第5章

atalltoobtainadisinterestedcourt。Indeed，thecommitteethatconsidered

anenclosurewaschosenontheverycontraryprinciple。Thisweknow，not

fromtheevidenceofunkindandprejudicedoutsiders，butfromtheReport

oftheCommitteeoftheHouseofCommons，whichinquiredin1825intothe

constitutionofCommitteesonPrivateBills。’Underthepresentsystemeach

BilliscommittedtotheMemberwhoischargedwithitsmanagementandsuch

otherMembersashemaychoosetonameintheHouse，andtheMembersserving

foraparticularCounty(usuallytheCountyimmediatelyconnectedwiththe

objectoftheBill)andtheadjoiningCounties，andconsequentlyithasbeen

practicallyfoundthattheMemberstowhomBillshavebeencommittedhave

beengenerallythosewhohavebeenmostinterestedintheresult。’

Duringtheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturiestheredevelopedthepractice

ofopeningthecommittees。ThiswasthesystemofapplyingtoPrivateBills

theprocedurefollowedinthecaseofPublicBills，andproposingaresolution

intheHouseofCommonsthat’allwhoattendshallhavevoices，’i。e。，that

anymemberoftheHousewhocaredtoattendthecommitteeshouldbeable

tovote。Wecanseehowthisarrangementacted。Itmighthappenthatsome

ofthecountymemberswerehostiletoaparticularenclosurescheme；inthat

casethepromoterscouldcallforanopencommitteeandmasstheirfriends

uponit。Itmighthappen，ontheotherhand，thatthecommitteewassolid

insupportinganenclosure，andthatsomepowerfulpersonintheHouseconsidered

thathisinterests，ortheinterestsofhisfriend，hadnotbeendulyconsulted

inthedivisionofthespoil。Insuchacasehewouldcallforallto’have

voices’andsocompelthepromoterstosatisfyhisclaims。Thissystemthen

securedsomesortofroughjusticeasbetweenthepowerfulinterestsrepresented

inParliament，butitleftthesmallproprietorsandthecottagers，whowere

unrepresentedinthismê；lé；e，absolutelyatthemercyofthese

conflictingforces。

Itisdifficult，forexample，toimaginethatacommitteeinwhichthe

smallmenwererepresentedwouldhavesanctionedtheamazingclauseinthe

AshelworthAct(7*)whichprovided’thatallfieldsorinclosurescontaining

thePropertyofTwoormorePersonswithinonefence，andalsoallinclosures

containingthepropertyofonePersononly，ifthesamebeheldbyorunder

differentTenuresorInterests，shallbeconsideredascommonablelandand

bedividedandallottedaccordingly。’Thisclause，takenwiththeclause

thatfollows，simplymeantthatsomebiglandownerhadhiseyeonsomeparticular

pieceofenclosedproperty，whichintheordinarywaywouldnothavegone

intothemelting-potatall。ThearrangementsoftheWakefieldActwould

hardlyhavesavedthescrutinyofacommitteeonwhichtheDukeofLeeds’

classwasnotparamount。UnderthatAct(8*)thedukewastohavefullpower

toworkminesandgetminerals，andthoseproprietorswhosepremisessuffered

inconsequenceweretohavereasonablesatisfaction，notfromthedukewho

wasenrichedbythedisturbingcause，butfromalltheallottees，including

presumablythosewhosepropertywasdamaged。Further，tosavehimselfinconvenience，

thedukecouldforbidallotteesonWestgateMoortobuildahouseforsixty

years。AdifferentkindofHouseofCommonswouldhavelookedcloselyat

theActatMoretonCorbetwhichgavetheLordofthemanorallenclosures

andencroachmentsmorethantwentyyearsold，andalsoatthenotuncommon

provisionwhichexemptedthetithe-ownerfrompayingforhisownfencing。

TheReportofthe1825Committeedescribesthesystemas’invitingall

theinterestedpartiesintheSousetotakepartinthebusinessofthecommittee，

whichnecessarilyterminatesintheprevalenceofthestrongestpart，for

theywhohavenointerestoftheirowntoservewillnotbeprevailedupon

totakepartinastruggleinwhichtheirunbiassedjudgmentcanhaveno

effect。’Thechairmanofthecommitteewasgenerallythememberwhohadmoved

tointroducetheBill。TheunreformedParliamentoflandownersthatpassed

theexcellentActof1782，forbiddingMembersofParliamenttohaveaninterest

inGovernmentcontracts，neverthoughtuntiltheeveoftheReformBillthat

therewasanythingremarkableinthishabitofreferringEnclosureBills

tothejudgmentoftheverylandownerswhoweretoprofitbythem。Andin

1825itwasnottheEncLosureBills，inwhich。therichtookandthepoor

suffered，buttheRailwayBills，inwhichrichmenwerepittedagainstrich

men，thatdrewtheattentionoftheHouseofCommonstothedisadvantages

andrisksofthisprocedure。

ThecommitteesocomposedsetstoworkontheBill，andmeanwhile，perhaps，

someofthepersonsaffectedbytheenclosuresendpetitionsagainstitto

theSouseofCommons。Difficultiesoftimeandspacewouldasaruledeter

allbuttherichdissentients，unlesstheenclosurewasnearLondon。These

petitionsaredifferentlytreatedaccordingtotheirorigin。Iftheyemanate

fromalordofthemanor，orfromatithe-owner，whoforsomereasonorother

isdissatisfiedwiththecontemplatedarrangements，theyreceivesomeattention。

InsuchacasethepetitionerprobablyhassomefriendinParliament，and

hispointofviewisunderstood。Hecan，ifnecessary，getthisfriendto

attendthecommitteeandintroduceamendments。Heisthereforeaforceto

bereckonedwith；theBillisperhapsalteredtosuithim；thepetitionis

atanyratereferredtothecommittee。Ontheotherhand，ifthepetition

comesfromcottagersorsmallproprietors，itissafe，asarule，toneglect

it。

TheenclosurehistoriessetoutintheAppendixsupplysomegoodexamples

ofthisdifferentialtreatment。LordStraffordsendsapetitionagainstthe

BillforenclosingWakefieldwiththeresultthatheisallowedtoappoint

acommissioner，andalsothathisdisputewiththedukeofLeedsisexempted

fromthejurisdictionoftheEnclosureCommissioners。Ontheotherhand，

theunfortunatepersonswhopetitionagainstthemonstrousprovisionthat

forbadethemtoerectanybuildingfortwenty，fortyorsixtyyears，get

nokindofredress。InthecaseofCroydon，JamesTrecothick，Esq。，whois

dissatisfiedwiththeBill，isstrongenoughtodemandspecialconsideration。

Accordinglyaspecialprovisionismadethatthecommissionersareobliged

tosellMr。Trecothick，byprivatecontract，partofAddingtonHills，if

hesowishes。Butwhenthevariousfreeholders，copyholders，leaseholders

andinhabitanthouseholdersofCroydon，whocomplainthatthepromotersof

theBillhavenamedcommissionerswithoutconsultingthepersonsinterested，

askleavetonominateathirdcommissioner，onlyfourmembersoftheHouse

ofCommonssupportLordWilliamRussell’sproposaltoconsiderthispetition，

andfifty-onevotetheotherway。Anotherexampleofthespiritinwhich

Parliamentreceivedpetitionsfromunimportantpersonsisfurnishedbythe

caseoftheenclosureofHolyIsland。In1791(Feb。23)(9*)apetitionwas

presentedtoParliamentfortheenclosureofHolyIsland，askingforthe

divisionofastintedpasture，andtheextinctionoftherightsofcommon

or’eatage’overcertaininfieldlands。Leavewasgiven，andtheBillwas

preparedandreadafirsttimeon28thFebruary。ThesamedayParliament

receivedapetitionfromfreeholdersandstallingers，whoasktobeheard

bythemselvesorbycounselagainsttheBill。FromEden(10*)welearnthat

therewere26freeholdersand31stallingers，andthatthelatterwerein

thestrictsenseofthetermasmuchfreeholdersastheformer。Whilst，however，

afreeholderhadtherighttoput30sheep，4blackcattleand3horseson

thestintedcommon，astallingerhadarightofcommonforonehorseand

onecowonly。TheHouseorderedthatthispetitionshouldlieonthetable

tillthesecondreading，andthatthepetitionersshouldthenbeheard。The

secondreading，whichhadbeenfixedfor2ndApril，wasdeferredtill20th

April，achangewhichprobablyputthepetitionerstoconsiderableexpense。

On20thApriltheBillwasreadasecondtime，andtheHousewasinformed

thatCounselattended，andamotionwasmadethatCounselbenowcalledin。

Butthemotionwasopposed，andonadivisionwasdefeatedby47votesto

12。TheBillpassedtheHouseofCommonson10thMay，andreceivedtheRoyal

Assenton9thJune。(11*)InthiscasetheHouseofCommonsbrokefaithwith

thepetitioners，andrefusedthehearingithadpromised。Suchexperience

wasnotlikelytoencouragedissentientstowastetheirmoneyonanappeal

toParliamentagainstaBillthatwaspromotedbypowerfulpoliticians。It

willbeobservedthatinmanycasesthepetitionersdidnotthinkthatit

wasworththetroubleandexpensetobeheardonSecondReading。

TheReportoftheCommitteefollowedastereotypedformula：’Thatthe

StandingOrdershadbeencompliedwith：andthattheCommitteehadexamined

theAllegationsoftheBillandfoundthesametobetrue；andthattheParties

concernedhadgiventheirConsenttotheBill，totheSatisfactionofthe

Committee，except……’

Nowwhatdidthismean？Whatconsentswerenecessarytosatisfythecommittee？

TheParliamentaryCommitteethatreportedonthecostofenclosuresin1800(12*)

saidthattherewasnofixedrule，thatinsomecasestheconsentofthree-fourths

wasrequired，inotherstheconsentoffour-fifths。Thisproportionhasa

lookoffairnessuntilwediscoverthatwearedealinginterms，notofpersons，

butofproperty，andthatthesuffrageswerenotcountedbutweighed。The

methodbywhichtheproportionswerereckonedvaried，asaglanceatthe

casesdescribedintheAppendixwillshow。Valueiscalculatedsometimes

inacres，sometimesinannualvalue，sometimesinassessmenttotheland

tax，sometimesinassessmenttothepoorrate。Itisimportanttoremember

thatitwasthepropertyinterestedthatcounted，andthatinacasewhere

therewascommonorwastetobedividedaswellasopenfields，onelarge

proprietor，whoownedaconsiderablepropertyinoldenclosures，couldswamp

theentirecommunityofsmallerproprietorsandcottagers。IfSquireWestern

ownedanenclosedestatewithparks，gardensandfarmsof800acres，and

therestoftheparishconsistedofacommonorwasteof1000acresandopen

fieldsof200acres，andthevillagepopulationconsistedof100cottagers

andsmallfarmers，eachwithastripoflandinthecommonfields，anda

rightofcommononthewaste，SquireWesternwouldhaveafour-fifthsmajority

indeterminingwhethertheopenfieldsandthewasteshouldbeenclosedor

not，andthewholematterwouldbeinhishands。Thisisanextremeexample

ofthewayinwhichthesystemworked。ThecaseofAshelworthshowsthat

acommonmightbecutup，onthevotesofpersonsholdingenclosedproperty，

againstthewishesofthegreatmajorityofthecommoners。AtLalehamthe

petitionersagainsttheBillclaimedthattheywere’agreatmajorityof

therealOwnersandProprietorsoforPersonsinterestedin，theLandsand

Groundsintendedtobeenclosed。’AtSimpson，wherecommonfieldswereto

beenclosed，theMajorPartoftheOwnersandProprietorspetitionedagainst

theBill，statingthattheywere’verywellsatisfiedwiththeSituation

andConvenienceoftheirrespectiveLandsandPropertiesintheirpresent

uninclosedState。’(13*)

Evenamajorityofthree-fourthsinvaluewasnotalwaysrequired；for

example，theReportoftheCommitteeontheenclosureofCartmelinLancashire

in1796gaveparticularsshowingthatthewholepropertybelongingtopersons

interestedintheenclosurewasassessedat£；150，andthattheproperty

ofthoseactuallyconsentingtotheenclosurewasjustunder£；110。(14*)

Yettheenclosurewasrecommendedandcarried。Anotherillustrationissupplied

bytheReportoftheCommitteeontheenclosureofHistonandImpingtonin

1801，wherethepartiesconcernedarereportedtohaveconsentedexceptthe

proprietorsof1020acres，outofatotalacreageof3680。(15*)Inthiscase

theBillwasrecommitted，andonitsnextappearancethecommitteegavethe

consentsintermsofassessmenttotheLandTaxinstead，puttingthetotal

figureat£；304，andtheassessmentoftheconsentingpartiesat£；188。

ThisseemstohavesatisfiedtheHouseofCommons。(16*)Further，theparticulars

giveninthecaseoftheenclosureofBishopstoneinWilts(enclosedin1809)

showthatthevotesofcopyholderswereheavilydiscounted。Inthiscase

thecopyholderswhodissentedheld1079acres，thecopyholderswhowereneuter

81acres，andthetotalareatobedividedwas2602acres。Butbysomeingenious

actuarialcalculationofthereversionaryinterestofthelordofthemanor

andtheinterestofthetithe-owner，the1079acresheldbycopyholdersare

writtendownto474acres。(17*)InthecasesofSimpsonandLouth，asreaders

whoconsulttheproceedingswillsee，thecommitteesweresatisfiedwith

majoritiesjustabovethree-fifthsinvalue。AtRaunds，where4963acres

were’interested，’theownersof570arestatedtobeagainst，andof721

neuter。(18*)Aninterestingillustrationofthelaxpracticeofthecommittees

isprovidedinthehistoryofanattemptedenclosureatQuainton

Inanycasethesignatureswereadoubtfulevidenceofconsent。’Itiseasy，’

wroteanacuteobserver，’forthelargeproprietorstoovercomeopposition。

Coaxing，bribing，threatening，togetherwithmanyotheractswhichsuperiors

willmakeuse，ofteninducetheinferiorstoconsenttothingswhichthey

thinkwillbetotheirfuturedisadvantage。(20*)Wehearechoesofsuchproceedings