第3章

Mydifficultywas，asIhavesaid，thatthisclaimofconscience，whetherutilitarianornot，hadtobeharmonisedwiththeclaimofRationalSelf-love；

andthatIvaguelysupposedButlertoavoidoroverride[thelatterclaim]。

Butreadinghimatthisstagewithmorecare，I

foundinhim，withpleasureandsurprise，aviewverysimilartothatwhichhaddevelopeditselfinmyownmindinstrugglingtoassimilateMillandKant。Ifoundheexpresslyadmittedthat``interest，myownhappiness，isamanifestobligation’’，andthat``ReasonableSelf-love’’[is``oneofthetwochieforsuperiorprinciplesinthenatureofman’’]。Thatis，herecogniseda``DualismoftheGoverningFaculty’’——orasIprefertosay``DualismofthePracticalReason’’，sincethe`authority’onwhichButlerlaidstressmustpresentitselftomymindastheauthorityofreason，beforeIcanadmitit。

Ofthismorepresently:whatInowwishtomakeclearisthatitwasonthisside——ifImaysosay——thatIenteredintoButler’ssystemandcameundertheinfluenceofhispowerfulandcautiousintellect。ButtheeffectofhisinfluencecarriedmeafurtherstepawayfromMill:forIwasledbyittoabandonthedoctrineofPsychologicalHedonism，andtorecognisetheexistenceof`disinterested’or`extra-regarding’

impulsestoaction，[impulses]notdirectedtowardstheagent’spleasure[cf。chapiv。ofBooki。ofTheMethodsofEthics]。InfactasregardswhatImaycall。aPsychologicalbasisofEthics，IfoundmyselfmuchmoreinagreementwithButlerthanMill。

AndthisledmetoreconsidermyrelationtoIntuitionalEthics。ThestrengthandvehemenceofButler’scondemnationofpureUtilitarianism，insocautiousawriter，naturallyimpressedmemuch。AndIhadmyselfbecome，asIhadtoadmittomyself，anIntuitionisttoacertainextent。

Forthesupremeruleofaimingatthegeneralhappiness，asIhadcometosee，mustrestonafundamentalmoralintuition，ifIwastorecogniseitasbindingatall。AndinreadingthewritingsoftheearlierEnglishIntuitionists，MoreandClarke，IfoundtheaxiomIrequiredformyUtilitarianism[ThatarationalagentisboundtoaimatUniversalHappiness]，inoneformoranother，holdingaprominentplace(cf。HistoryofEthics，pp。172，181)。

Ihadthen，theoreticallyaswellaspractically，acceptedthisfundamentalmoralintuition；andtherewasalsotheKantianprinciple，whichIrecognisedasirresistiblyvalid，thoughnotadequatetogivecompleteguidance——Iwasthenan``intuitional’’moralisttothisextent:andifso，whynotfurther？TheorthodoxmoralistssuchasWhewell(theninvogue)saidthattherewasawholeintelligiblesystemofintuitions:buthowweretheytobelearnt？1couldnotacceptButler’sviewastothesufficiencyofaplainman’sconscience:foritappearedtomethatplainmenagreedratherverballythanreally。

InthisstateofmindIhadtoreadAristotleagain；

andalightseemedtodawnuponmeastothemeaninganddriftofhisprocedure——especiallyinBooksii。，iii。，iv。oftheEthics——(cf。HistoryofEthics，chap。ii。§；9，p。58，readtoendofsection)。

WhathegaveustherewastheCommonSenseMoralityofGreece，reducedtoconsistencybycarefulcomparison:givennotassomethingexternaltohimbutaswhat``we’’——heandothers——think，ascertainedbyreflection。AndwasnotthisreallytheSocraticinduction，elicitedbyinterrogation？MightInotimitatethis:dothesameforourmoralityhereandnow，inthesamemannerofimpartialreflectiononcurrentopinion？

IndeedoughtInottodothisbeforedecidingonthequestionwhetherIhadorhadnotasystemofmoralintuitions？Atanyratetheresultwouldbeuseful，whateverconclusionIcameto。

Sothiswasthepartofmybookfirstwritten(Bookiii。，chaps。i——xi。)，andacertainimitationofAristotle’smannerwasverymarkedinitatfirst，andthoughIhavetriedtoremoveitwhereitseemedtomeaffectedorpedantic，itstillremainstosomeextent。

ButtheresultoftheexaminationwastobringoutwithfreshforceandvividnessthedifferencebetweenthemaximsofCommonSenseMorality(eventhestrongestandstrictest，e。g。VeracityandGoodFaith)andtheintuitionswhichIhadalreadyattained，i。e。theKantianPrinciple(ofwhichInowsawtheonlycertainelementinJustice——``treatsimilarcasessimilarly’’——tobeaparticularapplication)，andtheFundamentalPrincipleofUtilitarianism。AndthislatterwasinperfectharmonywiththeKantianPrinciple。Icertainlycouldwillittobeauniversallawthatmenshouldactinsuchawayastopromoteuniversalhappiness；infactitwastheonlylawthatitwasperfectlycleartomethatIcouldthusdecisivelywill，fromauniversalpointofview。

IwasthenaUtilitarianagain，butonanIntuitionalbasis。

Butfurther，thereflectiononCommonSenseMoralitywhichIhadgonethrough，hadcontinuallybroughthometomeitscharacterasasystemofrulestendingtothepromotionofgeneralhappiness(cf。

[MethodsofEthics]pp。

AlsothepreviousreflectiononhedonisticmethodforBookii。hadshownmeitsweaknesses。Whatwasthentobedone？[The]

conservativeattitude[tobeobserved]towardsCommonSense[is]giveninchapterv。ofBookiv。:``Adheregenerally，deviateandattemptreformonlyinexceptionalcasesinwhich，——notwithstandingtheroughnessofhedonisticmethod，——theargumentagainstCommonSenseisdecisive。’’

InthisstateofmindIpublishedmybook:ItriedtosaywhatIhadfound:thattheoppositionbetweenUtilitarianismandIntuitionismwasduetoamisunderstanding。Therewasindeedafundamentaloppositionbetweentheindividual’sinterestandeithermorality，whichIcouldnotsolvebyanymethodIhadyetfoundtrustworthy，withouttheassumptionofthemoralgovernmentoftheworld:sofarIagreedwithbothButlerandKant。

ButIcouldfindnorealoppositionbetweenIntuitionismandUtilitarianism？TheUtilitarianismofMillandBenthamseemedtometowantabasis:thatbasiscouldonlybesuppliedbyafundamentalintuition；

ontheotherhandthebestexamination1couldmakeoftheMoralityofCommonSenseshowedmenoclearandself-evidentprinciplesexceptsuchaswereperfectlyconsistentwithUtilitarianism。

Still，investigationoftheUtilitarianmethodledmetoseedefects[init]:themerelyempiricalexaminationoftheconsequencesofactionsisunsatisfactory，andbeingthusconsciousofthepracticalimperfectioninmanycasesoftheguidanceoftheUtilitariancalculus，Iremainedanxioustotreatwithrespect，andmakeuseof，theguidanceaffordedbyCommonSenseinthesecases，onthegroundofthegeneralpresumptionwhichevolutionaffordedthatmoralsentimentsandopinionswouldpointtoconductconducivetogeneralhappiness；thoughIcouldnotadmitthispresumptionasagroundforoverrulingastrongprobabilityoftheopposite，derivedfromutilitariancalculations。’’

ItonlyremainstomentionthattheTableofContentsandtheIndexhavebeenrevisedinaccordancewiththechangesinthetext。

ThisEditionisareprintoftheSixth，theonlychanges(besidescorrectionofafewclericalerrors)beinganalterationoftypeinthepassagewhichoccursonp。45intheSixthEditionandpp。

inthisEdition，togetherwithconsequentchanges(1)inpagingandindexing，(2)inthereferencetothepassageinquestioninthereprintedPrefacetotheSixthEdition，and(3)intheinsertionofthenoteonp。

HenrySidgwick

TheboundariesofthestudycalledEthicsarevariouslyandoftenvaguelyconceived:buttheywillperhapsbesufficientlydefined，attheoutset，forthepurposesofthepresenttreatise，ifa`MethodofEthics’isexplainedtomeananyrationalprocedurebywhichwedeterminewhatindividualhumanbeings`ought’——orwhatitis`right’forthem-todo，ortoseektorealisebyvoluntaryaction。Byusingtheword``individual’’IprovisionallydistinguishthestudyofEthicsfromthatofPolitics，whichseekstodeterminetheproperconstitutionandtherightpublicconductofgovernedsocieties:

bothEthicsandPoliticsbeing，inmyview，distinguishedfrompositivesciencesbyhavingastheirspecialandprimaryobjecttodeterminewhatoughttobe，andnottoascertainwhatmerelyis，hasbeen，orwillbe。

ThestudentofEthicsseekstoattainsystematicandprecisegeneralknowledgeofwhatoughttobe，andinthissensehisaimsandmethodsmayproperlybetermed`scientific’:butIhavepreferredtocallEthicsastudyratherthanascience，becauseitiswidelythoughtthataSciencemustnecessarilyhavesomedepartmentofactualexistenceforitssubject-matter。Andinfacttheterm`EthicalScience’might，withoutviolationofusage，denoteeitherthedepartmentofPsychologythatdealswithvoluntaryactionanditssprings，andwithmoralsentimentsandjudgments，asactualphenomenaofindividualhumanminds；orthedepartmentofSociologydealingwithsimilarphenomena，asmanifestedbynormalmembersoftheorganisedgroupsofhumanbeingswhichwecallsocieties。Weobserve，however，thatmostpersonsdonotpursueeitherofthesestudiesmerelyfromcuriosity，inordertoascertainwhatactuallyexists，hasexisted，orwillexistintime。Theycommonlywishnotonlytounderstandhumanaction，butalsotoregulateit；inthisviewtheyapplytheideas`good’and`bad’，`right’

and`wrong’，totheconductorinstitutionswhichtheydescribe；andthuspass，asIshouldsay，fromthepointofviewofPsychologyorSociologytothatofEthicsorPolitics。MydefinitionofEthicsisdesignedtomarkclearlythefundamentalimportanceofthistransition。Itistruethatthemutualimplicationofthetwokindsofstudy——thepositiveandthepractical——is，onanytheory，verycloseandcomplete。Onanytheory，ourviewofwhatoughttobemustbelargelyderived，indetails，fromourapprehensionofwhatis；themeansofrealisingouridealcanonlybethoroughlylearnt。byacarefulstudyofactualphenomenaandtoanyindividualaskinghimself`WhatoughtItodooraimat？’itisimportanttoexaminetheanswerswhichhisfellow-menhaveactuallygiventosimilarquestions。Stillitseemsclearthatanattempttoascertainthegenerallawsoruniformitiesbywhichthevarietiesofhumanconduct，andofmen’ssentimentsandjudgmentsrespectingconduct，maybeexplained，isessentiallydifferentfromanattempttodeterminewhichamongthesevarietiesofconductisrightandwhichofthesedivergentjudgmentsvalid。

Itis，then，thesystematicconsiderationoftheselatterquestionswhichconstitutes，inmyview，thespecialanddistinctaimofEthicsandPolitics。

InthelanguageoftheprecedingsectionIcouldnotavoidtakingaccountoftwodifferentformsinwhichthefundamentalproblemofEthicsisstated；thedifferencebetweenwhichleads，asweshallpresentlysee，toratherimportantconsequences。EthicsissometimesconsideredasaninvestigationofthetrueMorallawsorrationalpreceptsofConduct；sometimesasaninquiryintothenatureoftheUltimateEndofreasonablehumanaction——theGoodor`TrueGood’ofman——andthemethodofattainingit。Boththeseviewsarefamiliar，andwillhavetobecarefullyconsidered:buttheformerseemsmostprominentinmodernethicalthought，andmosteasilyapplicabletomodernethicalsystemsgenerally。FortheGoodinvestigatedinEthicsislimitedtoGoodinsomedegreeattainablebyhumaneffort；accordinglyknowledgeoftheendissoughtinordertoascertainwhatactionsaretherightmeanstoitsattainment。ThushoweverprominentthenotionofanUltimateGood——otherthanvoluntaryactionofanykind——maybeinanethicalsystem，andwhateverinterpretationmaybegiventothisnotion，wemuststillarrivefinally，ifitistobepracticallyuseful，atsomedeterminationofpreceptsordirectiverulesofconduct。

Ontheotherhand，theconceptionofEthicsasessentiallyaninvestigationofthe`UltimateGood’ofManandthemeansofattainingitisnotuniversallyapplicable，withoutstraining，totheviewofMoralitywhichwemayconvenientlydistinguishastheIntuitionalview；accordingtowhichconductisheldtoberightwhenconformedtocertainpreceptsorprinciplesofDuty，intuitivelyknowntobeunconditionallybinding。InthisviewtheconceptionofUltimateGoodisnotnecessarilyoffundamentalimportanceinthedeterminationofRightconductexceptontheassumptionthatRightconductitself——orthecharacterrealisedinanddevelopedthroughRightconduct——isthesoleUltimateGoodforman。ButthisassumptionisnotimpliedintheIntuitionalviewofEthics:

norwouldit，Iconceive，accordwiththemoralcommonsenseofmodernChristiancommunities。ForwecommonlythinkthatthecompletenotionofhumanGoodorWell-beingmustincludetheattainmentofHappinessaswellastheperformanceofDuty；evenifweholdwithButlerthat``thehappinessoftheworldistheconcernofHimwhoistheLordandtheProprietorofit’’，andthat，accordingly，itisnotrightformentomaketheirperformanceofDutyconditionalontheirknowledgeofitsconducivenesstotheirHappiness。

Forthosewhoholdthis，whatmenoughttotakeasthepracticallyultimateendoftheiractionandstandardofRightconduct，mayinsomecaseshavenologicalconnexionwiththeconceptionofUltimateGoodforman:sothat，insuchcases，howeverindispensablethislatterconceptionmaybetothecompletenessofanethicalsystem，itwouldstillnotbeimportantforthemethodicaldeterminationofRightconduct。

ItisonaccountoftheprevalenceoftheIntuitionalviewjustmentioned，andtheprominentplacewhichitconsequentlyoccupiesinmydiscussion，thatindefiningEthicsIhaveavoidedtheterm`ArtofConduct’whichsomewouldregardasitsmoreappropriatedesignation。Fortheterm`Art’——whenappliedtothecontentsofatreatise——seemstosignifysystematicexpressknowledge(asdistinguishedfromtheimplicitknowledgeororganisedhabitwhichwecallskill)oftherightmeanstoagivenend。Nowifweassumethattherightnessofactiondependsonitsconducivenesstosomeulteriorend，thennodoubt——whenthisendhasbeenclearlyascertained——theprocessofdeterminingtherightrulesofconductforhumanbeingsindifferentrelationsandcircumstanceswouldnaturallycomeunderthenotionofArt。ButontheviewthatthepracticallyultimateendofmoralactionisoftentheRightnessoftheactionitself——ortheVirtuerealisedinandconfirmedbysuchaction——andthatthisisknownintuitivelyineachcaseorclassofcases，wecanhardlyregardtheterm`Art’asproperlyapplicabletothesystematisationofsuchknowledge。

Hence，asIdonotwishtostartwithanyassumptionincompatiblewiththislatterview，IprefertoconsiderEthicsasthescienceorstudyofwhatisrightorwhatoughttobe，sofarasthisdependsuponthevoluntaryactionofindividuals。

If，however，thisviewofthescopeofEthicsisaccepted，thequestionariseswhyitiscommonlytakentoconsist，toagreatextent，ofpsychologicaldiscussionastothe`natureofthemoralfaculty’；especiallyasIhavemyselfthoughtitrighttoincludesomediscussionofthiskindinthepresenttreatise。ForitdoesnotatfirstappearwhythisshouldbelongtoEthics，anymorethandiscussionsaboutthemathematicalfacultyorthefacultyofsense-perceptionbelongtomathematicsandphysicsrespectively。Whydowenotsimplystartwithcertainpremises，statingwhatoughttobedoneorsought，withoutconsideringthefacultybywhichweapprehendtheirtruth？

Oneansweristhatthemoralisthasapracticalaim:wedesireknowledgeofrightconductinordertoactonit。Nowwecannothelpbelievingwhatweseetobetrue，butwecanhelpdoingwhatweseetoberightorwise，andinfactoftendowhatweknowtobewrongorunwise:thusweareforcedtonoticetheexistenceinusofirrationalspringsofaction，conflictingwithourknowledgeandpreventingitspracticalrealisation:andtheveryimperfectnessoftheconnexionbetweenourpracticaljudgmentandourwillimpelsustoseekformorepreciseknowledgeastothenatureofthatconnexion。

Butthisisnotall。Menneverask，`WhyshouldIbelievewhatIseetobetrue？’buttheyfrequentlyask，`WhyshouldIdowhatIseetoberight？’Itiseasytoreplythatthequestionisfutile，sinceitcouldonlybeansweredbyareferencetosomeotherrecognisedprincipleofrightconduct，andthequestionmightjustaswellbeaskedasregardsthatagain，andsoon。Butstillwedoaskthequestionwidelyandcontinually，andthereforethisdemonstrationofitsfutilityisnotcompletelysatisfactory:werequirebesidessomeexplanationofitspersistency。

Oneexplanationthatmaybeofferedisthat，sincewearemovedtoactionnotbymoraljudgmentalone，butalsobydesiresandinclinationsthatoperateindependentlyofmoraljudgment，theanswerwhichwereallywanttothequestion`WhyshouldIdoit？’isonewhichdoesnotmerelyproveacertainactiontoberight，butalsostirsinusapredominantinclinationtodotheaction