第9章

IntheprecedingchapterIhaveleftundeterminedtheemotionalcharacteristicsoftheimpulsethatpromptsustoobeythedictatesofReason。Ihavedonesobecausetheseseemtobeverydifferentindifferentminds，andeventovarymuchandrapidlyinthesamemind，withoutanycorrespondingvariationinthevolitionaldirectionoftheimpulse。Forinstance，inthemindofarationalEgoisttherulingimpulseisgenerallywhatButlerandHutchesoncalla``calm’’

or``cool’’self-love:whereasinthemanwhotakesuniversalhappinessastheendandstandardofrightconduct，thedesiretodowhatisjudgedtobereasonableassuchiscommonlyblendedinvaryingdegreeswithsympathyandphilanthropicenthusiasm。Again，ifoneconceivesthedictatingReason——whateveritsdictatesmaybe——asexternaltooneself，thecognitionofrightnessisaccompaniedbyasentimentofReverenceforAuthority；whichmaybysomebeconceivedimpersonally，butismorecommonlyregardedastheauthorityofasupremePerson，sothatthesentimentblendswiththeaffectionsnormallyexcitedbypersonsindifferentrelations，andbecomesReligious。ThisconceptionofReasonasanexternalauthority，againstwhichtheself-willrebels，isoftenirresistiblyforcedonthereflectivemind:atothertimes，however，theidentityofReasonandSelfpresentsitselfasanimmediateconviction，andthenReverenceforAuthoritypassesoverintoSelf-respect；

andtheoppositeandevenmorepowerfulsentimentofFreedomiscalledin，ifweconsidertherationalSelfasliabletobeenslavedbytheusurpingforceofsensualimpulses。QuitedifferentagainaretheemotionsofAspirationorAdmirationarousedbytheconceptionofVirtueasanidealofMoralBeauty。Otherphasesofemotionmightbementioned，allhavingwiththesethecommoncharacteristicthattheyareinseparablefromanapparentcognition——implicitorexplicit，directorindirect——ofrightnessintheconducttowhichtheyprompt。Thereare，nodoubt，importantdifferencesinthemoralvalueandefficacyofthesedifferentemotions，towhichIshallhereaftercallattention；buttheirprimarypracticaleffectdoesnotappeartovarysolongasthecognitionofrightnessremainsunchanged。ItisthenwiththesecognitionsthatEthics，inmyview，isprimarilyconcerned:itsobjectistofreethemfromdoubtanderror，andsystematisethemasfaraspossible。

Thereis，however，oneviewofthefeelingswhichprompttovoluntaryaction，whichissometimesthoughttocutshortallcontroversyastotheprinciplesonwhichsuchactionoughttoberegulated。

Imeantheviewthatvolitionisalwaysdeterminedbypleasuresorpainsactualorprospective。Thisdoctrine——whichImaydistinguishasPsychologicalHedonism——isoftenconnectedandnotseldomconfoundedwiththemethodofEthicswhichIhavecalledEgoisticHedonism；andnodoubtitseemsatfirstsightanaturalinferencethatifoneendofaction——myownpleasureorabsenceofpain——isdefinitelydeterminedformebyunvaryingpsychologicallaws，adifferentendcannotbeprescribedformebyReason。

Reflection，however，showsthatthisinferenceinvolvestheunwarrantedassumptionthataman’spleasureandpainaredeterminedindependentlyofhismoraljudgments:whereasitismanifestlypossiblethatourprospectofpleasureresultingfromanycourseofconductmaylargelydependonourconceptionofitasrightorotherwise:andinfactthepsychologicaltheoryabovementionedwouldrequireustosupposethatthisisnormallythecasewithconscientiouspersons，whohabituallyactinaccordancewiththeirmoralconvictions。Theconnexionoftheexpectationofpleasurefromanactwiththejudgmentthatitisrightmaybedifferentindifferentcases:wecommonlyconceiveatrulymoralmanasonewhofindspleasureindoingwhathejudgestoberightbecausebesojudgesit:but，evenwheremoralsensibilityisweak，expectationofpleasurefromanactmaybeanecessaryconsequentofajudgmentthatitisright，throughabeliefinthemoralgovernmentoftheworldsomehowharmonisingVirtueandSelf-interest。

I

thereforeconcludethatthereisnonecessaryconnexionbetweenthepsychologicalpropositionthatpleasureorabsenceofpaintomyselfisalwaystheactualultimateendofmyaction，andtheethicalpropositionthatmyowngreatesthappinessorpleasureisformetherightultimateend。Itmay，however，berepliedthatiftheformerpropositionbeacceptedinthesamequantitativelypreciseformasthelatter——ifitisadmittedthatImustbyalawofmynaturealwaysaimatthegreatestpossiblepleasure(orleastpain)tomyself——thenatleastIcannotconceiveanyaimconflictingwiththistobeprescribedbyReason。Andthisseemstomeundeniable。

If，asBenthamaffirms，``ontheoccasionofeveryactheexercises，everyhumanbeingis’’inevitably``ledtopursuethatlineofconductwhich，accordingtohisviewofthecase，takenbyhimatthemoment，willbeinthehighestdegreecontributorytohisowngreatesthappiness’’[3]，then，toanyonewhoknowsthis，itmustbecomeinconceivablethatReasondictatestohimtopursueanyotherlineofconduct。Butatthesametime，asitseemstome，thepropositionthathe`ought’topursuethatlineofconductbecomesnolessclearlyincapableofbeingaffirmedwithanysignificance。Forapsychologicallawinvariablyrealisedinmyconductdoesnotadmitofbeingconceivedas`aprecept’or`dictate’ofreason:

thislattermustbearulefromwhichIamconsciousthatitispossibletodeviate。Idonot，however，thinkthatthepropositionquotedfromBenthamwouldbeaffirmedwithoutqualificationbyanyofthewriterswhonowmaintainpsychologicalHedonism。Theywouldadmit，withJ。S。Mill，thatmenoften，notfrommerelyintellectualdeficiencies，butfrom``infirmityofcharacter，maketheirelectionforthenearergood，thoughtheyknowittobelessvaluable:andthisnolesswhenthechoiceisbetweentwobodilypleasures？theypursuesensualindulgencestotheinjuryofhealth，thoughperfectlyawarethathealthisthegreatergood。’’[5]

Thisbeingso，EgoisticHedonismbecomesapossibleethicalidealtowhichpsychologicalHedonismseemstopoint。Ifitcanbeshownthattheultimateaimofeachofusinactingisalwayssolelysomepleasure(orabsenceofpain)tohimself，thedemonstrationcertainlysuggeststhateachoughttoseekhisowngreatestpleasure。Ashasbeensaid，nocogentinferenceispossiblefromthepsychologicalgeneralisationtotheethicalprinciple:

butthemindhasanaturaltendencytopassfromtheonepositiontotheother:iftheactualultimatespringsofourvolitionarealwaysourownpleasuresandpains，itseemsprimafaciereasonabletobemovedbytheminproportiontotheirpleasantnessandpainfulness，andthereforetochoosethegreatestpleasureorleastpainonthewhole。Further，thispsychologicaldoctrineseemstoconflictwithanethicalviewwidelyheldbypersonswhosemoralconsciousnessishighlydeveloped:viz。thatanact，tobeinthehighestsensevirtuous，mustnotbedonesolelyforthesakeoftheattendantpleasure，evenifthatbethepleasureofthemoralsense；sothatifIdoanactfromthesoledesireofobtainingtheglowofmoralself-approbationwhichIbelievewillattenditsperformance，theactwillnotbetrulyvirtuous。

ItseemsthereforeimportanttosubjectpsychologicalHedonism，eveninitsmoreindefiniteform，toacarefulexamination。

Itwillbewelltobeginbydefiningmorepreciselythequestionatissue。

First，Iwillconcedethatpleasureisakindoffeelingwhichstimulatesthewilltoactionstendingtosustainorproduceit，——tosustainit，ifactuallypresent，andtoproduceit，ifitbeonlyrepresentedinidea——；

andsimilarlypainisakindoffeelingwhichstimulatestoactionstendingtoremoveoravertit。[1]ItseemsconvenienttocallthefeltvolitionalstimulusinthetwocasesrespectivelyDesireandAversion；thoughitshouldbeobservedthattheformertermisordinarilyrestrictedtotheimpulsefeltwhenpleasureisnotactuallypresent，butonlyrepresentedinidea。

Thequestionatissue，then，isnotwhetherpleasure，presentorrepresented，isnormallyaccompaniedbyanimpulsetoprolongtheactualorrealisetherepresentedfeeling，andpaincorrespondinglybyaversion:butwhethertherearenodesiresandaversionswhichhavenotpleasuresandpainsfortheirobjects——noconsciousimpulsestoproduceoravertresultsotherthantheagent’sownfeelings。InthetreatisetowhichIhavereferred，Millexplainsthat``desiringathing，andfindingitpleasant，are，inthestrictnessoflanguage，twomodesofnamingthesamepsychologicalfact。’’Ifthisbethecase，itishardtoseehowthepropositionwearediscussingrequirestobedeterminedby``practisedself-consciousnessandself-observation’’；asthedenialofitwouldinvolveacontradictioninterms。ThetruthisthatanambiguityinthewordPleasurehastendedtoconfusethediscussionofthisquestion。Whenwespeakofamandoingsomething``athispleasure’’，or``ashepleases’’，weusuallysignifythemerefactofvoluntarychoice:notnecessarilythattheresultaimedatissomeprospectivefeelingofthechooser。Now，ifby``pleasant’’

wemerelymeanthatwhichinfluenceschoice，exercisesacertainattractiveforceonthewillitisanassertionincontrovertiblebecausetautological，tosaythatwedesirewhatispleasant——oreventhatwedesireathinginproportionasitappearspleasant。Butifwetake``pleasure’’todenotethekindoffeelings，abovedefined，itbecomesareallydebateablequestionwhethertheendtowhichourdesiresarealwaysconsciouslydirectedistheattainmentbyourselvesofsuchfeelings。AndthisiswhatwemustunderstandMilltoconsider``soobvious，thatitwillhardlybedisputed’’。

Itisrathercurioustofindthatoneofthebest-knownofEnglishmoralistsregardstheexactoppositeofwhatMillthinkssoobvious，asbeingnotmerelyauniversalfactofourconsciousexperience，butevenanecessarytruth。Butler，asiswellknown，distinguishesself-love，ortheimpulsetowardsourownpleasure，from``particularmovementstowardsparticularexternalobjects-honour，power，theharm。orgoodofanother’’；

theactionsproceedingfromwhichare``nootherwiseinterestedthanaseveryactionofeverycreaturemustfromthenatureofthecasebe；fornoonecanactbutfromadesire，orchoice，orpreferenceofhisown’’。

Suchparticularpassionsorappetitesare，begoesontosay，``necessarilypresupposedbytheveryideaofaninterestedpursuit；sincetheveryideaofinterestorhappinessconsistsinthis，thatanappetiteoraffectionenjoysitsobject。’’Wecouldnotpursuepleasureatall，unlesswehaddesiresforsomethingelsethanpleasure；forpleasureconsistsinthesatisfactionofjustthese``disinterested’’impulses。

Butlerhascertainlyover-statedhiscase，sofarasmyownexperiencegoes；formanypleasures，——especiallythoseofsight，hearingandsmell，togetherwithmanyemotionalpleasures，——occurtomewithoutanyperceptiblerelationtopreviousdesires，anditseemsquiteconceivablethatourprimarydesiresmightbeentirelydirectedtowardssuchpleasuresasthese。Butasamatteroffact，itappearstomethatthroughoutthewholescaleofmyimpulses，sensual，emotional，andintellectualalike，Icandistinguishdesiresofwhichtheobjectissomethingotherthanmyownpleasure。

Iwillbeginbytakinganillustrationofthisfromtheimpulsescommonlyplacedlowestinthescale。Theappetiteofhunger，sofarasIcanobserve，isadirectimpulsetotheeatingoffood。

Sucheatingisnodoubtcommonlyattendedwithanagreeablefeelingofmoreorlessintensity；butitcannot，Ithink，bestrictlysaidthatthisagreeablefeelingistheobjectofhunger，andthatitistherepresentationofthispleasure。whichstimulatesthewillofthehungrymanassuch。

Ofcourse，hungerisfrequentlyandnaturallyaccompaniedwithanticipationofthepleasureofeating:butcarefulintrospectionseemstoshowthatthetwoarebynomeansinseparable。Andevenwhentheyoccurtogetherthepleasureseemsproperlytheobjectnotoftheprimaryappetite，butofasecondarydesirewhichcanbedistinguishedfromtheformer；sincethegourmand，inwhomthissecondarydesireisstrong，isoftenpromptedbyittoactionsdesignedtostimulatehunger，andoften，again，isledtocontroltheprimaryimpulse，inordertoprolongandvarytheprocessofsatisfyingit。

Indeeditissoobviousthathungerissomethingdifferentfromthedesireforanticipatedpleasure，thatsomewritershaveregardeditsvolitionalstimulus(andthatofdesiregenerally)asacaseofaversionfrompresentpain。This，however，seemstomeadistinctmistakeinpsychologicalclassification。Nodoubtdesireisastateofconsciousness。

Sofarsimilartopain，thatinbothwefeelastimuluspromptingustopassfromthepresentstateintoadifferentone。Butaversionfrompainisanimpulsetogetoutofthepresentstateandpassintosomeotherstatewhichisonlynegativelyrepresentedasdifferentfromthepresent:

whereasindesireassuch，theprimaryimpulseistowardstherealisationofsomepositivefutureresult。Itistruethatwhenastrongdesireis，foranyreason，baulkedofitseffectincausingaction，itisgenerallypainfulinsomedegree:andsoasecondaryaversiontothestateofdesireisgenerated，whichblendsitselfwiththedesireandmayeasilybeconfoundedwithit。Buthere，again，wemaydistinguishthetwoimpulsesbyobservingthedifferentkindsofconducttowhichtheyoccasionallyprompt:fortheaversiontothepainofungratifieddesire，thoughitmayactasanadditionalstimulustowardsthegratificationofthedesire，mayalso(andoftendoes)

promptustogetridofthepainbysuppressingthedesire。

Thequestionwhetheralldesirehasinsomedegreethequalityofpain，isoneofpsychologicalratherthanethicalinterest；solongasitisadmittedthatitisoftennotpainfulinanydegreecomparabletoitsintensityasdesire，sothatitsvolitionalimpulsecannotbeexplainedasacaseofaversiontoitsownpainfulness。