第9章

WearesurprisedatthepunishmentoftheAreopagiteforkillingasparrowwhich，toescapethepursuitofahawk，hadtakenshelterinhisbosom。SurprisedwearealsothatanAreopagiteshouldputhissontodeathforputtingouttheeyesofalittlebird。Butletusreflectthatthequestionheredoesnotrelatetoacriminalsentence，buttoajudgmentconcerningmannersinarepublicfoundedonmanners。

Inmonarchiesthereshouldbenocensors；theformerarefoundedonhonour，andthenatureofhonouristohavethewholeworldforitscensor。Everymanwhofailsinthisarticleissubjecttothereproachesevenofthosewhoarevoidofhonour。

Herethecensorswouldbespoiledbytheverypeoplewhomtheyoughttocorrect：theycouldnotprevailagainstthecorruptionofamonarchy；

thecorruptionratherwouldbetoostrongagainstthem。

Henceitisobviousthatthereoughttobenocensorsindespoticgovernments。TheexampleofChinaseemstoderogatefromthisrule；butweshallsee，inthecourseofthiswork，theparticularreasonsofthatinstitution。

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1。Plutarch，Solon。

2。Ibid。

3。PhilolausofCorinthmadealawatAthensthatthenumberoftheportionsoflandandthatofinheritancesshouldbealwaysthesame。——

Aristotle，Politics，ii。7，12。

4。Laws，xi。

5。CorneliusNepos，preface。Thiscustombeganintheearliesttimes。

ThusAbrahamsaysofSarah，"Sheismysister，myfather’sdaughter，butnotmymother’s。"Thesamereasonsoccasionedtheestablishingthesamelawamongdifferentnations。

6。Despecialibuslegibusqu？pertinentadpr？ceptarDecalogi。

7。Bookx。

8。Athenisdimidiumlicet，Alexandri？totum。——Seneca，DeMorteClaudii。

9。Platohasalawofthiskind。Laws，v。

10。Aristotle。ii。7。

11。Solonmadefourclasses：thefirst，ofthosewhohadanincomeof500minaseitherincornorliquidfruits；thesecond，ofthosewhohad300，andwereabletokeepahorse；thethird，ofsuchashadonly200；

thefourth，ofallthosewholivedbytheirmanuallabour。——Plutarch，Solon。

12。Solonexcludesfrompublicemploymentsallthoseofthefourthclass。

13。Theyinsisteduponalargerdivisionoftheconqueredlands。——

Plutarch，LivesoftheancientKingsandCommanders。

14。Inthese，theportionsorfortunesofwomenoughttobeverymuchlimited。

15。Themagistratestherewereannual，andthesenatorsforlife。

16。Lycurgus，saysXenophon，DeRepub。Laced？m。，10。§1，2，ordainedthatthesenatorsshouldbechosenfromamongsttheoldmen，totheendthattheymightnotbeneglectedinthedeclineoflife；thusbymakingthemjudgesofthecourageofyoungpeople，herenderedtheoldageoftheformermorehonourablethanthestrengthandvigourofthelatter。

17。EventheAreopagusitselfwassubjecttotheircensure。

18。DeRepub。Laced？m。，8。

19。WemayseeintheRomanHistoryhowusefulthispowerwastotherepublic。Ishallgiveaninstanceeveninthetimeofitsgreatestcorruption。AulusFulviuswassetoutonhisjourneyinordertojoinCatiline；hisfathercalledhimback，andputhimtodeath。——Sallust，DeBelloCatil。，xxxiv。

20。InourdaystheVenetians，whoinmanyrespectsmaybesaidtohaveaverywisegovernment，decidedadisputebetweenanobleVenetianandagentlemanofTerraFirmainrespecttoprecedencyinachurch，bydeclaringthatoutofVeniceanobleVenetianhadnopre—eminenceoveranyothercitizen。

21。Itwasinsertedbythedecemvirsinthetwolasttables。SeeDionysiusHelicarnassus，x。

22。Asinsomearistocraciesinourtime；nothingismoreprejudicialtothegovernment。

23。SeeinStrabo，xiv。，inwhatmannertheRhodiansbehavedinthisrespect。

24。AmelotdelaHoussaye，OftheGovernmentofVenice，partIII。TheClaudianlawforbadethesenatorstohaveanyshipatseathatheldabovefortybushels。——Livy，xxi。63。

25。Theinformersthrowtheirscrollsintoit。

26。SeeLivy，xlix。Acensorcouldnotbetroubledevenbyacensor；

eachmadehisremarkwithouttakingtheopinionofhiscolleague；andwhenitotherwisehappened，thecensorshipwasinamannerabolished。

27。AtAthenstheLogist？，whomadeallthemagistratesaccountablefortheirconduct，gavenoaccountthemselves。

28。ItissopractisedatVenice。——AmelotdelaHoussaye，pp。30，31。

29。Themaindesignofsomearistocraciesseemstobelessthesupportofthestatethanoftheirnobility。

30。Itistoleratedonlyinthecommonpeople。SeeLeg。3，Cod。decomm。

etmercatoribus，whichisfullofgoodsense。

31。Testamentpolit。

32。Barbariscunctatioservilis，statimexequiregiumvidetur。——

Tacitus，Annals。，v。32。

33。MemoirsofCardinaldeRetz，andotherhistories。

34。Testamentpolit。

35。EdifyingLetters，coll。ii，p。315。

36。ContinuationofPufendorf，IntroductiontotheHistoryofEurope，inthearticleonSweden，10。

37。AccordingtoSirJohnChardin，thereisnocouncilofstateinPersia。

38。SeeRicaut，StateoftheOttomanEmpire，p。196。

39。SeeconcerningtheinheritancesoftheTurks，AncientandModernSparta。SeealsoRicautontheOttomanempire。

40。CollectionofVoyagesthatContributedtotheEstablishmentoftheEastIndiaCompany，i。ThelawofPeguislesscruel；iftherehappentobechildren，thekingsucceedsonlytotwo—thirds。Ibid。，iii，p。1。

41。Seethedifferentconstitutions，especiallythatof1722。

42。SeeJustin。

43。Seethebookoflawsasrelativetothenatureoftheclimate。Bookxiv，below。

44。Laquilletiere，AncientandModernSparta，p。463。

45。Thesamemaybesaidofcompositionsinregardtofairbankrupts。

46。TherewasnosuchestablishmentmadetilltheJulianlaw，DeCessionebonorum；whichpreservedthemfromprisonandfromanignominiousdivisionoftheirgoods。——Cod。，ii。tit。12。

47TheyseemtohavebeentoofondofconfiscationsintherepublicofAthens。

48。Authenticabonadamnatorum。——Cod。debon。proscript。seudamn。

49。DelaRepublique，v。3。

50。UtessePhoebidulciuslumensoletJamjamcadentis——Seneca，Troas，V。i。1。

51。CollectionofVoyagesthatContributedtotheEstablishmentoftheEastIndiaCompany，i，p。80。

52。Laws，xii。

53。Leg。6，§2；Dig。adleg。Jul。repet。

54。Munuscula。

55。Plato，inhisRepublic，viii，rankstheserefusalsamongthemarksofthecorruptionofarepublic。InhisLaws，vi，heordersthemtobepunishedbyafine；atVenicetheyarepunishedwithbanishment。

56。VictorAmadeus。

57。Somecenturionshavingappealedtothepeoplefortheemploymentswhichtheyhadbeforeenjoyed，"Itisjust，mycomrades，"saidacenturion，"thatyoushouldlookuponeverypostashonourableinwhichyouhaveanopportunityofdefendingtherepublic。"——Livy，dec。5，xlii，34。

58。Neimperiumadoptimosnobiliumtransferretur，SenatummilitiavetuitGallienus，etiamadireexercitum。——AureliusVictor，DeC？saribus。

59。Augustusdeprivedthesenators，proconsuls，andgovernorsoftheprivilegeofwearingarms。——Dio，xxxiii。

60。Constantine。SeeZozimus，ii。

61。AmmianusMarcellinus，xxvi，EtCivilia，moreveterum，etbellarecturo。

62。Republic，viii。

63。WeseethelazinessofSpain，whereallpublicemploymentsaregivenaway。

BookVI。ConsequencesofthePrinciplesofDifferentGovernmentswithRespecttotheSimplicityofCivilandCriminalLaws，theFormofJudgments，andtheInflictingofPunishments1。OftheSimplicityofCivilLawsindifferentGovernments。Monarchiesdonotpermitofsogreatasimplicityoflawsasdespoticgovernments。

Forinmonarchiestheremustbecourtsofjudicature；thesemustgivetheirdecisions；thedecisionsmustbepreservedandlearned，thatwemayjudgeinthesamemannerto—dayasyesterday，andthatthelivesandpropertyofthecitizensmaybeascertainandfixedastheveryconstitutionofthestate。

Inmonarchies，theadministrationofjustice，whichdecidesnotonlyinwhateverbelongstolifeandproperty，butlikewisetohonour，demandsveryscrupulousinquiries。Thedelicacyofthejudgeincreasesinproportiontotheincreaseofhistrust，andoftheimportanceoftheinterestsonwhichhedetermines。

Wemustnot，therefore，besurprisedtofindsomanyrules，restrictions，andextensionsinthelawsofthosecountries——rulesthatmultiplytheparticularcases，andseemtomakeofreasonitselfanart。

Thedifferenceofrank，birth，andconditionestablishedinmonarchicalgovernmentsisfrequentlyattendedwithdistinctionsinthenatureofproperty；andthelawsrelatingtotheconstitutionofthisgovernmentmayaugmentthenumberofthesedistinctions。Hence，amongusgoodsaredividedintorealestates，purchases，dowries，paraphernalia，paternalandmaternalinheritances；movablesofdifferentkinds；estatesheldinfee—simple，orintail；acquiredbydescentorconveyance；allodial，orheldbysoccage；groundrents；orannuities。Eachsortofgoodsissubjecttoparticularrules，whichmustbecompliedwithinthedisposalofthem。Thesethingsmustneedsdiminishthesimplicityofthelaws。

Inourgovernmentsthefiefshavebecomehereditary。Itwasnecessarythatthenobilityshouldhaveafixedproperty，thatis，thefiefshouldhaveacertainconsistency，totheendthattheproprietormightbealwaysinacapacityofservingtheprince。Thismusthavebeenproductiveofgreatvarieties；forinstance，therearecountrieswherefiefscouldnotbedividedamongthebrothers；inothers，theyoungerbrothersmaybeallowedamoregeneroussubsistence。

Themonarchwhoknowseachofhisprovincesmayestablishdifferentlaws，ortoleratedifferentcustoms。Butasthedespoticprinceknowsnothing，andcanattendtonothing，hemusttakegeneralmeasures，andgovernbyarigidandinflexiblewill，whichthroughouthiswholedominionsproducesthesameeffect；inshort，everythingbendsunderhisfeet。

Inproportionasthedecisionsofthecourtsofjudicaturearemultipliedinmonarchies，thelawisloadedwithdecreesthatsometimescontradictoneanother；eitherbecausesucceedingjudgesareofadifferentwayofthinking，orbecausethesamecausesaresometimeswell，andatothertimesill，defended；or，infine，byreasonofaninfinitenumberofabuses，towhichallhumanregulationsareliable。

Thisisanecessaryevil，whichthelegislatorredressesfromtimetotime，ascontraryeventothespiritofmoderategovernments。Forwhenpeopleareobligedtohaverecoursetocourtsofjudicature，thisshouldcomefromthenatureoftheconstitution，andnotfromthecontradictionoruncertaintyofthelaw。

Ingovernmentswheretherearenecessarydistinctionsofpersons，theremustlikewisebeprivileges。Thisalsodiminishesthesimplicity，andcreatesathousandexceptions。

Oneoftheprivilegesleastburdensometosociety，andespeciallytohimwhoconfersit，isthatofpleadinginonecourtinpreferencetoanother。Herenewdifficultiesarise，whenitbecomesaquestionbeforewhichcourtweshallplead。

Fardifferentisthecaseofthepeopleunderdespoticgovernments。InthosecountriesIcanseenothingthatthelegislatorisabletodecree，orthemagistratetojudge。Asthelandsbelongtotheprince，itfollowsthattherearescarcelyanycivillawsinregardtolandedproperty。Fromtherightthesovereignhastosuccessions，itfollows，likewise，thattherearenonerelatingtoinheritances。Themonopoliesestablishedbytheprinceforhimselfinsomecountriesrenderallsortsofcommerciallawsquiteuseless。Themarriageswhichtheyusuallycontractwithfemaleslavesarethecausethattherearescarcelyanycivillawsrelatingtodowries，ortotheparticularadvantageofmarriedwomen。Fromtheprodigiousmultitudeofslaves，itfollows，likewise，thatthereareveryfewwhohaveanysuchthingasawilloftheirown，andofcourseareanswerablefortheirconductbeforeajudge。Mostmoralactionsthatareonlyinconsequenceofafather’s，ahusband’s，oramaster’swill，areregulatedbythem，andnotbythemagistrates。

Iforgottoobservethataswhatwecallhonourisathinghardlyknowninthosecountries，theseveraldifficultiesrelatingtothisarticle，thoughofsuchimportancewithus，arewiththemquiteoutofthequestion。Despoticpowerisself—sufficient；rounditthereisanabsolutevacuum。Henceitisthatwhentravellersfavouruswiththedescriptionofcountrieswherearbitraryswayprevails，theyseldommakementionofcivillaws。[1]

Alloccasions，therefore，ofwranglingandlaw—suitsarehereremoved。

Andtothisinpartisitowingthatlitigiouspeopleinthosecountriesaresoroughlyhandled。Astheinjusticeoftheirdemandisneitherscreened，palliated，norprotectedbyaninfinitenumberoflaws，ofcourseitisimmediatelydiscovered。

2。OftheSimplicityofCriminalLawsindifferentGovernments。Wehearitgenerallysaid，thatjusticeoughttobeadministeredwithusasinTurkey。Isitpossible，then，thatthemostignorantofallnationsshouldbethemostclear—sightedonapointwhichitmostbehovesmankindtoknow？

Ifweexaminethesetformsofjusticewithrespecttothetroublethesubjectundergoesinrecoveringhisproperty，orinobtainingsatisfactionforaninjuryoraffront，weshallfindthemdoubtlesstoonumerous：butifweconsiderthemintherelationtheybeartothelibertyandsecurityofeveryindividual，weshalloftenfindthemtoofew；andbeconvincedthatthetrouble，expense，delays，andeventheverydangersofourjudiciaryproceedings，arethepricethateachsubjectpaysforhisliberty。

InTurkey，wherelittleregardisshowntothehonour，life，orestateofthesubject，allcausesarespeedilydecided。Themethodofdeterminingthemisamatterofindifference，providedtheybedetermined。Thepasha，afteraquickhearing，orderswhichpartyhepleasestobebastinadoed，andthensendsthemabouttheirbusiness。

Hereitwouldbedangeroustobeofalitigiousdisposition；thissupposesastrongdesireofobtainingjustice，asettledaversion，anactivemind，andasteadinessinpursuingone’spoint。Allthisshouldbeavoidedinagovernmentwherefearoughttobetheonlyprevailingsentiment，andinwhichpopulardisturbancesarefrequentlyattendedwithsuddenandunforeseenrevolutions。Hereeverymanoughttoknowthatthemagistratemustnothearhisnamementioned，andthathissecuritydependsentirelyonhisbeingreducedtoakindofannihilation。

Butinmoderategovernments，wherethelifeofthemeanestsubjectisdeemedprecious，nomanisstrippedofhishonourorpropertyuntilafteralonginquiry；andnomanisbereftoflifetillhisverycountryhasattackedhim——anattackthatisnevermadewithoutleavinghimallpossiblemeansofmakinghisdefence。

Henceitisthatwhenapersonrendershimselfabsolute，[2]heimmediatelythinksofreducingthenumberoflaws。Inagovernmentthusconstitutedtheyaremoreaffectedwithparticularinconveniencesthanwiththelibertyofthesubject，whichisverylittleminded。

Inrepublics，itisplainthatasmanyformalitiesatleastarenecessaryasinmonarchies。Inbothgovernmentstheyincreaseinproportiontothevaluewhichissetonthehonour，fortune，liberty，andlifeofthesubject。

Inrepublicangovernments，menareallequal；equaltheyarealsoindespoticgovernments：intheformer，becausetheyareeverything；inthelatter，becausetheyarenothing。

3。InwhatGovernmentsandinwhatCasestheJudgesoughttodetermineaccordingtotheexpressLetteroftheLaw。Theneareragovernmentapproachestowardsarepublic，themorethemannerofjudgingbecomessettledandfixed；henceitwasafaultintherepublicofSpartafortheEphoritopasssucharbitraryjudgmentswithouthavinganylawstodirectthem。ThefirstconsulsatRomepronouncedsentenceinthesamemannerastheEphori；buttheinconvenienceofthisproceedingwassoonfelt，andtheywereobligedtohaverecoursetoexpressanddeterminatelaws。

Indespoticgovernmentstherearenolaws；thejudgehimselfishisownrule。Therearelawsinmonarchies；andwheretheseareexplicit，thejudgeconformstothem；wheretheyareotherwise，heendeavourstoinvestigatetheirspirit。Inrepublics，theverynatureoftheconstitutionrequiresthejudgestofollowtheletterofthelaw；

otherwisethelawmightbeexplainedtotheprejudiceofeverycitizen，incaseswheretheirhonour，property，orlifeisconcerned。

AtRomethejudgeshadnomoretodothantodeclarethatthepersonsaccusedwereguiltyofaparticularcrime，andthenthepunishmentwasfoundinthelaws，asmaybeseenindiverslawsstillextant。InEnglandthejurygivetheirverdictwhetherthefactbroughtundertheircognisancebeprovedornot；ifitbeproved，thejudgepronouncesthepunishmentinflictedbythelaw，andforthisheneedsonlytoopenhiseyes。

4。OftheMannerofpassingJudgment。Hencearisethedifferentmodesofpassingjudgment。Inmonarchiesthejudgeschoosethemethodofarbitration；theydeliberatetogether，theycommunicatetheirsentimentsforthesakeofunanimity；theymoderatetheiropinions，inordertorenderthemconformabletothoseofothers：andthelessernumberareobligedtogivewaytothemajority。Butthisisnotagreeabletothenatureofarepublic。AtRome，andinthecitiesofGreece，thejudgesneverenteredintoaconsultation；eachgavehisopinioninoneofthesethreeways："Iabsolve，""Icondemn，""Itdoesnotappearcleartome"；[3]thiswasbecausethepeoplejudged，orweresupposedtojudge。

Butthepeoplearefarfrombeingcivilians；alltheserestrictionsandmethodsofarbitrationareabovetheirreach；theymusthaveonlyoneobjectandonesinglefactsetbeforethem；andthentheyhaveonlytoseewhethertheyoughttocondemn，toacquit，ortosuspendtheirjudgment。

TheRomansintroducedsetformsofactions，[4]aftertheexampleoftheGreeks，andestablishedarulethateachcauseshouldbedirectedbyitsproperaction。Thiswasnecessaryintheirmannerofjudging；itwasnecessarytofixthestateofthequestion，thatthepeoplemighthaveitalwaysbeforetheireyes。Otherwise，inalongprocess，thisstateofthequestionwouldcontinuallychange，andbenolongerdistinguished。

HenceitfollowedthattheRomanjudgesgrantedonlythesimpledemand，withoutmakinganyaddition，deduction，orlimitation。Butthepr？torsdevisedotherformsofactions，whichwerecalledexbonafide，inwhichthemethodofpronouncingsentencewaslefttothedispositionofthejudge。Thiswasmoreagreeabletothespiritofmonarchy。HenceitisasayingamongtheFrenchlawyers，thatinFrance[5]allactionsareexbonafide。

5。InwhatGovernmentstheSovereignmaybeJudge。Machiavel[6]

attributesthelossofthelibertyofFlorencetothepeople’snotjudginginabodyincasesofhightreasonagainstthemselves，aswascustomaryatRome。Forthispurposetheyhadeightjudges："butthefew，"saysMachiavel，"arecorruptedbyafew。"Ishouldwillinglyadoptthemaximofthisgreatman。Butasinthosecasesthepoliticalinterestprevailsinsomemeasureoverthecivil（foritisalwaysaninconveniencethatthepeopleshouldbejudgesintheirowncause），inordertoremedythisevil，thelawsmustprovideasmuchaspossibleforthesecurityofindividuals。

WiththisviewtheRomanlegislatorsdidtwothings：theygavethepersonsaccusedpermissiontobanishthemselves[7]beforesentencewaspronounced；[8]andtheyordainedthatthegoodsofthosewhowerecondemnedshouldbesacred，topreventtheirbeingconfiscatedtothepeople。WeshallseeinBookXItheotherlimitationsthatweresettothejudicatorypowerresidinginthepeople。

Solonknewhowtopreventtheabusewhichthepeoplemightmakeoftheirpowerincriminaljudgments。HeordainedthattheCourtofAreopagusshouldre—examinetheaffair；thatiftheybelievedthepartyaccusedwasunjustlyacquitted[9]theyshouldimpeachhimagainbeforethepeople；thatiftheybelievedhimunjustlycondemned[10]theyshouldpreventtheexecutionofthesentence，andmakethemrejudgetheproceeding——anadmirablelaw，thatsubjectedthepeopletothecensureofthemagistracywhichtheymostrevered，andeventotheirown！

Inaffairsofthiskinditisalwayspropertothrowinsomedelays，especiallywhenthepartyaccusedisunderconfinement；totheendthatthepeoplemaygrowcalmandgivetheirjudgmentcoolly。

Indespoticgovernments，theprincehimselfmaybejudge。Butinmonarchiesthiscannotbe；theconstitutionbysuchmeanswouldbesubverted，andthedependentintermediatepowersannihilated；allsetformsofjudgmentwouldcease；fearwouldtakepossessionofthepeople’sminds，andpalenessspreaditselfovereverycountenance：themoreconfidence，honour，affection，andsecurityinthesubject，themoreextendedisthepowerofthemonarch。

Weshallgivehereafewmorereflectionsonthispoint。Inmonarchies，theprinceisthepartythatprosecutesthepersonaccused，andcauseshimtobepunishedoracquitted。Now，werehehimselftosituponthetrial，hewouldbebothjudgeandparty。

Inthisgovernmenttheprincehasfrequentlythebenefitofconfiscation，sothathereagain，bydeterminingcriminalcauses，hewouldbebothjudgeandparty。

Further，bythismethodhewoulddeprivehimselfofthemostgloriousattributeofsovereignty，namely，thatofgrantingpardon，[11]foritwouldbequiteridiculousofhimtomakeandunmakehisdecisions；

surelyhewouldnotchoosetocontradicthimself。

Besides，thiswouldbeconfoundingallideas；itwouldbeimpossibletotellwhetheramanwasacquitted，orreceivedhispardon。

LouisXIIIbeingdesiroustositinjudgmentuponthetrialoftheDukedelaValette，[12]sentforsomemembersoftheparliamentandoftheprivycouncil，todebatethematter；upontheirbeingorderedbythekingtogivetheiropinionconcerningthewarrantforhisarrest，thepresident，DeBelievre，said"thathefounditverystrangethataprinceshouldpasssentenceuponasubject；thatkingshadreservedtothemselvesthepowerofpardoning，andleftthatofcondemningtotheirofficers；thathismajestywantedtoseebeforehimatthebarapersonwho，byhisdecision，wastobehurriedawayintotheotherworld！Thattheprince’scountenanceshouldinspirewithhopes，andnotconfoundwithfears；thathispresencealoneremovedecclesiasticcensures；andthatsubjectsoughtnottogoawaydissatisfiedfromthesovereign。"

Whensentencewaspassed，thesamemagistratedeclared，"Thisisanunprecedentedjudgmenttosee，contrarytotheexampleofpastages——akingofFrance，inthequalityofajudge，condemningagentlemantodeath。"[13]

Again，sentencespassedbytheprincewouldbeaninexhaustiblesourceofinjusticeandabuse；thecourtiersbytheirimportunitywouldalwaysbeabletoextorthisdecisions。SomeRomanemperorsweresomadastositasjudgesthemselves；theconsequencewasthatnoreignseversosurprisedtheworldwithoppressionandinjustice。

"Claudius，"saysTacitus，[14]"havingappropriatedtohimselfthedeterminationoflawsuits，andthefunctionofmagistrates，gaveoccasiontoallmannerofrapine。"ButNero，uponcomingtotheempireafterClaudius，endeavouredtoconciliatethemindsofthepeoplebydeclaring"thathewouldtakecarenottobejudgehimselfinprivatecauses，thatthepartiesmightnotbeexposedwithinthewallsofapalacetotheiniquitousinfluenceofafewfreedmen。"[15]

"UnderthereignofArcadius，"saysZozimus，[16]"aswarmofcalumniatorsspreadthemselvesoneveryside，andinfestedthecourt。

Uponaperson’sdecease，itwasimmediatelysupposedhehadleftnochildren；[17]and，inconsequenceofthis，hispropertywasgivenawaybyarescript。Forastheprincewassurprisinglystupid，andtheempressexcessivelyenterprising，shewasaslavetotheinsatiableavariceofherdomesticsandconfidants；insomuchthattoanhonestmannothingcouldbemoredesirablethandeath。"

"Formerly，"saysProcopius[18]"thereusedtobeveryfewpeopleatcourt；butinJustinian’sreign，asthejudgeshadnolongerthelibertyofadministeringjustice，theirtribunalsweredeserted，whiletheprince’spalaceresoundedwiththelitigiousclamoursoftheseveralparties。"Everybodyknowswhataprostitutiontherewasofpublicjudgments，andevenoftheverylawsthemselves，atthatemperor’scourt。

Thelawsaretheeyeoftheprince；bythemheseeswhatwouldotherwiseescapehisobservation。Shouldheattemptthefunctionofajudge，hewouldnotthenlabourforhimself，butforimpostors，whoseaimistodeceivehim。

6。ThatinMonarchiesMinistersoughtnottositasJudges。Itislikewiseaverygreatinconvenienceinmonarchiesfortheministersoftheprincetositasjudges。Wehavestillinstancesofstateswherethereareagreatnumberofjudgestodecideexchequercauses，andwheretheministersnevertheless（athingmostincredible！）wouldfaindeterminethem。Manyarethereflectionsthatherearise；butthissingleonewillsufficeformypurpose。

Thereisintheverynatureofthingsakindofcontrastbetweenaprince’scouncilandhiscourtsofjudicature。Theking’scounciloughttobecomposedofafewpersons，andthecourtsofjudicatureofagreatmany。Thereasonis，intheformer，thingsshouldbeundertakenandconductedwithakindofwarmthandpassion，whichcanhardlybeexpectedbutfromfourorfivemenwhomakeittheirsolebusiness。Onthecontrary，incourtsofjudicatureacertaincoolnessinrequisite，andanindifference，insomemeasure，toallmannerofaffairs。

7。OfasingleMagistrate。Amagistracyofthiskindcannottakeplacebutinadespoticgovernment。WehaveaninstanceintheRomanhistoryhowfarasinglemagistratemayabusehispower。MightitnotbeverywellexpectedthatAppiusonhistribunalshouldcontemnalllaws，afterhavingviolatedthatofhisownenacting？[19]LivyhasgivenustheiniquitousdistinctionoftheDecemvir。HehadsubornedamantoreclaimVirginiainhispresenceashisslave；Virginia’srelativesinsistedthatbyvirtueofhisownlawsheshouldbeconsignedtothem，tillthedefinitivejudgmentwaspassed。Uponwhichhedeclaredthathislawhadbeenenactedonlyinfavourofthefather，andthatasVirginiuswasabsent，noapplicationcouldbemadeofittothepresentcase。[20]

8。OfAccusationindifferentGovernments。AtRome[21]itwaslawfulforonecitizentoaccuseanother。Thiswasagreeabletothespiritofarepublic，whereeachcitizenoughttohaveanunlimitedzealforthepublicgood，andissupposedtoholdalltherightsofhiscountryinhisownhands。Undertheemperors，therepublicanmaximswerestillpursued；andinstantlyappearedapernicioustribe，aswarmofinformers。Crafty，wickedmen，whocouldstooptoanyindignitytoservethepurposesoftheirambition，weresuretobusythemselvesinthesearchofcriminalswhosecondemnationmightbeagreeabletotheprince；

thiswastheroadtohonourandpreferment，[22]butluckilywearestrangerstoitinourcountry。

Wehaveatpresentanadmirablelaw，namely，thatbywhichtheprince，whoisestablishedfortheexecutionofthelaws，appointsanofficerineachcourtofjudicaturetoprosecuteallsortsofcrimesinhisname；

hencetheprofessionofinformersisathingunknowntous，forifthispublicavengerweresuspectedtoabusehisoffice，hewouldsoonbeobligedtomentionhisauthor。

ByPlato’sLaws[23]thosewhoneglecttoinformorto。assistthemagistratesareliabletopunishment。Thiswouldnotbesoproperinourdays。Thepublicprosecutorwatchesforthesafetyofthecitizens；heproceedsinhisofficewhiletheyenjoytheirquietandease。

9。OftheSeverityofPunishmentsindifferentGovernments。Theseverityofpunishmentsisfitterfordespoticgovernments，whoseprincipleisterror，thanforamonarchyorarepublic，whosespringishonourandvirtue。

Inmoderategovernments，theloveofone’scountry，shame，andthefearofblamearerestrainingmotives，capableofpreventingamultitudeofcrimes。Herethegreatestpunishmentofabadactionisconviction。Thecivillawshavethereforeasofterwayofcorrecting，anddonotrequiresomuchforceandseverity。