第17章

Tobeclear，then，wemustparticulariseastheobjectofSelf-love，andEndofthemethodwhichIhavedistinguishedasEgoisticHedonism，Pleasure，takeninitswidestsense，asincludingeveryspeciesof``delight’’，``enjoyment’’，or``satisfaction’’；

exceptsofarasanyparticularspeciesmaybeexcludedbyitsincompatibilitywithsomegreaterpleasures，orasnecessarilyinvolvingconcomitantorsubsequentpains。ItisthusthatSelf-loveseemstobeunderstoodbyButlerandotherEnglishmoralistsafterhim；asadesireofone’sownpleasuregenerally，andofthegreatestamountofitobtainable，fromwhateversourceitmaybeobtained。Infact，itisuponthisgeneralityandcomprehensivenessthatthe`authority’and`reasonableness’attributedtoSelf-loveinButler’ssystemarefounded。Forsatisfactionorpleasureofsomekindresultsfromgratifyinganyimpulse；thuswhenantagonisticimpulsescompeteforthedeterminationoftheWill，wearepromptedbythedesireforpleasureingeneraltocomparethepleasureswhichweforeseewillrespectivelyattendthegratificationofeitherimpulse，andwhenwehaveascertainedwhichsetofpleasuresisthegreatest，Self-loveorthedesireforpleasureingeneralreinforcesthecorrespondingimpulse。Itisthuscalledintoplaywheneverimpulsesconflict，andisthereforenaturallyregulativeanddirective(asButlerargues)ofotherspringsofaction。Onthisview，sofarasSelf-loveoperates，wemerelyconsidertheamountofpleasureorsatisfaction:touseBentham’sillustration，``quantityofpleasurebeingequal，push-pinisasgoodaspoetry’’。

Thisposition，however，seemstomanyoffensivelyparadoxical；andJ。S。MillinhisdevelopmentofBentham’sdoctrinethoughtitdesirabletoabandonitandtotakeintoaccountdifferencesinqualityamongpleasuresaswellasdifferencesindegree。Nowherewemayobserve，first，thatitisquiteconsistentwiththeviewquotedasBentham’stodescribesomekindsofpleasureasinferiorinqualitytoothers，ifby`apleasure’wemean(asisoftenmeant)awholestateofconsciousnesswhichisonlypartlypleasurable；andstillmoreifwetakeintoviewsubsequentstates。Formanypleasuresarenotfreefrompainevenwhileenjoyed；andmanymorehavepainfulconsequences。Suchpleasuresare，inBentham’sphrase，``impure’’:andasthepainhastobesetoffasadrawbackinvaluingthepleasure，itisinaccordancewithstrictlyquantitativemeasurementofpleasuretocalltheminferiorinkind。Andagain，wemustbecarefulnottoconfoundintensityofpleasurewithintensityofsensation:asapleasantfeelingmaybestrongandabsorbing，andyetnotsopleasantasanotherthatismoresubtleanddelicate。Withtheseexplanations，itseemstomethatinordertoworkoutconsistentlythemethodthattakespleasureasthesoleultimateendofrationalconduct，Bentham’spropositionmustbeaccepted，andallqualitativecomparisonofpleasuresmustreallyresolveitselfintoquantitative。Forallpleasuresareunderstoodtobesocalledbecausetheyhaveacommonpropertyofpleasantness，andmaythereforebecomparedinrespectofthiscommonproperty。If，then，whatweareseekingispleasureassuch，andpleasurealone，wemustevidentlyalwayspreferthemorepleasantpleasuretothelesspleasant:nootherchoiceseemsreasonable，unlessweareaimingatsomethingbesidespleasure。Andoftenwhenwesaythatonekindofpleasureisbetterthananother——as(e。g。)thatthepleasuresofreciprocatedaffectionaresuperiorinqualitytothepleasuresofgratifiedappetite-wemeanthattheyaremorepleasant。Nodoubtwemaymeansomethingelse:

wemaymean，forinstance，thattheyarenoblerandmoreelevated，althoughlesspleasant。Butthenweareclearlyintroducinganon-hedonisticgroundofpreference:andifthisisdone，themethodadoptedisaperplexingmixtureofIntuitionismandHedonism。

Tosumup:Egoism，ifwemerelyunderstandbyitamethodthataimsatSelf-realisation，seemstobeaformintowhichalmostanyethicalsystemmaybethrown，withoutmodifyingitsessentialcharacteristics。

AndevenwhenfurtherdefinedasEgoisticHedonism，itisstillimperfectlydistinguishablefromIntuitionismifqualityofpleasuresisadmittedasaconsiderationdistinctfromandoverrulingquantity。ThereremainsthenPureorQuantitativeEgoisticHedonism，which，asamethodessentiallydistinctfromallothersandwidelymaintainedtoberational，seemstodeserveadetailedexamination。Accordingtothistherationalagentregardsquantityofconsequentpleasureandpaintohimselfasaloneimportantinchoosingbetweenalternativesofaction；andseeksalwaysthegreatestattainablesurplusofpleasureoverpain——which，withoutviolationofusage，wemaydesignateashis`greatesthappiness’。Itseemstobethisviewandattitudeofmindwhichismostcommonlyintendedbythevaguerterms`egoism’，`egoistic’:andthereforeIshallallowmyselftousethesetermsinthismoreprecisesignification。

Ihaveusedtheterm`Intuitional’todenotetheviewofethicswhichregardsasthepracticallyultimateendofmoralactionstheirconformitytocertainrulesordictatesofDutyunconditionallyprescribed。Thereis，however，considerableambiguityastotheexactantithesisimpliedbytheterms`intuition’，`intuitive’，andtheircongeners，ascurrentlyusedinethicaldiscussion，whichwemustnowendeavourtoremove。Writerswhomaintainthatwehave`intuitiveknowledge’oftherightnessofactionsusuallymeanthatthisrightnessisascertainedbysimply``lookingat’’theactionsthemselves，withoutconsideringtheirulteriorconsequences。Thisview，indeed，canhardlybeextendedtothewholerangeofduty；sincenomoralityeverexistedwhichdidnotconsiderulteriorconsequencestosomeextent。PrudenceorForethoughthascommonlybeenreckonedavirtue:andallmodernlistsofVirtueshaveincludedRationalBenevolence，whichaimsatthehappinessofotherhumanbeingsgenerally，andthereforenecessarilytakesintoconsiderationevenremoteeffectsofactions。Itmustbeobserved，too，thatitisdifficulttodrawthelinebetweenanactanditsconsequences:astheeffectsconsequentoneachofourvolitionsformacontinuousseriesofindefiniteextension，andweseemtobeconsciousofcausingalltheseeffects，sofarasatthemomentofvolitionweforeseethemtobeprobable。However，wefindthatinthecommonnotionsofdifferentkindsofactions，alineisactuallydrawnbetweentheresultsincludedinthenotionandregardedasformingpartoftheact，andthoseconsideredasitsconsequences。Forexample，inspeakingtruthtoajury，Imaypossiblyforeseethatmywords，operatingalongwithotherstatementsandindications，willunavoidablyleadthemtoawrongconclusionastotheguiltorinnocenceoftheaccused，ascertainlyasIforeseethattheywillproducearightimpressionastotheparticularmatteroffacttowhichIamtestifying:still，weshouldcommonlyconsiderthelatterforesightorintentiontodeterminethenatureoftheactasanactofveracity，whiletheformermerelyrelatestoaconsequence。Wemustunderstandthenthatthedisregardofconsequences，whichtheIntuitionalviewisheretakentoimply，onlyrelatestocertaindeterminateclassesofaction(suchasTruth-speaking)wherecommonusageoftermsadequatelydefineswhateventsaretobeincludedinthegeneralnotionsoftheacts，andwhatregardedastheirconsequences。

Butagain:

wehavetoobservethatmenmayanddojudgeremoteaswellasimmediateresultstobeinthemselvesgood，andsuchasweoughttoseektorealise，withoutconsideringtheminrelationtothefeelingsofsentientbeings。

IhavealreadyassumedthistobetheviewofthosewhoadoptthegeneralPerfection，asdistinctfromtheHappiness，ofhumansocietyastheirultimateend；anditwouldseemtobetheviewofmanywhoconcentratetheireffortsonsomemoreparticularresults，otherthanmorality，suchasthepromotionofArtorKnowledge。Suchaview，ifexpresslydistinguishedfromHedonism，mightproperlybeclassedasIntuitional，butinasensewiderthanthatdefinedintheprecedingparagraph:i。e。itwouldbemeantthattheresultsinquestionarejudgedtobegoodimmediately，andnotbyinferencefromexperienceofthepleasureswhichtheyproduce。Wehave，therefore，toadmitawideruseof`Intuition’，asequivalentto`immediatejudgmentastowhatoughttobedoneoraimedat’。Itshould，however，beobservedthatthecurrentcontrastbetween`intuitive’or`a-priori’

and`inductive’or`a-posteriori’moralitycommonlyinvolvesacertainconfusionofthought。Forwhatthe`inductive’moralistprofessestoknowbyinduction，iscommonlynotthesamethingaswhatthe`intuitive’moralistprofessestoknowbyintuition。Intheformercaseitistheconducivenesstopleasureofcertainkindsofactionthatismethodicallyascertained:

inthelattercase，theirrightness:thereisthereforenoproperopposition。

IfHedonismclaimstogiveauthoritativeguidance，thiscanonlybeinvirtueoftheprinciplethatpleasureistheonlyreasonableultimateendofhumanaction:andthisprinciplecannotbeknownbyinductionfromexperience。

Experiencecanatmosttellusthatallmenalwaysdoseekpleasureastheirultimateend(thatitdoesnotsupportthisconclusionIhavealreadytriedtoshow):itcannottellusthatanyoneoughtsotoseekit。Ifthislatterpropositionislegitimatelyaffirmedinrespecteitherofprivateorofgeneralhappiness，itmusteitherbeimmediatelyknowntobetrue，andtherefore，wemaysay，amoralintuition——orbeinferredultimatelyfrompremiseswhichincludeatleastonesuchmoralintuition；henceeitherspeciesofHedonism，regardedfromthepointofviewprimarilytakeninthistreatise，mightbelegitimatelysaidtobeinacertainsense`intuitional’。

Itseems，however，tobetheprevailingopinionofordinarymoralpersons，andofmostofthewriterswhohavemaintainedtheexistenceofmoralintuitions，thatcertainkindsofactionsareunconditionallyprescribedwithoutregardtoulteriorconsequences:andIhaveaccordinglytreatedthisdoctrineasadistinguishingcharacteristicoftheIntuitionalmethod，duringthemainpartofthedetailedexaminationofthatmethodwhichIattemptinBookiii。

Further；thecommonantithesisbetween’intuitive’

and’inductive’moralityismisleadinginanotherway:sinceamoralistmayholdtherightnessofactionstobecognisableapartfromthepleasureproducedbythem，whileyethismethodmaybeproperlycalledInductive。

Forhemayholdthat，justasthegeneralisationsofphysicalsciencerestonparticularobservations，soinethicsgeneraltruthscanonlybereachedbyinductionfromjudgmentsorperceptionsrelatingtotherightnessorwrongnessofparticularacts。

Forexample，whenSocratesissaidbyAristotletohaveappliedinductivereasoningtoethicalquestions，itisthiskindofinductionwhichismeant。Hediscovered，aswearetold，thelatentignoranceofhimselfandothermen:thatis，thattheyusedgeneraltermsconfidently，withoutbeingable，whencalledupon，toexplainthemeaningofthoseterms。Hisplanforremedyingthisignorancewastoworktowardsthetruedefinitionofeachterm，byexaminingandcomparingdifferentinstancesofitsapplication。ThusthedefinitionofJusticewouldbesoughtbycomparingdifferentactionscommonlyjudgedtobejust，andframingageneralpropositionthatwouldharmonisewithalltheseparticularjudgments。

Soagain，inthepopularviewofConscienceitseemstobeoftenimpliedthatparticularjudgmentsarethemosttrustworthy。

`Conscience’istheacceptedpopulartermforthefacultyofmoraljudgment，asappliedtotheactsandmotivesofthepersonjudging；andwemostcommonlythinkofthedictatesofconscienceasrelatingtoparticularactions。

Thuswhenamanisbidden，inanyparticularcase，to`trusttohisconscience’，itcommonlyseenistobemeantthatheshouldexerciseafacultyofjudgingmorallythisparticularcasewithoutreferencetogeneralrules，andeveninoppositiontoconclusionsobtainedbysystematicdeductionfromsuchrules。AnditisonthisviewofConsciencethatthecontemptoftenexpressedfor’Casuistry’maybemosteasilyjustified:foriftheparticularcasecanbesatisfactorilysettledbyconsciencewithoutreferencetogeneralrules，`Casuistry’，whichconsistsintheapplicationofgeneralrulestoparticularcases，isatbestsuperfluous。Butthen，onthisview，weshallhavenopracticalneedofanysuchgeneralrules，orofscientificEthicsatall。Wemayofcourseformgeneralpropositionsbyinductionfromtheseparticularconscientiousjudgments，andarrangethemsystematically:

butanyinterestwhichsuchasystemmayhavewillbepurelyspeculative。

Andthisaccounts，perhaps，fortheindifferenceorhostilitytosystematicmoralityshownbysomeconscientiouspersons。Fortheyfeelthattheycanatanyratedowithoutit:andtheyfearthatthecultivationofitmayplacethemindinawrongattitudeinrelationtopractice，andproveratherunfavourablethanotherwisetotheproperdevelopmentofthepracticallyimportantfacultymanifestedorexercisedinparticularmoraljudgments。

Theviewabovedescribedmaybecalled，inasense，`ultra-intuitional’，since，initsmostextremeform，itrecognisessimpleimmediateintuitionsaloneanddiscardsassuperfluousallmodesofreasoningtomoralconclusions:andwemayfindinitonephaseorvarietyoftheIntuitionalmethod，——ifwemayextendtheterm`method’toincludeaprocedurethatiscompletedinasinglejudgment。