第18章

Butthoughprobablyallmoralagentshaveexperienceofsuchparticularintuitions，andthoughtheyconstituteagreatpartofthemoralphenomenaofmostminds，comparativelyfewaresothoroughlysatisfiedwiththem，asnottofeelaneedofsomefurthermoralknowledgeevenfromastrictlypracticalpointofview。Fortheseparticularintuitionsdonot，toreflectivepersons，presentthemselvesasquiteindubitableandirrefragable:nordotheyalwaysfindwhentheyhaveputanethicalquestiontothemselveswithallsincerity，thattheyareconsciousofclearimmediateinsightinrespectofit。Again，whenamancomparestheutterancesofhisconscienceatdifferenttimes，heoftenfindsitdifficulttomakethemaltogetherconsistent:thesameconductwillwearadifferentmoralaspectatonetimefromthatwhichitworeatanother，althoughourknowledgeofitscircumstancesandconditionsisnotmateriallychanged。Further，webecomeawarethatthemoralperceptionsofdifferentminds，toallappearanceequallycompetenttojudge，frequentlyconflict:onecondemnswhatanotherapproves。Inthiswayseriousdoubtsarearousedastothevalidityofeachman’sparticularmoraljudgments:

andweareledtoendeavourtosetthesedoubtsatrestbyappealingtogeneralrules，morefirmlyestablishedonabasisofcommonconsent。

Andinfact，thoughtheviewofconscienceabovediscussedisonewhichmuchpopularlanguageseemstosuggest，itisnotthatwhichChristianandothermoralistshaveusuallygiven。Theyhaveratherrepresentedtheprocessofconscienceasanalogoustooneofjuralreasoning，suchasisconductedinaCourtofLaw。Herewehavealwaysasystemofuniversalrulesgiven，andanyparticularactionhastobebroughtunderoneoftheserulesbeforeitcanbepronouncedlawfulorunlawful。Nowtherulesofpositivelawareusuallynotdiscoverablebytheindividual’sreason:thismayteachhimthatlawoughttobeobeyed，butwhatlawismust，inthemain，becommunicatedtohimfromsomeexternalauthority。Andthisisnotunfrequentlythecasewiththeconscientiousreasoningofordinarypersonswhenanydisputeordifficultyforcesthemtoreason:theyhaveagenuineimpulsetoconformtotherightrulesofconduct，buttheyarenotconscious，indifficultordoubtfulcases，ofseeingforthemselveswhattheseare:theyhavetoinquireoftheirpriest，ortheirsacredbooks，orperhapsthecommonopinionofthesocietytowhichtheybelong。InsofarasthisisthecasewecannotstrictlycalltheirmethodIntuitional。Theyfollowrulesgenerallyreceived，notintuitivelyapprehended。Otherpersons，however(orperhapsalltosomeextent)，doseemtoseeforthemselvesthetruthandbindingnessofallormostofthesecurrentrules。Theymaystillputforward`commonconsent’asanargumentforthevalidityoftheserules:butonlyassupportingtheindividual’sintuition，notasasubstituteforitorassupersedingit。

HerethenwehaveasecondIntuitionalMethod:

ofwhichthefundamentalassumptionisthatwecandiscerncertaingeneralruleswithreallyclearandfinallyvalidintuition。Itisheldthatsuchgeneralrulesareimplicitinthemoralreasoningofordinarymen，whoapprehendthemadequatelyformostpracticalpurposes，andareabletoenunciatethemroughly；butthattostatethemwithproperprecisionrequiresaspecialhabitofcontemplatingclearlyandsteadilyabstractmoralnotions。

Itisheldthatthemoralist’sfunctionthenistoperformthisprocessofabstractcontemplation，toarrangetheresultsassystematicallyaspossible，andbyproperdefinitionsandexplanationstoremovevaguenessandpreventconflict。ItissuchasystemasthiswhichseemstobegenerallyintendedwhenIntuitiveorapriorimoralityismentioned，andwhichwillchieflyoccupyusinBookiii。

Byphilosophicminds，however，the`MoralityofCommonSense’(asIhaveventuredtocallit)，evenwhenmadeaspreciseandorderlyaspossible，isoftenfoundunsatisfactoryasasystem，althoughtheyhavenodispositiontoquestionitsgeneralauthority。Itisfounddifficulttoacceptasscientificfirstprinciplesthemoralgeneralitiesthatweobtainbyreflectionontheordinarythoughtofmankind，eventhoughwesharethisthought。Evengrantingthattheserulescanbesodefinedasperfectlytofittogetherandcoverthewholefieldofhumanconduct，withoutcomingintoconflictandwithoutleavinganypracticalquestionsunanswered，——stilltheresultingcodeseemsanaccidentalaggregateofprecepts，whichstandsinneedofsomerationalsynthesis。Inshort，withoutbeingdisposedtodenythatconductcommonlyjudgedtoberightisso，wemayyetrequiresomedeeperexplanationwhyitisso。FromthisdemandspringsathirdspeciesorphaseofIntuitionism，which，whileacceptingthemoralityofcommonsenseasinthemainsound，stillattemptstofindforitaphilosophicbasiswhichitdoesnotitselfoffer:togetoneormoreprinciplesmoreabsolutelyandundeniablytrueandevident，fromwhichthecurrentrulesmightbededuced，eitherjustastheyarecommonlyreceivedorwithslightmodificationsandrectifications。[1]

ThethreephasesofIntuitionismjustdescribedmaybetreatedasthreestagesintheformaldevelopmentofIntuitiveMorality:

wemaytermthemrespectivelyPerceptional，Dogmatic，andPhilosophical。

Thelast-mentionedIhaveonlydefinedinthevaguestway:infact，asyetIhavepresenteditonlyasaproblem，ofwhichitisimpossibletoforeseehowmanysolutionsmaybeattempted:butitdoesnotseemdesirabletoinvestigateitfurtheratpresent，asitwillbemoresatisfactorilystudiedafterexaminingindetailtheMoralityofCommonSense。

Itmustnotbethoughtthatthesethreephasesaresharplydistinguishedinthemoralreasoningofordinarymen:butthennomoreisIntuitionismofanysortsharplydistinguishedfromeitherspeciesofHedonism。Aloosecombinationorconfusionofmethodsisthemostcommontypeofactualmoralreasoning。Probablymostmoralmenbelievethattheirmoralsenseorinstinctinanycasewillguidethemfairlyright，butalsothattherearegeneralrulesfordeterminingrightactionindifferentdepartmentsofconduct:andthatfortheseagainitispossibletofindaphilosophicalexplanation，bywhichtheymaybededucedfromasmallernumberoffundamentalprinciples。Stillforsystematicdirectionofconduct，werequiretoknowonwhatjudgmentswearetorelyasultimatelyvalid。

SofarIhavebeenmainlyconcernedwithdifferencesinintuitionalmethodduetodifferenceofgeneralityintheintuitivebeliefsrecognisedasultimatelyvalid。Thereis，however，anotherclassofdifferencesarisingfromavariationofviewastotheprecisequalityimmediatelyapprehendedinthemoralintuition。Thesearepeculiarlysubtleanddifficulttofixinclearandpreciselanguage，andIthereforereservethemforaseparatechapter。{Note。}

MEBook1Chapter8Section4Note2

NOTE——Intuitionalmoralistshavenotalwaystakensufficientcareinexpoundingtheirsystemtomakeclearwhethertheyregardasultimatelyvalid，moraljudgmentsonsingleacts，orgeneralrulesprescribingparticularkindsofacts，ormoreuniversalandfundamentalprinciples。Forexample，DugaldStewartusestheterm``perception’’

todenotetheimmediateoperationofthemoralfaculty；atthesametime，indescribingwhatisthusperceived，healwaysseemstohaveinviewgeneralrules。

StillwecantolerablywelldistinguishamongEnglishethicalwritersthosewhohaveconfinedthemselvesmainlytothedefinitionandarrangementoftheMoralityofCommonSense，fromthosewhohaveaimedatamorephilosophicaltreatmentofthecontentofmoralintuition。Andwefindthatthedistinctioncorrespondsinthemaintoadifferenceofperiods:andthat——whatperhapsweshouldhardlyhaveexpected——themorephilosophicalschoolistheearlier。

Theexplanationofthismaybepartlyfoundbyreferringtothedoctrinesinantagonismtowhich，intherespectiveperiods，theIntuitionalmethodassertedanddevelopeditself。InthefirstperiodallorthodoxmoralistswereoccupiedinrefutingHobbism。Butthissystem，thoughbasedonMaterialismandEgoism，wasyetintendedasethicallyconstructive。Acceptinginthemainthecommonlyreceivedrulesofsocialmorality，itexplainedthemastheconditionsofpeacefulexistencewhichenlightenedselfinterestdirectedeachindividualtoobey；providedonlythesocialordertowhichtheybelongedwasnotmerelyideal，butmadeactualbyastronggovernment。

Nownodoubtthisviewrendersthetheoreticalbasisofdutyseriouslyunstable；still，assumingadecentlygoodgovernment，Hobbismmayclaimtoatonceexplainandestablish，insteadofundermining，themoralityofCommonSense。Andtherefore，thoughsomeofHobbes’antagonists(asCudworth)contentedthemselveswithsimplyreaffirmingtheabsolutenessofmorality，themorethoughtfulfeltthatsystemmustbemetbysystemandexplanationbyexplanation，andthattheymustpenetratebeyondthedogmasofcommonsensetosomemoreirrefragablecertainty。Aridso，whileCumberlandfoundthisdeeperbasisinthenotionof``thecommongoodofallRationals’’asanultimateend，Clarkesoughttoexhibitthemorefundamentalofthereceivedrulesasaxiomsofperfectself-evidence，necessarilyforceduponthemindincontemplatinghumanbeingsandtheirrelations。Clarke’sresults，however，werenotfoundsatisfactory:andbydegreestheattempttoexhibitmoralityasabodyofscientifictruthfellintodiscredit，andthedispositiontodwellontheemotionalsideofthemoralconsciousnessbecameprevalent。Butwhenethicaldiscussionthuspassedoverintopsychologicalanalysisandclassification，theconceptionoftheobjectivityofduty，onwhichtheauthorityofmoralsentimentdepends，fellgraduallyoutofview:forexample，wefindHutchesonaskingwhythemoralsenseshouldnotvaryindifferenthumanbeings，asthepalatedoes，withoutdreamingthatthereisanyperiltomoralityinadmittingsuchvariationsaslegitimate。

When，however，thenewdoctrinewasendorsedbythedreadednameofHume，itsdangerousnature，andtheneedofbringingagainintoprominencethecognitiveelementofmoralconsciousness，wereclearlyseen:andthisworkwasundertakenasapartofthegeneralphilosophicprotestoftheScottishSchoolagainsttheEmpiricismthathadculminatedinHume。ButthisschoolclaimedasitscharacteristicmeritthatitmetEmpiricismonitsownground，andshowedamongthefactsofpsychologicalexperiencewhichtheEmpiricistprofessedtoobserve，theassumptionswhichherepudiated。AndthusinEthicsitwasledrathertoexpoundandreaffirmthemoralityofCommonSense，thantoofferanyprofounderprincipleswhichcouldnotbesoeasilysupportedbyanappealtocommonexperience。

Wehavehithertospokenofthequalityofconductdiscernedbyourmoralfacultyas`rightness’，whichisthetermcommonlyusedbyEnglishmoralists。Wehaveregardedthisterm，anditsequivalentsinordinaryuse，asimplyingtheexistenceofadictateorimperativeofreason，whichprescribescertainactionseitherunconditionally，orwithreferencetosomeulteriorend。

Itis，however，possibletotakeaviewofvirtuousactioninwhich，thoughthevalidityofmoralintuitionsisnotdisputed，thisnotionofruleordictateisatanyrateonlylatentorimplicit，themoralidealbeingpresentedasattractiveratherthanimperative。Suchaviewseemstobetakenwhentheactiontowhichwearemorallyprompted，orthequalityofcharactermanifestedinit，isjudgedtobe`good’initself(andnotmerelyasameanstosomeulteriorGood)。This，aswasbeforenoticed，wasthefundamentalethicalconceptionintheGreekschoolsofMoralPhilosophygenerally；includingeventheStoics，thoughtheirsystem，fromtheprominencethatitgivestotheconceptionofNaturalLaw，formsatransitionallinkbetweenancientandmodernethics。Andthishistoricalillustrationmayservetoexhibitoneimportantresultofsubstitutingtheideaof`goodness’forthatof`rightness’ofconduct，whichatfirstsightmightbethoughtamerelyverbalchange。Forthechiefcharacteristicsofancientethicalcontroversyasdistinguishedfrommodernmaybetracedtotheemploymentofagenericnotioninsteadofaspecificoneinexpressingthecommonmoraljudgmentsonactions。VirtueorRightactioniscommonlyregardedasonlyaspeciesoftheGood:andso，onthisviewofthemoralintuition，thefirstquestionthatoffersitself，whenweendeavourtosystematiseconduct，ishowtodeterminetherelationofthisspeciesofgoodtotherestofthegenus。ItwasonthisquestionthattheGreekthinkersargued，fromfirsttolast。Theirspeculationscanscarcelybeunderstoodbyusunlesswithacertaineffortwethrowthequasi-juralnotionsofmodernethicsaside，andask(astheydid)not``WhatisDutyandwhatisitsground？’’but``WhichoftheobjectsthatmenthinkgoodistrulyGoodortheHighestGood？’’or，inthemorespecialisedformofthequestionwhichthemoralintuitionintroduces，``WhatistherelationofthekindofGoodwecallVirtue，thequalitiesofconductandcharacterwhichmencommendandadmire，toothergoodthings？’’

This，then，isthefirstdifferencetobenoticedbetweenthetwoformsoftheintuitivejudgment。Intherecognitionofconductas`right’isinvolvedanauthoritativeprescriptiontodoit:

butwhenwehavejudgedconducttobegood，itisnotyetclearthatweoughttopreferthiskindofgoodtoallothergoodthings:somestandardforestimatingtherelativevaluesofdifferent`goods’hasstilltobesought。

Ipropose，then，toexaminetheimportofthenotion’Good’inthewholerangeofitsapplication；——premisingthat，asitisfortheconstituentsofUltimateGoodthatwerequireastandardofcomparison，wearenotdirectlyconcernedwithanythingthatisclearlyonlygoodasameanstotheattainmentofsomeulteriorend。If，indeed，wehadonlythislattercasetoconsider，itwouldbeplausibletointerpret`good’

withoutreferencetohumandesireorchoice，asmeaningmerely`fit’or`adapted’fortheproductionofcertaineffects——agoodhorseforriding，agoodgunforshooting，etc。Butasweapplythenotionalsotoultimateendswemustseekameaningforitwhichwillcoverbothapplications。