第7章

andinmakingthisappealitseemsmostconvenienttobeginbyshowingtheinadequacyofallattemptstoexplainthepracticaljudgmentsorpropositionsinwhichthisfundamentalnotionisintroduced，withoutrecognisingitsuniquecharacterasabovenegativelydefined。Thereisanelementoftruthinsuchexplanations，insofarastheybringintoviewfeelingswhichundoubtedlyaccompanymoralorprudentialjudgments，andwhichordinarilyhavemoreorlesseffectindeterminingthewilltoactionsjudgedtoberight；butsofarastheyprofesstobeinterpretationsofwhatsuchjudgmentsmean，theyappeartometofailaltogether。

InconsideringthisquestionitisimportanttotakeseparatelythetwospeciesofjudgmentswhichIhavedistinguishedas``moral’’and``prudential’’。Bothkindsmight，indeed，betermed``moral’’

inawidersense；and，aswesaw，itisastronglysupportedopinionthatallvalidmoralruleshaveultimatelyaprudentialbasis。Butinordinarythoughtweclearlydistinguishcognitionsorjudgmentsofdutyfromcognitionsorjudgmentsastowhat``isright’’or``oughttobedone’’inviewoftheagent’sprivateinterestorhappinessandthedepthofthedistinctionwillnot，Ithink，bediminishedbythecloserexaminationofthesejudgmentsonwhichwearenowtoenter。

Thisverydistinction，however，suggestsaninterpretationofthenotionofrightnesswhichdeniesitspeculiarsignificanceinmoraljudgments。Itisurgedthat``rightness’’

isproperlyanattributeofmeans，notofends:sothattheattributionofitmerelyimpliesthattheactjudgedrightisthefittestoronlyfitmeanstotherealisationofsomeendunderstoodifnotexpresslystated:

andsimilarlythattheaffirmationthatanything`oughttobedone’isalwaysmadewithatleasttacitreferencetosomeulteriorend。AndIgrantthatthisisalegitimateinterpretation，inrespectofapartoftheuseofeitherterminordinarydiscourse。Butitseemsclear(1)thatcertainkindsofactions——underthenamesofJustice，Veracity，GoodFaith，etc——arecommonlyheldtoberightunconditionally，withoutregardtoulteriorresults:

and(2)thatwesimilarlyregardas``right’’theadoptionofcertainends——suchasthecommongoodofsociety，orgeneralhappiness。Ineitherofthesecasestheinterpretationabovesuggestedseemsclearlyinadmissible。

Wehavethereforetofindameaningfor``right’’

or``whatoughttobe’’otherthanthenotionoffitnesstosomeulteriorend。Herewearemetbythesuggestionthatthejudgmentsorpropositionswhichwecommonlycallmoral——inthenarrowersense——reallyaffirmnomorethantheexistenceofaspecificemotioninthemindofthepersonwhouttersthem；thatwhenIsay`Truthoughttobespoken’or`Truthspeakingisright’，Imeannomorethanthattheideaoftruthspeakingexcitesinmymindafeelingofapprobationorsatisfaction。Andprobablysomedegreeofsuchemotion，commonlydistinguishedas`moralsentiment’，ordinarilyaccompaniesmoraljudgmentsonrealcases。Butitisabsurdtosaythatamerestatementofmyapprobationoftruthspeakingisproperlygivenintheproposition`Truthoughttobespoken’；otherwisethefactofanotherman’sdisapprobationmightequallybeexpressedbysaying`Truthoughtnottobespoken’；andthusweshouldhavetwocoexistentfactsstatedintwomutuallycontradictorypropositions。Thisissoobvious，thatwemustsupposethatthosewhoholdtheviewwhichIamcombatingdonotreallyintendtodenyit:butrathertomaintainthatthissubjectivefactofmyapprobationisallthatthereisanygroundforstating，orperhapsthatitisallthatanyreasonablepersonispreparedonreflectiontoaffirm。Andnodoubtthereisalargeclassofstatements，informobjective，whichyetwearenotcommonlypreparedtomaintainasmorethansubjectiveiftheirvalidityisquestioned。IfIsaythat`theairissweet’，or`thefooddisagreeable’，itwouldnotbeexactlytruetosaythatImeannomorethanthatIliketheoneordisliketheother；butifmystatementischallenged，Ishallprobablycontentmyselfwithaffirmingtheexistenceofsuchfeelingsinmyownmind。Butthereappearstometobeafundamentaldifferencebetweenthiscaseandthatofmoralfeelings。Thepeculiaremotionofmoralapprobationis，inmyexperience，inseparablyboundupwiththeconviction，implicitorexplicit，thattheconductapprovedis`really’

right——i。e。thatitcannot，withouterror，bedisapprovedbyanyothermind。IfIgiveupthisconvictionbecauseothersdonotshareit，orforanyotherreason，Imaynodoubtstillretainasentimentpromptingtotheconductinquestion，or——whatisperhapsmorecommon——asentimentofrepugnancetotheoppositeconduct:butthissentimentwillnolongerhavethespecialqualityof`moralsentiment’strictlysocalled。Thisdifferencebetweenthetwoisoftenoverlookedinethicaldiscussion:butanyexperienceofachangeinmoralopinionproducedbyargumentmayaffordanillustrationofit。Suppose(e。g。)thatanyonehabituallyinfluencedbythesentimentofVeracityisconvincedthatundercertainpeculiarcircumstancesinwhichhefindshimself，speakingtruthisnotrightbutwrong。Hewillprobablystillfeelarepugnanceagainstviolatingtheruleoftruthspeaking:

butitwillbeafeelingquitedifferentinkindanddegreefromthatwhichpromptedhimtoveracityasadepartmentofvirtuousaction。Wemightperhapscalltheonea`moral’andtheothera`quasi-moral’sentiment。

Theargumentjustgivenholdsequallyagainsttheviewthatapprobationordisapprobationisnotthemerelikingoraversionofanindividualforcertainkindsofconduct，butthiscomplicatedbyasympatheticrepresentationofsimilarlikingsoraversionsfeltbyotherhumanbeings。Nodoubtsuchsympathyisanormalconcomitantofmoralemotion，andwhentheformerisabsentthereismuchgreaterdifficultyinmaintainingthelatter:this，however，ispartlybecauseourmoralbeliefscommonlyagreewiththoseofothermembersofoursociety，andonthisagreementdependstoanimportantextentourconfidenceinthetruthofthesebeliefs。Butif，asinthecasejustsupposed，wearereallyledbyargumenttoanewmoralbelief，opposednotonlytoourownhabitualsentimentbutalsotothatofthesocietyinwhichwelive，wehaveacrucialexperimentprovingtheexistenceinusofmoralsentimentsasIhavedefinedthem，collidingwiththerepresentedsympathiesofourfellow-mennolessthanwithourownmerelikingsandaversions。Andevenifweimaginethesympathiesopposedtoourconvictionsextendeduntiltheyincludethoseofthewholehumanrace，auainstwhomweimagineourselvestostandasAthanasiuscontramundum；still，solongasourconvictionofdutyisfirm，theemotionwhichwecallmoralstandsoutinirhaginationquitedistinctfromthecomplexsympathyopposedtoit，howevermuchweextend，complicateandintensifythelatter。

Sofar，then，frombeingpreparedtoadmitthattheproposition`Xoughttobedone’merelyexpressestheexistenceofacertainsentimentinmyselforothers，Ifinditstrictlyimpossiblesotoregardmyownmoraljudgmentswithouteliminatingfromtheconcomitantsentimentthepeculiarqualitysignifiedbytheterm`moral’。Thereis，however，anotherinterpretationof`ought’，inwhichthelikingsandaversionsthatmeningeneralfeelforcertainkindsofconductareconsiderednotassympatheticallyrepresentedintheemotionofthepersonjudging，andthusconstitutingthemoralelementinit，butascausesofpaintothepersonofwhom`ought’or`duty’ispredicated。Onthisview，whenwesaythataman`ought’todoanything，orthatitishis`duty’todoit，wemeanthatheisboundunderpenaltiestodoit；theparticularpenaltyconsideredbeingthepainthatwillaccruetohimdirectlyorindirectlyfromthedislikeofhisfellow-creatures。

Ithinkthatthisinterpretationexpressesapartofthemeaningwithwhichthewords`ought’and`duty’areusedinordinarythoughtanddiscourse。Forwecommonlyusetheterm`moralobligation’

asequivalentto`duty’andexpressingwhatisimpliedintheverb`ought’，thussuggestingananalogybetweenthisnotionandthatoflegalobligation；

andinthecaseofpositivelawwecannotrefusetorecognisetheconnexionof`obligation’and`punishment’:alawcannotbeproperlysaidtobeactuallyestablishedinasocietyifitishabituallyviolatedwithimpunity。ButamorecarefulreflectionontherelationofLawtoMorality，asordinarilyconceived，seemstoshowthatthisinterpretationof`ought’——thoughitcannotbeexcluded——mustbedistinguishedfromthespecialethicaluseoftheterm。Fortheidealdistinctiontakenincommonthoughtbetweenlegalandmerelymoralrulesseemstolieinjustthisconnexionoftheformerbutnotthelatterwithpunishment:wethinkthattherearesomethingswhichamanoughttobecompelledtodo，orforbear，andotherswhichbeoughttodoorforbearwithoutcompulsion，andthattheformeralonefallproperlywithinthesphereoflaw。Nodoubtwealsothinkthatinmanycaseswherethecompulsionoflawisundesirable，thefearofmoralcensureanditsconsequencessuppliesanormallyusefulconstraintonthewillofanyindividual。Butitisevidentthatwhatwemeanwhenwesaythatamanis``morallythoughnotlegallybound’’todoathingisnotmerelythathe``willbepunishedbypublicopinionifbedoesnot’’；forweoftenjointhesetwostatements，clearlydistinguishingtheirimport:

andfurther(sincepublicopinionisknowntobeeminentlyfallible)therearemanythingswhichwejudgemen`ought’todo，whileperfectlyawarethattheywillincurnoserioussocialpenaltiesforomittingthem。Insuchcases，indeed，itwouldbecommonlysaidthatsocialdisapprobation`ought’tofollowonimmoralconduct；andthisveryassertionitisclearthattheterm`ought’cannotmeanthatsocialpenaltiesaretobefearedbythosewhodonotdisapprove。Again，allormostmeninwhomthemoralconsciousnessisstronglydevelopedfindthemselvesfromtimetotimeinconflictwiththecommonlyreceivedmoralityofthesocietytowhichtheybelong:andthus——aswasbeforesaid——haveacrucialexperienceprovingthatdutydoesnotmeantothemwhatothermenwilldisapproveofthemfornotdoing。

AtthesametimeIadmit，asindeedIhavealreadysuggestedin§；3ofchap。i。，thatwenotunfrequentlypassjudgmentsresemblingmoraljudgmentsinform，andnotdistinguishedfromtheminordinarythought，incaseswheretheobligationaffirmedisfound，onreflection，todependontheexistenceofcurrentopinionsandsentimentsassuch。

ThemembersofmoderncivilisedsocietiesareundertheswayofacodeofPublicOpinion，enforcedbysocialpenalties，whichnoreflectivepersonobeyingitidentifieswiththemoralcode，orregardsasunconditionallybinding:indeedthecodeismanifestlyfluctuatingandvariable，differentatthesametimeindifferentclasses，professions，socialcircles，ofthesamepoliticalcommunity。Suchacodealwayssupportstoaconsiderableextentthecommonlyreceivedcodeofmorality:andmostreflectivepersonsthinkitgenerallyreasonabletoconformtothedictatesofpublicopinion——tothecodeofHonour，wemaysay，ingravermatters，ortherulesofPolitenessorGoodBreedinginlightermatters——whereverthesedictatesdonotpositivelyconflictwithmorality；suchconformitybeingmaintainedeitherongroundsofprivateinterest，orbecauseitisthoughtconducivetogeneralhappinessorwellbeingtokeepasmuchaspossibleinharmonywithone’sfellow-men。

Henceintheordinarythoughtofunreflectivepersonsthedutiesimposedbysocialopinionareoftenundistinguishedfrommoralduties:andindeedthisindistinctnessisalmostinherentinthecommonmeaningofmanyterms。

Forinstance，ifwesaythatamanhasbeen`dishonoured’byacowardlyact，itisnotquiteclearwhetherwemeanthathehasincurredcontempt，orthathehasdeservedit，orboth:asbecomesevidentwhenwetakeacaseinwhichtheCodeofHonourcomesintoconflictwithMorality。If(e。g。)amanweretoincursocialostracismanywhereforrefusingaduelonreligiousgrounds，somewouldsaythathewas`dishonoured’，thoughhehadactedrightly，othersthattherecouldbenorealdishonourinavirtuousact。Asimilararabiguityseemstolurkinthecommonnotionof`improper’or`incorrect’behaviour。Stillinallsuchcasestheambiguitybecomesevidentonreflection:andwhendiscovered，merelyservestoillustratefurtherthedistinctionbetweenthenotionof`rightconduct’，`duty’，whatwe`ought’orareunder`moralobligation’todo——whenthesetermsareusedinastrictlyethicalsense——andconductthatismerelyconformedtothestandardofcurrentopinion。

Thereis，however，anotherwayofinterpreting`ought’asconnotingpenalties，whichissomewhatlesseasytomeetbyacrucialpsychologicalexperiment。ThemoralimperativemaybetakentobealawofGod，tothebreachofwhichDivinepenaltiesareannexed；andthese，nodoubt，inaChristiansociety，arecommonlyconceivedtobeadequateanduniversallyapplicable。Still，itcanhardlybesaidthatthisbeliefissharedbyallthepersonswhoseconductisinfluencedbyindependentmoralconvictions，occasionallyunsupportedeitherbythelaworthepublicopinionoftheircommunity。Andeveninthecaseofmanyofthosewhobelievefullyinthemoralgovernmentoftheworld，thejudgment``Ioughttodothis’’cannotbeidentifiedwiththejudgment``GodwillpunishmeifIdonot’’；sincetheconvictionthattheformerpropositionistrueisdistinctlyrecognisedasanimportantpartofthegroundsforbelievingthelatter。Again，whenChristiansspeak——astheycommonlydo——ofthe`justice’(orothermoralattributes)ofGod，asexhibitedinpunishingsinnersandrewardingtherighteous，theyobviouslyimplynotmerelythatGodwillthuspunishandreward，butthatitis`right’forHimtodoso:which，ofcourse，cannotbetakentomeanthatHeis`boundunderpenalties’。