolvedwithourselveswhatwemeanbythem，itwillnotbehardtodetermine，ineitherofthem，orthelike，whenitisthesame，andwhennot。

16。Consciousnessaloneunitesactionsintothesameperson。Butthoughthesameimmaterialsubstanceorsouldoesnotalone，whereveritbe，andinwhatsoeverstate，makethesameman；yetitisplain，consciousness，asfaraseveritcanbeextended-shoulditbetoagespast-unitesexistencesandactionsveryremoteintimeintothesameperson，aswellasitdoestheexistencesandactionsoftheimmediatelyprecedingmoment:sothatwhateverhastheconsciousnessofpresentandpastactions，isthesamepersontowhomtheybothbelong。HadIthesameconsciousnessthatIsawthearkandNoah’sflood，asthatIsawanoverflowingoftheThameslastwinter，orasthatIwritenow，IcouldnomoredoubtthatIwhowritethisnow，thatsaw’theThamesoverflowedlastwinter，andthatviewedthefloodatthegeneraldeluge，wasthesameself，-placethatselfinwhatsubstanceyouplease-thanthatIwhowritethisamthesamemyselfnowwhilstIwrite(whetherIconsistofallthesamesubstance，materialorimmaterial，orno)thatIwasyesterday。Forastothispointofbeingthesameself，itmattersnotwhetherthispresentselfbemadeupofthesameorothersubstances-Ibeingasmuchconcerned，andasjustlyaccountableforanyactionthatwasdoneathousandyearssince，appropriatedtomenowbythisself-consciousness，asIamforwhatIdidthelastmoment。

17。Selfdependsonconsciousness，notonsubstance。Selfisthatconsciousthinkingthing，-whateversubstancemadeupof，(whetherspiritualormaterial，simpleorcompounded，itmattersnot)-whichissensibleorconsciousofpleasureandpain，capableofhappinessormisery，andsoisconcernedforitself，asfarasthatconsciousnessextends。Thuseveryonefindsthat，whilstcomprehendedunderthatconsciousness，thelittlefingerisasmuchapartofhimselfaswhatismostso。Uponseparationofthislittlefinger，shouldthisconsciousnessgoalongwiththelittlefinger，andleavetherestofthebody，itisevidentthelittlefingerwouldbetheperson，thesameperson；andselfthenwouldhavenothingtodowiththerestofthebody。Asinthiscaseitistheconsciousnessthatgoesalongwiththesubstance，whenonepartisseparatefromanother，whichmakesthesameperson，andconstitutesthisinseparableself:soitisinreferencetosubstancesremoteintime。Thatwithwhichtheconsciousnessofthispresentthinkingthingcanjoinitself，makesthesameperson，andisoneselfwithit，andwithnothingelse；andsoattributestoitself，andownsalltheactionsofthatthing，asitsown，asfarasthatconsciousnessreaches，andnofurther；aseveryonewhoreflectswillperceive。