第6章

1havestatedtheRelationofEthicstoPolitics——regardedfromanethicalpointofview——thatseemstometoaccordwiththedefinitionoftheformersubjectadoptedintheprecedingchapter。Somethinkers，however，takeaviewofEthicalTheorywhichinvolvesarelationtoPoliticalTheoryquitedifferentfromthatjust-setforth；regardingTheoreticalor``Absolute’’Ethicsasproperlyaninvestigationnotofwhatoughttobedonehereandnow，butofwhatoughttobetherulesofbehaviourinasocietyofideallyperfecthumanbeings。Thusthesubjectmatterofourstudywouldbedoublyideal:asitwouldnotonlyprescribewhatoughttobedoneasdistinctfromwhatis，butwhatoughttobedoneinasocietythatitselfisnot，butonlyoughttobe。InthisviewtheconclusionsofTheoreticalor``Absolute’’

EthicswouldhaveasindirectanduncertainarelationtothepracticalproblemsofactuallifeasthoseofTheoreticalPolitics:——orevenmoreso，asinsoberpoliticaltheoryitiscommonlyonlythegovernmentandnotthegovernedsocietythatisconceivedinanidealcondition。Stillthetwostudiesarenotunlikelytoblendinonetheoryofidealsocialrelations；-unlesstheidealsocietyisconceivedashavingnoneedofgovernment，sothatPolitics，intheordinarysense，vanishesaltogether。

ThosewhotakethisviewadducetheanalogyofGeometrytoshowthatEthicsoughttodealwithideallyperfecthumanrelations，justasGeometrytreatsofideallystraightlinesandperfectcircles。ButtheirregularlineswhichwemeetwithinexperiencehavespatialrelationswhichGeometrydoesnotignorealtogether；itcananddoesascertainthemwithasufficientdegreeofaccuracyforpracticalpurposes:thoughofcoursetheyaremorecomplexthanthoseofperfectlystraightlines。SoinAstronomy，itwouldbemoreconvenientforpurposesofstudyifthestarsmovedincircles，aswasoncebelieved:butthefactthattheymovenotincirclesbutinellipses，andeveninimperfectandperturbedellipses，doesnottakethemoutofthesphereofscientificinvestigation:bypatienceandindustrywehavelearnthowtoreducetoprinciplesandcalculateeventhesemorecomplicatedmotions。Itmaybeusefulforpurposesofinstructiontoassumethattheplanetsmoveinperfectellipses:butwhatwewant，asastronomers，toknowistheactualmotionofthestars，anditscauses:andsimilarlyasmoralistswenaturallyinquirewhatoughttobedoneintheactualworldinwhichwelive。Inneithercasecanwehopetorepresentinourgeneralreasoningsthefullcomplexityoftheactualconsiderations:butweendeavourtoapproximatetoitascloselyaspossible。Itisonlysothatwereallygrapplewiththequestiontowhichmankindgenerallyrequireananswer:`Whatisaman’sdutyinhispresentcondition？’Foritistooparadoxicaltosaythatthewholedutyofmanissummedupintheefforttoattainanidealstateofsocialrelations；andunlesswesaythis，wemustdetermineourdutiestoexistingmeninviewofexistingcircumstances:andthisiswhatthestudentofEthicsseekstodoinasystematicmanner。

Theinquiryintothemoralityofanidealsocietycanthereforebeatbestbutapreliminaryinvestigation，afterwhichthestepfromtheidealtotheactual，inaccordancewithreason，remainstobetaken。Wehavetoaskthen，howfarsuchapreliminaryconstructionseemsdesirable。AndinansweringthiswemustdistinguishthedifferentmethodsofEthics。ForitisgenerallyheldbyIntuitioniststhattruemoralityprescribesabsolutelywhatisinitselfright，underallsocialconditions；atleastasfarasdeterminatedutiesareconcerned:as(e。g。)

thattruthshouldalwaysbespokenandpromiseskept，and`Justicebedone，thoughtheskyshouldfall’。Andsofarasthisishelditwouldseemthattherecanbenofundamentaldistinctiondrawn，inthedeterminationofduty，betweentheactualstateofsocietyandanidealstate:atanyratethegeneraldefinitionof(e。g。)Justicewillbethesameforboth，nolessthanitsabsolutestringency。StillevenanextremeIntuitionistwouldadmitthatthedetailsofJusticeandotherdutieswillvarywithsocialinstitutions:anditisaplausiblesuggestion，thatifwecanclearlycontemplateasapatternthe``absolute’’Justiceofanidealcommunity，weshallbebetterabletoattainthemerely``relative’’Justicethatisalonepossibleunderexistingconditions。Howfarthisisso，weshallbeinabetterpositiontojudgewhenwehaveexaminedthedefinitionofJusticefromanIntuitionalpointofview。

Thequestiontakesasimplerforminthecaseofthemethodwhichproposesasanultimateend，andsupremestandard，UniversalHappiness。Herewehavemerelytoaskhowfarasystematicconsiderationofthesocialrelationsofanideallyhappygroupofhumanbeingsislikelytoaffordguidanceinoureffortstopromotehumanhappinesshereandnow。Ishallnotatpresentdenythatthistaskmightusefullybeincludedinanexhaustivestudyofthismethod。Butitcaneasilybeshownthatitisinvolvedinseriousdifficulties。

Forasinordinarydeliberationwehavetoconsiderwhatisbestundercertainconditionsofhumanlife，internalorexternal，sowemustdothisincontemplatingtheidealsociety。Werequiretocontemplatenotsomuchtheendsupposedtobeattained——whichissimplythemostpleasantconsciousnessconceivable，lastingaslongandasuninterruptedlyaspossible——butrathersomemethodofrealisingit，pursuedbyhumanbeings；andthese，again，mustbeconceivedasexistingunderconditionsnottooremotefromourown，sothatwecanatleastendeavourtoimitatethem。Andforthiswemustknowhowfarourpresentcircumstancesaremodifiable；

averydifficultquestion，astheconstructionswhichhaveactuallybeenmadeofsuchidealsocietiesshow。Forexample，theRepublicofPlatoseemsinmanyrespectssufficientlydivergentfromthereality，andyethecontemplateswarasapermanentunalterablefact，tobeprovidedforintheidealstate，andindeedsuchprovisionseemsthepredominantaimofhisconstruction；whereasthesoberestmodernUtopiawouldcertainlyincludethesuppressionofwar。Indeedtheidealwilloftenseemtodivergeindiametricallyoppositedirectionsfromtheactual，accordingtothelineofimaginedchangewhichwehappentoadopt，inourvisionaryflightfrompresentevils。Forexample，permanentmarriage-unionsnowcausesomeunhappiness，becauseconjugalaffectionisnotalwayspermanent；buttheyarethoughttobenecessary，partlytoprotectmenandwomenfromvagariesofpassionpernicioustothemselves，butchieflyinordertothebetterrearingofchildren。Nowitmayseemtosomethatinanidealstateofsocietywecouldtrustmoretoparentalaffections，andrequirelesstocontrolthenaturalplayofemotionbetweenthesexes，andthat`FreeLove’

isthereforetheideal；whileotherswouldmaintainthatpermanenceinconjugalaffectionisnaturalandnormal，andthatanyexceptionstothisrulemustbesupposedtodisappearasweapproximatetotheideal。Again，thehappinessenjoyedinouractualsocietyseemsmuchdiminishedbytheunequaldistributionofthemeansofhappiness，andthedivisionofmankindintorichandpoor。Butwecanconceivethisevilremovedintwoquitedifferentways:eitherbyanincreaseddispositiononthepartoftherichtoredistributetheirshare，orbysuchsocialarrangementsaswouldenablethepoortosecuremoreforthemselves。Intheonecasetheidealinvolvesagreatextensionandsystematisationofthearbitraryandcasualalmsgivingthatnowgoeson:intheothercase，itsextinction。

Inshort，itseemsthatwhenweabandonthefirmgroundofactualsocietywehaveanillimitablecloudlandsurroundingusonallsides，inwhichwemayconstructanyvarietyofpatternstates；

butnodefiniteidealtowhichtheactualundeniablyapproximates，asthestraightlinesandcirclesoftheactualphysicalworldapproximatetothoseofscientificgeometry。

Itmaybesaid，however，thatwecanreducethisvarietybystudyingthepasthistoryofmankind，asthiswillenableustopredicttosomeextenttheirfuturemannerofexistence。

Butevensoitdoesnotappearthatweshallgainmuchdefiniteguidanceforourpresentconduct。Forletusmakethemostfavourablesuppositionsthatwecan，andsuchassoarevenabovetheconfidenceofthemostdogmaticofscientifichistorians。Letusassumethattheprocessofhumanhistoryisaprogressofmankindtowardsevergreaterhappiness。Letusassumefurtherthatwecannotonlyfixcertainlimitswithinwhichthefuturesocialconditionofmankindmusthe，butevendetermineindetailthemutualrelationsofthedifferentelementsofthefuturecommunity，soastoviewinclearoutlinetherulesofbehaviour，byobservingwhichtheywillattainthemaximumofhappiness。Itstillremainsquitedoubtfulhowfaritwouldbedesirableforustoimitatetheserulesinthecircumstancesinwhichwenowlive。Forthisforeknownsocialorderisexhypothesionlypresentedasamoreadvancedstageinoursocialprogress，andnotasatypeorpatternwhichweoughttomakeastruggletorealiseapproximatelyatanearlierstage。Howfaritshouldbetakenassuchapattern，isaquestionwhichwouldstillhavetobedetermined，andintheconsiderationofittheeffectsofouractionsontheexistinggenerationwouldafterallbethemostimportantelement。

InthefirstchapterIspokeofactionsthatwejudgetoberightandwhatoughttobedoneasbeing``reasonable’’，or``rational’’，andsimilarlyofultimateendsas``prescribedbyReason’’:

andIcontrastedthemotivetoactionsuppliedbytherecognitionofsuchreasonablenesswith``non-rational’’desiresandinclinations。Thismannerofspeakingisemployedbywritersofdifferentschools，andseemsinaccordancewiththecommonviewandlanguageonthesubject。Forwecommonlythinkthatwrongconductisessentiallyirrational，andcanbeshowntobesobyargument；andthoughwedonotconceivethatitisbyreasonalonethatmenareinfluencedtoactrightly，westillholdthatappealstothereasonareanessentialpartofallmoralpersuasion，andthatpartwhichconcernsthemoralistormoralphilosopherasdistinctfromthepreacherormoralrhetorician。Ontheotherhanditiswidelymaintainedthat，asHumesays，``Reason，meaningthejudgmentoftruthandfalsehood，canneverofitselfbeanymotivetotheWill’’；andthatthemotivetoactionisinallcasessomeNon-rationalDesire，includingunderthistermtheimpulsestoactiongivenbypresentpleasureandpain。Itseemsdesirabletoexaminewithsomecarethegroundsofthiscontentionbeforeweproceedanyfurther。

Letusbeginbydefiningtheissueraisedasclearlyaspossible。Everyone，Isuppose，hashadexperienceofwhatismeantbytheconflictofnon-rationalorirrationaldesireswithreason:mostofus(e。g。)occasionallyfeelbodilyappetitepromptingustoindulgenceswhichwejudgetobeimprudent，andangerpromptingustoactswhichwedisapproveasunjustorunkind。Itiswhenthisconflictoccursthatthedesiresaresaidtobeirrational，asimpellingustovolitionsopposedtoourdeliberatejudgments；sometimesweyieldtosuchseductiveimpulses，andsometimesnot；anditisperhapswhenwedonotyieldthattheimpulsiveforceofsuchirrationaldesiresismostdefinitelyfelt，aswehavetoexertinresistingthemavoluntaryeffortsomewhatanalogoustothatinvolvedinanymuscularexertion。Often，again，——sincewearenotalwaysthinkingeitherofourdutyorofourinterest，——desiresofthiskindtakeeffectinvoluntaryactionswithoutourhavingjudgedsuchactionstobeeitherrightorwrong，eitherprudentorimprudent；as(e。g。)whenanordinaryhealthymaneatshisdinner。Insuchcasesitseemsmostappropriatetocallthedesires``non-rational’’ratherthan``irrational’’。Neithertermisintendedtoimplythatthedesiresspokenof——oratleastthemoreimportantofthem——arenotnormallyaccompaniedbyintellectualprocesses。

Itistruethatsomeimpulsestoactionseemtotakeeffect，aswesay``blindly’’or``instinctively’’，withoutanydefiniteconsciousnesseitheroftheendatwhichtheactionisaimed，orofthemeansbywhichtheendistobeattained:butthis，Iconceive，isonlythecasewithimpulsesthatdonotoccupyconsciousnessforanappreciabletime，andordinarilydonotrequireanybutveryfamiliarandhabitualactionsfortheattainmentoftheirproximateends。Inallothercases——thatis，inthecaseoftheactionswithwhichwearechieflyconcernedinethicaldiscussion——theresultaimedat，andsomepartatleastofthemeansbywhichitistoberealised，aremoreorlessdistinctlyrepresentedinconsciousness，previoustothevolitionthatinitiatesthemovementstendingtoitsrealisation。

HencetheresultantforcesofwhatIcall``non-rational’’desires，andthevolitionstowhichtheyprompt，arecontinuallymodifiedbyintellectualprocessesintwodistinctways；firstbynewperceptionsorrepresentationsofmeansconducivetothedesiredends，andsecondlybynewpresentationsorrepresentationsoffactsactuallyexistingorinprospect——especiallymoreorlessprobableconsequencesofcontemplatedactions——whichrousenewimpulsesofdesireandaversion。

Thequestion，then，iswhethertheaccountjustgivenoftheinfluenceoftheintellectondesireandvolitionisnotexhaustive；

andwhethertheexperiencewhichiscommonlydescribedasa``conflictofdesirewithreason’’isnotmoreproperlyconceivedasmerelyaconflictamongdesiresandaversions；thesolefunctionofreasonbeingtobringbeforethemindideasofactualorpossiblefacts，whichmodifyinthemannerabovedescribedtheresultantforceofourvariousimpulses。

Iholdthatthisisnotthecase；thattheordinarymoralorprudentialjudgmentswhich，inthecaseofallormostminds，havesome——thoughoftenaninadequate——influenceonvolition，cannotlegitimatelybeinterpretedasjudgmentsrespectingthepresentorfutureexistenceofhumanfeelingsoranyfactsofthesensibleworld；thefundamentalnotionrepresentedbytheword``ought’’or``right’’，whichsuchjudgmentscontainexpresslyorbyimplication，beingessentiallydifferentfromallnotionsrepresentingfactsofphysicalorpsychicalexperience。Thequestionisoneonwhichappealmustultimatelybemadetothereflectionofindividualsontheirpracticaljudgmentsandreasonings: