第7章

PhaleasofChalcedon[10]contrivedaveryextraordinarymethodofrenderingallfortunesequal，inarepublicwheretherewasthegreatestinequality。Thiswasthattherichshouldgivefortuneswiththeirdaughterstothepoor，butreceivenonethemselves；andthatthepoorshouldreceivemoneyfortheirdaughters，insteadofgivingthemfortunes。ButIdonotrememberthataregulationofthiskindevertookplaceinanyrepublic。Itlaysthecitizensundersuchhardandoppressiveconditionsaswouldmakethemdetesttheveryequalitywhichtheydesignedtoestablish。Itispropersometimesthatthelawsshouldnotseemtotendsodirectlytotheendtheypropose。

Thoughrealequalitybetheverysoulofademocracy，itissodifficulttoestablishthatanextremeexactnessinthisrespectwouldnotbealwaysconvenient。Sufficientisittoestablishacensus[11]whichshallreduceorfixthedifferencestoacertainpoint：itisafterwardsthebusinessofparticularlawstolevel，asitwere，theinequalities，bythedutieslaidupontherich，andbytheeaseaffordedtothepoor。

Itismoderaterichesalonethatcangiveorsufferthissortofcompensation；forastomenofovergrownestates，everythingwhichdoesnotcontributetoadvancetheirpowerandhonourisconsideredbythemasaninjury。

Allinequalityindemocraciesoughttobederivedfromthenatureofthegovernment，andevenfromtheprincipleofequality。Forexample，itmaybeapprehendedthatpeoplewhoareobligedtolivebytheirlabourwouldbetoomuchimpoverishedbyapublicemployment，orneglectthedutiesattendingit；thatartisanswouldgrowinsolent，andthattoogreatanumberoffreemenwouldoverpowertheancientcitizens。Inthiscasetheequality[12]inademocracymaybesuppressedforthegoodofthestate。

Butthisisonlyanapparentequality；foramanruinedbyapublicemploymentwouldbeinaworseconditionthanhisfellow—citizens；andthissameman，beingobligedtoneglecthisduty，wouldreducetheresttoaworseconditionthanhimself，andsoon。

6。InwhatMannertheLawsoughttomaintainFrugalityinaDemocracy。

Itisnotsufficientinawell—regulateddemocracythatthedivisionsoflandbeequal；theyoughtalsotobesmall，aswascustomaryamongtheRomans。"Godforbid，"saidCuriustohissoldiers，[13]"thatacitizenshouldlookuponthatasasmallpieceoflandwhichissufficienttomaintainhim。"

Asequalityoffortunessupportsfrugality，sothelattermaintainstheformer。Thesethings，thoughinthemselvesdifferent，areofsuchanatureastobeunabletosubsistseparately；theyreciprocallyactuponeachother；ifonewithdrawsitselffromademocracy，theothersurelyfollowsit。

Trueisitthatwhenademocracyisfoundedoncommerce，privatepeoplemayacquirevastricheswithoutacorruptionofmorals。

Thisisbecausethespiritofcommerceisnaturallyattendedwiththatoffrugality，economy，moderation，labour，prudence，tranquillity，order，andrule。Solongasthisspiritsubsists，therichesitproduceshavenobadeffect。Themischiefis，whenexcessivewealthdestroysthespiritofcommerce，thenitisthattheinconveniencesofinequalitybegintobefelt。

Inordertosupportthisspirit，commerceshouldbecarriedonbytheprincipalcitizens；thisshouldbetheirsoleaimandstudy；thisthechiefobjectofthelaws：andtheseverylaws，bydividingtheestatesofindividualsinproportiontotheincreaseofcommerce，shouldseteverypoorcitizensofarathiseaseastobeabletoworkliketherest，andeverywealthycitizeninsuchamediocrityastobeobligedtotakesomepainseitherinpreservingoracquiringafortune。

Itisanexcellentlawinatradingrepublictomakeanequaldivisionofthepaternalestateamongthechildren。Theconsequenceofthisisthathowgreatsoeverafortunethefatherhasmade，hischildren，beingnotsorichashe，areinducedtoavoidluxury，andtoworkashehasdone。Ispeakhereonlyoftradingrepublics；astothosethathavenocommerce，thelegislatormustpursuequitedifferentmeasures。[14]

InGreecethereweretwosortsofrepublics：theonemilitary，likeSparta；theothercommercial，asAthens。Intheformer，thecitizenswereobligedtobeidle；inthelatter，endeavourswereusedtoinspirethemwiththeloveofindustryandlabour。Solonmadeidlenessacrime，andinsistedthateachcitizenshouldgiveanaccountofhismannerofgettingalivelihood。And，indeed，inawell—regulateddemocracy，wherepeople’sexpensesshouldextendonlytowhatisnecessary，everyoneoughttohaveit；forhowshouldtheirwantsbeotherwisesupplied？

7。OtherMethodsoffavouringthePrincipleofDemocracy。Anequaldivisionoflandscannotbeestablishedinalldemocracies。Therearesomecircumstancesinwhicharegulationofthisnaturewouldbeimpracticable，dangerous，andevensubversiveoftheconstitution。Wearenotalwaysobligedtoproceedtoextremes。Ifitappearsthatthisdivisionoflands，whichwasdesignedtopreservethepeople’smorals，doesnotsuitthedemocracy，recoursemustbehadtoothermethods。

Ifapermanentbodybeestablishedtoserveasaruleandpatternofmanners；asenate，towhichyears，virtue，gravity，andeminentservicesprocureadmittance；thesenators，bybeingexposedtopublicviewlikethestatuesofthegods，mustnaturallyinspireeveryfamilywithsentimentsofvirtue。

Aboveall，thissenatemuststeadilyadheretotheancientinstitutions，andmindthatthepeopleandthemagistratesneverswervefromthem。

Thepreservationoftheancientcustomsisaveryconsiderablepointinrespecttomanners。Sinceacorruptpeopleseldomperformanymemorableactions，seldomestablishsocieties，buildcities，orenactlaws；onthecontrary，sincemostinstitutionsarederivedfrompeoplewhosemannersareplainandsimple，tokeepuptheancientcustomsisthewaytopreservetheoriginalpurityofmorals。

Besides，ifbysomerevolutionthestatehashappenedtoassumeanewform，thisseldomcanbeeffectedwithoutinfinitepainsandlabour，andhardlyeverbyidleanddebauchedpersons。Eventhosewhohadbeentheinstrumentsoftherevolutionweredesirousitshouldberelished，whichisdifficulttocompasswithoutgoodlaws。Henceitisthatancientinstitutionsgenerallytendtoreformthepeople’smanners，andthoseofmoderndatetocorruptthem。Inthecourseofalongadministration，thedescenttoviceisinsensible；butthereisnoreascendingtovirtuewithoutmakingthemostgenerousefforts。

Ithasbeenquestionedwhetherthemembersofthesenatewearespeakingofoughttobeforlifeoronlychosenforatime。Doubtlesstheyoughttobeforlife，aswasthecustomatRome，[15]atSparta，[16]andevenatAthens。ForwemustnotconfoundthesenateatAthens，whichwasabodythatchangedeverythreemonths，withtheAreopagus，whosemembers，asstandingpatterns，wereestablishedforlife。

Letthisbethereforeageneralmaxim；thatinasenatedesignedtobearule，andthedepository，asitwere，ofmanners，themembersoughttobechosenforlife：inasenateintendedfortheadministrationofaffairs，themembersmaybechanged。

Thespirit，saysAristotle，waxesoldaswellasthebody。Thisreflectionholdsgoodonlyinregardtoasinglemagistrate，butcannotbeappliedtoasenatorialassembly。

AtAthens，besidestheAreopagus，therewereguardiansofthepublicmorals，aswellasofthelaws。[17]AtSparta，alltheoldmenwerecensors。AtRome，thecensorshipwascommittedtotwoparticularmagistrates。Asthesenatewatchedoverthepeople，thecensorsweretohaveaneyeoverthepeopleandthesenate。Theirofficewastoreformthecorruptionsoftherepublic，tostigmatiseindolence，tocensureneglects，andtocorrectmistakes；astoflagrantcrimes，thesewerelefttothepunishmentofthelaws。

ThatRomanlawwhichrequiredtheaccusationsincasesofadulterytobepublicwasadmirablywellcalculatedforpreservingthepurityofmorals；itintimidatedmarriedwomen，aswellasthosewhoweretowatchovertheirconduct。

Nothingcontributesmoretothepreservationofmoralsthananextremesubordinationoftheyoungtotheold。Thustheyarebothrestrained，theformerbytheirrespectforthoseofadvancedage，andthelatterbytheirregardforthemselves。

Nothinggivesagreaterforcetothelawthanaperfectsubordinationbetweenthecitizensandthemagistrate。"ThegreatdifferencewhichLycurgusestablishedbetweenSpartaandtheothercities，"saysXenophon，[18]"consistschieflyintheobediencethecitizensshowtotheirlaws；theyrunwhenthemagistratecallsthem。ButatAthensarichmanwouldbehighlydispleasedtobethoughtdependentonthemagistrate。"

Paternalauthorityislikewiseofgreatusetowardsthepreservationofmorals。Wehavealreadyobservedthatinarepublicthereisnotsocoerciveaforceasinothergovernments。Thelawsmustthereforeendeavourtosupplythisdefectbysomemeansorother；andthisisdonebypaternalauthority。

FathersatRomehadthepoweroflifeanddeathovertheirchildren。[19]

AtSparta，everyfatherhadarighttocorrectanotherman’schild。

PaternalauthorityendedatRometogetherwiththerepublic。Inmonarchies，wheresuchapurityofmoralsisnotrequired，theyarecontrolledbynootherauthoritythanthatofthemagistrates。

TheRomanlaws，whichaccustomedyoungpeopletodependence，establishedalongminority。Perhapswearemistakeninconformingtothiscustom；

thereisnonecessityforsomuchconstraintinmonarchies。

Thisverysubordinationinarepublicmightmakeitnecessaryforthefathertocontinueinthepossessionofhischildren’sfortuneduringlife，aswasthecustomatRome。Butthisisnotagreeabletothespiritofmonarchy。

8。InwhatMannertheLawsshouldrelatetothePrincipleofGovernmentinanAristocracy。Ifthepeoplearevirtuousinanaristocracy，theyenjoyverynearlythesamehappinessasinapopulargovernment，andthestategrowspowerful。Butasagreatshareofvirtueisveryrarewheremen’sfortunesaresounequal，thelawsmusttendasmuchaspossibletoinfuseaspiritofmoderation，andendeavourtore—establishthatequalitywhichwasnecessarilyremovedbytheconstitution。

Thespiritofmoderationiswhatwecallvirtueinanaristocracy；itsuppliestheplaceofthespiritofequalityinapopularstate。

Asthepompandsplendourwithwhichkingsaresurroundedformapartoftheirpower，somodestyandsimplicityofmannersconstitutethestrengthofanaristocraticnobility。[20]Whentheyaffectnodistinction，whentheymixwiththepeople，dresslikethem，andwiththemsharealltheirpleasures，thepeopleareapttoforgettheirsubjectionandweakness。

Everygovernmenthasitsnatureandprinciple。Anaristocracymustnotthereforeassumethenatureandprincipleofmonarchy；whichwouldbethecasewerethenoblestobeinvestedwithpersonalprivilegesdistinctfromthoseoftheirbody；privilegesoughttobeforthesenate，andsimplerespectforthesenators。

Inaristocraticgovernmentstherearetwoprincipalsourcesofdisorder：

excessiveinequalitybetweenthegovernorsandthegoverned；andthesameinequalitybetweenthedifferentmembersofthebodythatgoverns。

Fromthesetwoinequalities，hatredsandjealousiesarise，whichthelawsoughtevertopreventorrepress。

Thefirstinequalityischieflywhentheprivilegesofthenobilityarehonourableonlyastheyareignominioustothepeople。SuchwasthelawatRomebywhichthepatricianswereforbiddentomarryplebeians；[21]alawthathadnoothereffectthantorenderthepatriciansontheonesidemorehaughty，andontheothermoreodious。Thereadermayseewhatadvantagesthetribunesderivedthenceintheirharangues。

Thisinequalityoccurslikewisewhentheconditionofthecitizensdifferswithregardtotaxes，whichmayhappeninfourdifferentways：

whenthenoblesassumetheprivilegeofpayingnone；whentheycommitfraudstoexemptthemselves；[22]whentheyengrossthepublicmoney，underpretenceofrewardsorappointmentsfortheirrespectiveemployments；infine，whentheyrenderthecommonpeopletributary，anddivideamongtheirownbodytheprofitsarisingfromtheseveralsubsidies。Thislastcaseisveryrare；anaristocracysoinstitutedwouldbethemostintolerableofallgovernments。

WhileRomeinclinedtowardsaristocracy，sheavoidedalltheseinconveniences。Themagistratesneverreceivedanyemolumentsfromtheiroffice。Thechiefmenoftherepublicweretaxedliketherest，nay，moreheavily；andsometimesthetaxesfelluponthemalone。Infine，farfromsharingamongthemselvestherevenuesofthestate，alltheycoulddrawfromthepublictreasure，andallthewealththatfortuneflungintotheirlaps，theybestowedfreelyonthepeople，tobeexcusedfromacceptingpublichonours。[23]

Itisafundamentalmaximthatlargessesarepernicioustothepeopleinademocracy，butsalutaryinanaristocraticgovernment。Theformermakethemforgettheyarecitizens，thelatterbringthemtoasenseofit。

Iftherevenuesofthestatearenotdistributedamongthepeople，theymustbeconvincedatleastoftheirbeingwelladministered：tofeasttheireyeswiththepublictreasureiswiththemthesamethingalmostasenjoyingit。ThegoldenchaindisplayedatVenice，therichesexhibitedatRomeinpublictriumphs，thetreasurespreservedinthetempleofSaturn，wereinrealitythewealthofthepeople。

Itisaveryessentialpointinanaristocracythatthenoblesthemselvesshouldnotlevythetaxes。ThefirstorderofthestateinRomeneverconcernedthemselveswithit；thelevyingofthetaxeswascommittedtothesecond，andeventhisinprocessoftimewasattendedwithgreatinconveniences。Inanaristocracyofthiskind，wherethenoblesleviedthetaxes，theprivatepeoplewouldbeallatthediscretionofpersonsinpublicemployments；andtherewouldbenosuchthingasasuperiortribunaltochecktheirpower。Themembersappointedtoremovetheabuseswouldratherenjoythem。Thenobleswouldbeliketheprincesofdespoticgovernments，whoconfiscatewhateverestatestheyplease。

Soonwouldtheprofitshencearisingbeconsideredasapatrimony，whichavaricewouldenlargeatpleasure。Thefarmswouldbelowered，andthepublicrevenuesreducedtonothing。Thisisthereasonthatsomegovernments，withouthavingeverreceivedanyremarkableshock，havedwindledawaytosuchadegreeasnotonlytheirneighbours，buteventheirownsubjects，havebeensurprisedatit。

Thelawsshouldlikewiseforbidthenoblesallkindsofcommerce：

merchantsofsuchunboundedcreditwouldmonopolisealltothemselves。

Commerceisaprofessionofpeoplewhoareuponanequality；henceamongdespoticstatesthemostmiserablearethoseinwhichtheprinceapplieshimselftotrade。

ThelawsofVenicedebar[24]thenoblesfromcommerce，bywhichtheymighteveninnocentlyacquireexorbitantwealth。

Thelawsoughttoemploythemosteffectualmeansformakingthenoblesdojusticetothepeople。Iftheyhavenotestablishedatribune，theyoughttobeatribunethemselves。

Everysortofasyluminoppositiontotheexecutionofthelawsdestroysaristocracy，andissoonsucceededbytyranny。Theyoughtalwaystomortifythelustofdominion。Thereshouldbeeitheratemporaryorperpetualmagistratetokeepthenoblesinawe，astheEphoriatSpartaandtheStateInquisitorsatVenice——magistratessubjecttonoformalities。Thissortofgovernmentstandsinneedofthestrongestsprings：thusamouthofstone[25]isopentoeveryinformeratVenice——amouthtowhichonewouldbeapttogivetheappellationoftyranny。

Thesearbitrarymagistratesinanaristocracybearsomeanalogytothecensorshipindemocracies，whichofitsownnatureisequallyindependent。And，indeed，thecensorsoughttobesubjecttonoinquiryinrelationtotheirconductduringtheiroffice；theyshouldmeetwithathoroughconfidence，andneverbediscouraged。InthisrespectthepracticeoftheRomansdeservedadmiration；magistratesofalldenominationswereaccountablefortheiradministration，[26]exceptthecensors。[27]

Therearetwoveryperniciousthingsinanaristocracy——excesseitherofpoverty，orofwealthinthenobility。Topreventtheirpoverty，itisnecessary，aboveallthings，toobligethemtopaytheirdebtsintime。Tomoderatetheexcessofwealth，prudentandgradualregulationsshouldbemade；butnoconfiscations，noagrarianlaws，noexpungingofdebts；theseareproductiveofinfinitemischief。

Thelawsoughttoabolishtherightofprimogenitureamongthenobles[28]totheendthatbyacontinualdivisionoftheinheritancestheirfortunesmaybealwaysuponalevel。

Thereshouldbenosubstitutions，nopowersofredemption，norightsofMajorasgo，oradoption。Thecontrivancesforperpetuatingthegrandeuroffamiliesinmonarchicalgovernmentsoughtnevertobeemployedinaristocracies。[29]

Whenthelawshavecompassedtheequalityoffamilies，thenextthingistopreserveaproperharmonyandunionamongthem。Thequarrelsofthenobilityoughttobequicklydecided；otherwisethecontestsofindividualsbecomethoseoffamilies。Arbitersmayterminate，orevenprevent，theriseotdisputes。

Infine，thelawsmustnotfavourthedistinctionsraisedbyvanityamongfamilies，underpretencethattheyaremorenobleorancientthanothers。Pretencesofthisnatureoughttoberankedamongtheweaknessesofprivatepersons。

WehaveonlytocastaneyeuponSparta；therewemayseehowtheEphoricontrivedtocheckthefoiblesofthekings，aswellasthoseofthenobilityandcommonpeople。

9。InwhatMannertheLawsareinrelationtotheirPrincipleinMonarchies。Ashonouristheprincipleofamonarchicalgovernment，thelawsoughttobeinrelationtothisprinciple。

Theyshouldendeavourtosupportthenobility，inrespecttowhomhonourmaybe，insomemeasure，deemedbothchildandparent。

Theyshouldrenderthenobilityhereditary，notasaboundarybetweenthepoweroftheprinceandtheweaknessofthepeople，butasthelinkwhichconnectsthemboth。

Inthisgovernment，substitutionswhichpreservetheestatesoffamiliesundividedareextremelyuseful，thoughinothersnotsoproper。

Herethepowerofredemptionisofservice，asitrestorestonoblefamiliesthelandsthathadbeenalienatedbytheprodigalityofaparent。

Thelandofthenobilityoughttohaveprivilegesaswellastheirpersons。Themonarch’sdignityisinseparablefromthatofhiskingdom；

and—thedignityofthenoblemanfromthatofhisfief。

Alltheseprivilegesmustbepeculiartothenobility，andincommunicabletothepeople，unlessweintendtoactcontrarytotheprincipleofgovernment，andtodiminishthepowerofthenoblestogetherwiththatofthepeople。

Substitutionsarearestrainttocommerce，thepowerofredemptionproducesaninfinitenumberofprocesses；everyestateinlandthatissoldthroughoutthekingdomisinsomemeasurewithoutanownerforthespaceofayear。Privilegesannexedtofiefsgiveapowerveryburdensometothosegovernmentswhichtoleratethem。Thesearetheinconveniencesofnobility——inconveniences，however，thatvanishwhenconfrontedwithitsgeneralutility：butwhentheseprivilegesarecommunicatedtothepeople，everyprincipleofgovernmentiswantonlyviolated。

Inmonarchiesapersonmayleavethebulkofhisestatetooneofhischildren——apermissionimproperinanyothergovernment。

Thelawsoughttofavourallkindsofcommerce[30]consistentwiththeconstitution，totheendthatthesubjectsmay，withoutruiningthemselves，beabletosatisfythecontinualcravingsoftheprinceandhiscourt。

Theyshouldestablishsomeregulationthatthemannerofcollectingthetaxesmaynotbemoreburdensomethanthetaxesthemselves。

Theweightofdutiesproduceslabour，labourweariness，andwearinessthespiritofindolence。

10。OftheExpeditionpeculiartotheExecutivePowerinMonarchies。

Greatistheadvantagewhichamonarchicalgovernmenthasoverarepublic：asthestateisconductedbyasingleperson，theexecutivepoweristherebyenabledtoactwithgreaterexpedition。Butasthisexpeditionmaydegenerateintorapidity，thelawsshouldusesomecontrivancetoslackenit。Theyoughtnotonlytofavourthenatureofeachconstitution，butlikewisetoremedytheabusesthatmightresultfromthisverynature。

CardinalRichelieu[31]advisesmonarchstopermitnosuchthingsassocietiesorcommunitiesthatraisedifficultiesuponeverytrifle。Ifthisman’shearthadnotbeenbewitchedwiththeloveofdespoticpower，stillthesearbitrarynotionswouldhavefilledhishead。

Thebodiesentrustedwiththedepositionofthelawsarenevermoreobedientthanwhentheyproceedslowly，andusethatreflectionintheprince’saffairswhichcanscarcelybeexpectedfromtheignoranceofacourt，orfromtheprecipitationofitscouncils。[32]

Whatwouldhavebecomeofthefinestmonarchyintheworldifthemagistrates，bytheirdelays，theircomplaints，andentreaties，hadnotcheckedtherapidityevenoftheirprinces’virtues，whenthesemonarchs，consultingonlythegenerousimpulseoftheirminds，wouldfainhavegivenaboundlessrewardtoservicesperformedwithanunlimitedcourageandfidelity？

11。OftheExcellenceofaMonarchicalGovernment。Monarchyhasagreatadvantageoveradespoticgovernment。Asitnaturallyrequiresthereshouldbeseveralordersorranksofsubjects，thestateismorepermanent，theconstitutionmoresteady，andthepersonofhimwhogovernsmoresecure。

Ciceroisofopinionthattheestablishingofthetribunespreservedtherepublic。"Andindeed，"sayshe，"theviolenceofaheadlesspeopleismoreterrible。Achieforheadissensiblethattheaffairdependsuponhimself，andthereforehethinks；butthepeopleintheirimpetuosityareignorantofthedangerintowhichtheyhurrythemselves。"Thisreflectionmaybeappliedtoadespoticgovernment，whichisapeoplewithouttribunes；andtoamonarchy，wherethepeoplehavesomesortoftribunes。

Accordinglyitisobservablethatinthecommotionsofadespoticgovernment，thepeople，hurriedawaybytheirpassions，areapttopushthingsasfarastheycango。Thedisorderstheycommitareallextreme；

whereasinmonarchiesmattersareseldomcarriedtoexcess。Thechiefsareapprehensiveontheirownaccount；theyareafraidofbeingabandoned，andtheintermediatedependentpowersdonotchoosethatthepopulaceshouldhavetoomuchtheupperhand。Itrarelyhappensthatthestatesofthekingdomareentirelycorrupted：theprinceadherestothese；andtheseditious，whohaveneitherwillnorhopestosubvertthegovernment，haveneitherpowernorwilltodethronetheprince。

Inthesecircumstancesmenofprudenceandauthorityinterfere；moderatemeasuresarefirstproposed，thencompliedwith，andthingsatlengthareredressed；thelawsresumetheirvigour，andcommandsubmission。

Thusallourhistoriesarefullofcivilwarswithoutrevolutions，whilethehistoriesofdespoticgovernmentsaboundwithrevolutionswithoutcivilwars。

Thewritersofthehistoryofthecivilwarsofsomecountries，eventhosewhofomentedthem，sufficientlydemonstratethelittlefoundationprinceshavetosuspecttheauthoritywithwhichtheyinvestparticularbodiesofmen；since，evenundertheunhappycircumstanceoftheirerrors，theysighedonlyafterthelawsandtheirduty；andrestrained，morethantheywerecapableofinflaming，theimpetuosityoftherevolted。[33]CardinalRichelieu，reflectingperhapsthathehadtoomuchreducedthestatesofthekingdom，hasrecoursetothevirtuesoftheprinceandofhisministersforthesupport[34]ofgovernment：butherequiressomanythings，thatindeedthereisnonebutanangelcapableofsuchattention，suchresolutionandknowledge；andscarcelycanweflatterourselvesthatweshalleverseesuchaprinceandministerswhilemonarchysubsists。

Aspeoplewholiveunderagoodgovernmentarehappierthanthosewhowithoutruleorleaderswanderabouttheforests，somonarchswholiveunderthefundamentallawsoftheircountryarefarhappierthandespoticprinceswhohavenothingtoregulate，neithertheirownpassionsnorthoseoftheirsubjects。

12。ThesameSubjectcontinued。Letusnotlookformagnanimityindespoticgovernments；theprincecannotimpartagreatnesswhichhehasnothimself；withhimthereisnosuchthingasglory。