第10章

Atthesametime，sofarasmyexperiencegoes，Ihavenohesitationinansweringthequestioninthenegative。Consideragainthecaseofhunger；

Icertainlydonotfindhungerasanelementofmynormallifeatallapainfulfeeling:itonlybecomespainfulwhenIaminillhealth，orwhenthesatisfactionoftheappetiteisabnormallydelayed。And，generallyspeaking，anydesirethatisnotfelttobethwartedinitsprimaryimpulsetoactionstendingtoitssatisfaction，isnotonlynotitselfapainfulfeeling——evenwhenthisattainmentisstillremote——butisoftenanelementofastateofconsciousnesswhichasawholeishighlypleasurable。Indeed，thepleasuresaffordedbytheconsciousnessofeageractivity，inwhichdesireisanessentialelement，constituteaconsiderableiteminthetotalenjoymentoflife。Itisalmostacommonplacetosaythatsuchpleasures，whichwemaycallgenerallythepleasuresofPursuit，aremoreimportantthanthepleasuresofAttainment:andinmanycasesitistheprospectoftheformerratherthanofthelatterthatinducesustoengageinapursuit。Insuchcasesitispeculiarlyeasytodistinguishthedesiretoattaintheobjectpursued，fromadesireofthepleasureofattainment:

sincetheattainmentonlybecomespleasantinprospectbecausethepursuititselfstimulatesadesireforwhatispursued。Take，forexample，thecaseofanygamewhichinvolves——asmostgamesdo——acontestforvictory。

Noordinaryplayerbeforeenteringonsuchacontest，hasanydesireforvictoryinit:indeedheoftenfindsitdifficulttoimaginehimselfderivinggratificationfromsuchvictory，beforehehasactuallyengagedinthecompetition。Whathedeliberately，beforethegamebegins，desiresisnotvictory，butthepleasantexcitementofthestruggleforit；onlyforthefulldevelopmentofthispleasureatransientdesiretowinthegameisgenerallyindispensable。Thisdesire，whichdoesnotexistatfirst，isstimulatedtoconsiderableintensitybythecompetitionitself:andinproportionasitisthusstimulatedboththemerecontestbecomesmorepleasurable，andthevictory，whichwasoriginallyindifferent，comestoaffordakeenenjoyment。

Thesamephenomenonisexhibitedinthecaseofmoreimportantkindsofpursuit。Thusitoftenhappensthataman，feelinghislifelanguidanddevoidofinterests，beginstooccupyhimselfintheprosecutionofsomescientificorsociallyusefulwork，forthesakenotoftheendbutoftheoccupation。Atfirst，verylikely，theoccupationisirksome:butsoon，asheforesaw，adesiretoattaintheendatwhichheaimsisstimulated，partlybysympathywithotherworkers，partlybyhissustainedexerciseofvoluntaryeffortdirectedtowardsit；

sothathispursuit，becomingeager，becomesalsoasourceofpleasure。

Here，again，itisnodoubttruethatinproportionashisdesirefortheendgrowsstrong，theattainmentofitbecomespleasantinprospect:butitwouldbeapalpablemistaketosaythatthisprospectivepleasureistheobjectofthedesirethatcausesit。[6]

Whenwecomparethesepleasureswiththosepreviouslydiscussed，anotherimportantobservationsuggestsitself。intheformercase，thoughwecoulddistinguishappetite，asitappearsinconsciousness，fromthedesireofthepleasureattendingthesatisfactionofappetite，thereappearedtobenoincompatibilitybetweenthetwo。Thefactthatagluttonisdominatedbythedesireofthepleasuresofeatinginnowayimpedesthedevelopmentinhimoftheappetitewhichisanecessaryconditionofthesepleasures。Butwhenweturntothepleasuresofpursuit，weseemtoperceivethisincompatibilitytoacertainextent:acertainsubordinationofself-regardseemstobenecessaryinordertoobtainfullenjoyment。

Amanwhomaintainsthroughoutanepicureanmood，keepinghismainconsciousaimperpetuallyfixedonhisownpleasure，doesnotcatchthefullspiritofthechase；hiseagernessnevergetsjustthesharpnessofedgewhichimpartstothepleasureitshighestzest。HerecomesintoviewwhatwemaycallthefundamentalparadoxofHedonism，thattheimpulsetowardspleasure，iftoopredominant，defeatsitsownaim。Thiseffectisnotvisible，oratanyrateisscarcelyvisible，inthecaseofpassivesensualpleasures。

Butofouractiveenjoymentsgenerally，whethertheactivitiesonwhichtheyattendareclassedas`bodily’oras`intellectual’(aswellasofmanyemotionalpleasures)，itmaycertainlybesaidthatwecannotattainthem，atleastintheirhighestdegree，solongaswekeepourmainconsciousaimconcentrateduponthem。Itisnotonlythattheexerciseofourfacultiesisinsufficientlystimulatedbythemeredesireofthepleasureattendingit，andrequiresthepresenceofothermoreobjective，`extra-regarding’，impulses，inordertobefullydeveloped:wemaygofurtherandsaythattheseotherimpulsesmustbetemporarilypredominantandabsorbing，iftheexerciseanditsattendantgratificationaretoattaintheirfullscope。

Manymiddle-agedEnglishmenwouldmaintaintheviewthatbusinessismoreagreeablethanamusement；buttheywouldhardlyfinditsoiftheytransactedthebusinesswithaperpetualconsciousaimattheattendantpleasure。

Similarly，thepleasuresofthoughtandstudycanonlybeenjoyedinthehighestdegreebythosewhohaveanardourofcuriositywhichcarriesthemindtemporarilyawayfromselfanditssensations。InallkindsofArt，again，theexerciseofthecreativefacultyisattendedbyintenseandexquisitepleasures:butitwouldseemthatinordertogetthem，onemustforgetthem:thegenuineartistatworkseemstohaveapredominantandtemporarilyabsorbingdesirefortherealisationofhisidealofbeauty。

TheimportantcaseofthebenevolentaffectionsisatfirstsightsomewhatmoredoubtfulOntheonehanditisofcoursetrue，thatwhenthosewhomwelovearepleasedorpained，weourselvesfeelsympatheticpleasureandpain:andfurther，thattheflowofloveorkindlyfeelingisitselfhighlypleasurable。Sothatitisatleastplausibletointerpretbenevolentactionsasaimingultimatelyattheattainmentofoneorbothofthesetwokindsofpleasures，orattheavertingofsympatheticpainfromtheagent。Butwemayobserve，first，thattheimpulsetobeneficentactionproducedinusbysympathyisoftensomuchoutofproportiontoanyactualconsciousnessofsympatheticpleasureandpaininourselves，thatitwouldbeparadoxicaltoregardthislatterasitsobject。Oftenindeedwecannotbutfeelthatataleofactualsufferingarousesinusanexcitementonthewholemorepleasurablethanpainful，liketheexcitementofwitnessingatragedy；andyetatthesametimestirsinusanimpulsetorelieveit，evenwhentheprocessofrelievingispainfulandlaboriousandinvolvesvarioussacrificesofourownpleasures。Again，wemayoftenfreeourselvesfromsympatheticpainmosteasilybymerelyturningourthoughtsfromtheexternalsufferingthatcausesit:andwesometimesfeelanegoisticimpulsetodothis，whichwecanthendistinguishclearlyfromtheproperlysympatheticimpulsepromptingustorelievetheoriginalsuffering。

Andfinally，themuch-commendedpleasuresofbenevolenceseemtorequire，inordertobefeltinanyconsiderabledegree，thepre-existenceofadesiretodogoodtoothersfortheirsakeandnotforourown。AsHutchesonexplains，wemaycultivatebenevolentaffectionforthesakeofthepleasuresattendingit(justasthegluttoncultivatesappetite)，butwecannotproduceitatwill，howeverstrongmaybeourdesireofthesepleasures:andwhenitexists，eventhoughitmayoweitsorigintoapurelyegoisticimpulse，itisstillessentiallyadesiretodogoodtoothersfortheirsakeandnotforourown。

Itcannotperhapsbesaidthattheself-abandonmentandself-forgetfulness，whichseemedanessentialconditionofthefulldevelopmentoftheotherelevatedimpulsesbeforenoticed，characterisebenevolentaffectionnormallyandpermanently；aslove，whenapowerfulemotion，seemsnaturallytoinvolveadesireforreciprocatedlove，stronginproportiontotheintensityoftheemotion；andthustheconsciousnessofselfandofone’sownpleasuresandpainsseemsoftenheightenedbytheveryintensityoftheaffectionthatbindsonetoothers。Stillwemayatleastsaythatthisself-suppressionandabsorptionofconsciousnessinthethoughtofotherhumanbeingsandtheirhappinessisacommonincidentofallstrongaffections:anditissaidthatpersonswholoveintenselysometimesfeelasenseofantagonismbetweentheegoisticandaltruisticelementsoftheirdesire，andanimpulsetosuppresstheformer，whichoccasionallyexhibitsitselfinactsoffantasticandextravagantself-sacrifice。

Ifthenreflectiononourmoralconsciousnessseemstoshowthat``thepleasureofvirtueisonewhichcanonlybeobtainedontheexpressconditionofitsnotbeingtheobjectsought’’，[7]weneednotdistrustthisresultofobservationonaccountoftheabnormalnatureofthephenomenon。Wehavemerelyanotherillustrationofapsychologicallaw，which，aswehaveseen，isexemplifiedthroughoutthewholerangeofourdesires。InthepromptingsofSensenolessthaninthoseofIntellectorReasonwefindthephenomenonofstrictlydisinterestedimpulse:baseandtrivialexternalendsmayexcitedesiresofthiskind，aswellasthesublimeandideal:andtherearepleasuresofthemerelyanimallifewhichcanonlybeobtainedonconditionofnotbeingdirectlysought，nolessthanthesatisfactionsofagoodconscience。

SofarIhavebeenconcernedtoinsistonthefeltincompatibilityof`self-regarding’and`extra-regarding’impulsesonlyasameansofprovingtheiressentialdistinctness。Idonotwishtooverstatethisincompatibility:Ibelievethatmostcommonlyitisverytransient，andoftenonlymomentary，andthatourgreatesthappiness——ifthatbeourdeliberateaim——isgenerallyattainedbymeansofasortofalternatingrhythmofthetwokindsofimpulseinconsciousness。Aman’sconsciousdesireis，Ithink，moreoftenthannotchieflyextra-regarding；

butwherethereisstrongdesireinanydirection，thereiscommonlykeensusceptibilitytothecorrespondingpleasures；andthemostdevotedenthusiastissustainedinhisworkbytherecurrentconsciousnessofsuchpleasures。

Butitisimportanttopointoutthatthefamiliarandobviousinstancesofconflictbetweenself-loveandsomeextra-regardingimpulsearenotparadoxesandillusionstobeexplainedaway，butphenomenawhichtheanalysisofourconsciousnessinitsnormalstate，whenthereisnosuchconflict，wouldleadustoexpect。Ifwearecontinuallyactingfromimpulseswhoseimmediateobjectsaresomethingotherthanourownhappiness，itisquitenaturalthatweshouldoccasionallyyieldtosuchimpulseswhentheypromptustoanuncompensatedsacrificeofpleasure。Thusamanofweakself-control，afterfastingtoolong，mayeasilyindulgehisappetiteforfoodtoanextentwhichheknowstobeunwholesome:andthatnotbecausethepleasureofeatingappearstohim，eveninthemomentofindulgence，atallworthyofconsiderationincomparisonwiththeinjurytohealth；butmerelybecausehefeelsanimpulsetoeatfood，whichprevailsoverhisprudentialjudgment。

Thus，again，menhavesacrificedalltheenjoymentsoflife，andevenlifeitself，toobtainposthumousfame:notfromanyillusorybeliefthattheywouldbesomehowcapableofderivingpleasurefromit，butfromadirectdesireofthefutureadmirationofothers，andapreferenceofittotheirownpleasure。Andso，again，whenthesacrificeismadeforsomeidealend，asTruth，orFreedom，orReligion:itmaybearealsacrificeoftheindividual’shappiness，andnotmerelythepreferenceofonehighlyrefinedpleasure(oroftheabsenceofonespecialpain)toalltheotherelementsofhappiness。Nodoubtthispreferenceispossible；amanmayfeelthatthehighandseveredelightofservinghisidealisa``pearlofgreatprice’’outweighinginvalueallotherpleasures。Buthemayalsofeelthatthesacrificewillnotrepayhim，andyetdeterminethatitshallbemade。

Tosumup:ourconsciousactiveimpulsesaresofarfrombeingalwaysdirectedtowardstheattainmentofpleasureoravoidance，ofpainforourselves，thatwecanfindeverywhereinconsciousnessextra-regardingimpulses，directedtowardssomethingthatisnotpleasure，norrelieffrompain；and，indeed，amostimportantpartofourpleasuredependsupontheexistenceofsuchimpulses:whileontheotherhandtheyareinmanycasessofarincompatiblewiththedesireofourownpleasurethatthetwokindsofimpulsedonoteasilycoexistinthesamemomentofconsciousness；andmoreoccasionally(butbynomeansrarely)thetwocomeintoirreconcilableconflict，andprompttooppositecoursesofaction。Andthisincompatibility(thoughitisimportanttonoticeitinotherinstances)isnodoubtspeciallyprominentinthecaseoftheimpulsetowardstheendwhichmostmarkedlycompetesinethicalcontroversywithpleasure:theloveofvirtueforitsownsake，ordesiretodowhatisrightassuch。