第17章

Theexecutivepower，pursuantofwhathasbeenalreadysaid，oughttohaveashareinthelegislaturebythepowerofrejecting，otherwiseitwouldsoonbestrippedofitsprerogative。Butshouldthelegislativepowerusurpashareoftheexecutive，thelatterwouldbeequallyundone。

Iftheprinceweretohaveapartinthelegislaturebythepowerofresolving，libertywouldbelost。Butasitisnecessaryheshouldhaveashareinthelegislatureforthesupportofhisownprerogative，thissharemustconsistinthepowerofrejecting。

ThechangeofgovernmentatRomewasowingtothis，thatneitherthesenate，whohadonepartoftheexecutivepower，northemagistrates，whowereentrustedwiththeother，hadtherightofrejecting，whichwasentirelylodgedinthepeople。

Herethenisthefundamentalconstitutionofthegovernmentwearetreatingof。Thelegislativebodybeingcomposedoftwoparts，theycheckoneanotherbythemutualprivilegeofrejecting。Theyarebothrestrainedbytheexecutivepower，astheexecutiveisbythelegislative。

Thesethreepowersshouldnaturallyformastateofreposeorinaction。

Butasthereisanecessityformovementinthecourseofhumanaffairs，theyareforcedtomove，butstillinconcert。

Astheexecutivepowerhasnootherpartinthelegislativethantheprivilegeofrejecting，itcanhavenoshareinthepublicdebates。Itisnotevennecessarythatitshouldpropose，becauseasitmayalwaysdisapproveoftheresolutionsthatshallbetaken，itmaylikewiserejectthedecisionsonthoseproposalswhichweremadeagainstitswill。

Insomeancientcommonwealths，wherepublicdebateswerecarriedonbythepeopleinabody，itwasnaturalfortheexecutivepowertoproposeanddebateinconjunctionwiththepeople，otherwisetheirresolutionsmusthavebeenattendedwithastrangeconfusion。

Weretheexecutivepowertodeterminetheraisingofpublicmoney，otherwisethanbygivingitsconsent，libertywouldbeatanend；

becauseitwouldbecomelegislativeinthemostimportantpointoflegislation。

Ifthelegislativepowerwastosettlethesubsidies，notfromyeartoyear，butforever，itwouldruntheriskoflosingitsliberty，becausetheexecutivepowerwouldbenolongerdependent；andwhenonceitwaspossessedofsuchaperpetualright，itwouldbeamatterofindifferencewhetherithelditofitselforofanother。Thesamemaybesaidifitshouldcometoaresolutionofentrusting，notanannual，butaperpetualcommandofthefleetsandarmiestotheexecutivepower。

Topreventtheexecutivepowerfrombeingabletooppress，itisrequisitethatthearmieswithwhichitisentrustedshouldconsistofthepeople，andhavethesamespiritasthepeople，aswasthecaseatRometillthetimeofMarius。Toobtainthisend，thereareonlytwoways，eitherthatthepersonsemployedinthearmyshouldhavesufficientpropertytoanswerfortheirconducttotheirfellow—subjects，andbeenlistedonlyforayear，aswascustomaryatRome：orifthereshouldbeastandingarmy，composedchieflyofthemostdespicablepartofthenation，thelegislativepowershouldhavearighttodisbandthemassoonasitpleased；thesoldiersshouldliveincommonwiththerestofthepeople；andnoseparatecamp，barracks，orfortressshouldbesuffered。

Whenonceanarmyisestablished，itoughtnottodependimmediatelyonthelegislative，butontheexecutive，power；andthisfromtheverynatureofthething，itsbusinessconsistingmoreinactionthanindeliberation。

Itisnaturalformankindtosetahighervalueuponcouragethantimidity，onactivitythanprudence，onstrengththancounsel。Hencethearmywilleverdespiseasenate，andrespecttheirownofficers。Theywillnaturallyslighttheorderssentthembyabodyofmenwhomtheylookuponascowards，andthereforeunworthytocommandthem。Sothatassoonasthetroopsdependentirelyonthelegislativebody，itbecomesamilitarygovernment；andifthecontraryhaseverhappened，ithasbeenowingtosomeextraordinarycircumstances。Itisbecausethearmywasalwayskeptdivided；itisbecauseitwascomposedofseveralbodiesthatdependedeachonaparticularprovince；itisbecausethecapitaltownswerestrongplaces，defendedbytheirnaturalsituation，andnotgarrisonedwithregulartroops。Holland，forinstance，isstillsaferthanVenice；shemightdrownorstarvetherevoltedtroops；forastheyarenotquarteredintownscapableoffurnishingthemwithnecessarysubsistence，thissubsistenceisofcourseprecarious。

InperusingtheadmirabletreatiseofTacitusOntheMannersoftheGermans，[13]wefinditisfromthatnationtheEnglishhaveborrowedtheideaoftheirpoliticalgovernment。Thisbeautifulsystemwasinventedfirstinthewoods。

Asallhumanthingshaveanend，thestatewearespeakingofwillloseitsliberty，willperish。HavenotRome，Sparta，andCarthageperished？

Itwillperishwhenthelegislativepowershallbemorecorruptthantheexecutive。

ItisnotmybusinesstoexaminewhethertheEnglishactuallyenjoythislibertyornot。Sufficientitisformypurposetoobservethatitisestablishedbytheirlaws；andIinquirenofurther。

NeitherdoIpretendbythistoundervalueothergovernments，nortosaythatthisextremepoliticallibertyoughttogiveuneasinesstothosewhohaveonlyamoderateshareofit。HowshouldIhaveanysuchdesign，Iwhothinkthateventhehighestrefinementofreasonisnotalwaysdesirable，andthatmankindgenerallyfindtheiraccountbetterinmediumsthaninextremes？

Harrington，inhisOceana，hasalsoinquiredintotheutmostdegreeoflibertytowhichtheconstitutionofastatemaybecarried。Butofhimindeeditmaybesaidthatforwantofknowingthenatureofreallibertyhebusiedhimselfinpursuitofanimaginaryone；andthathebuiltaChalcedon，thoughhehadaByzantiumbeforehiseyes。

7。OftheMonarchiesweareacquaintedwith。Themonarchiesweareacquaintedwithhavenot，likethatwehavebeenspeakingof，libertyfortheirdirectview：theonlyaimisthegloryofthesubject，ofthestate，andofthesovereign。Buthencethereresultsaspiritofliberty，whichinthosestatesiscapableofachievingasgreatthings，andofcontributingasmuchperhapstohappinessaslibertyitself。

Herethethreepowersarenotdistributedandfoundedonthemodeloftheconstitutionabove—mentioned；theyhaveeachaparticulardistribution，accordingtowhichtheybordermoreorlessonpoliticalliberty；andiftheydidnotborderuponit，monarchywoulddegenerateintodespoticgovernment。

8。WhytheAncientshadnotaclearIdeaofMonarchy。Theancientshadnonotionofagovernmentfoundedonabodyofnobles，andmuchlessonalegislativebodycomposedoftherepresentativesofthepeople。TherepublicsofGreeceandItalywerecitiesthathadeachtheirownformofgovernment，andconvenedtheirsubjectswithintheirwalls。BeforeRomehadswallowedupalltheotherrepublics，therewasscarcelyanywhereakingtobefound，no，notinItaly，Gaul，Spain，orGermany；

theywereallpettystatesorrepublics。EvenAfricaitselfwassubjecttoagreatcommonwealth：andAsiaMinorwasoccupiedbyGreekcolonies。

Therewas，therefore，noinstanceofdeputiesoftownsorassembliesofthestates；onemusthavegoneasfarasPersiatofindamonarchy。

Iamnotignorantthattherewereconfederaterepublics；inwhichseveraltownssentdeputiestoanassembly。ButIaffirmtherewasnomonarchyonthatmodel。

Thefirstplan，therefore，ofthemonarchiesweareacquaintedwithwasthusformed。TheGermannationsthatconqueredtheRomanempirewerecertainlyafreepeople。OfthiswemaybeconvincedonlybyreadingTacitusOntheMannersoftheGermans。Theconquerorsspreadthemselvesoverallthecountry；livingmostlyinthefields，andverylittleintowns。WhentheywereinGermany，thewholenationwasabletoassemble。

Thistheycouldnolongerdowhendispersedthroughtheconqueredprovinces。Andyetasitwasnecessarythatthenationshoulddeliberateonpublicaffairs，pursuanttotheirusualmethodbeforetheconquest，theyhadrecoursetorepresentatives。SuchistheoriginoftheGothicgovernmentamongstus。Atfirstitwasmixedwitharistocracyandmonarchy——amixtureattendedwiththisinconvenience，thatthecommonpeoplewerebondmen。Thecustomafterwardssucceededofgrantinglettersofenfranchisement，andwassoonfollowedbysoperfectaharmonybetweenthecivillibertyofthepeople，theprivilegesofthenobilityandclergy，andtheprince’sprerogative，thatIreallythinkthereneverwasintheworldagovernmentsowelltemperedasthatofeachpartofEurope，solongasitlasted。Surprisingthatthecorruptionofthegovernmentofaconqueringnationshouldhavegivenbirthtothebestspeciesofconstitutionthatcouldpossiblybeimaginedbyman！

9。Aristotle’sMannerofThinking。Aristotleisgreatlypuzzledintreatingofmonarchy。[14]Hemakesfivespecies；andhedoesnotdistinguishthembytheformofconstitution，butbythingsmerelyaccidental，asthevirtuesandvicesoftheprince；orbythingsextrinsic，suchastyrannyusurpedorinherited。

AmongthenumberofmonarchiesheranksthePersianempireandthekingdomofSparta。Butisitnotevidentthattheonewasadespoticstateandtheotherarepublic？

Theancients，whowerestrangerstothedistributionofthethreepowersinthegovernmentofasingleperson，couldneverformajustideaofmonarchy。

10。WhatotherPoliticiansthought。Totempermonarchy，Arybas，kingofEpirus，[15]foundnootherremedythanarepublic。TheMolossi，notknowinghowtolimitthesamepower，madetwokings，[16]bywhichmeansthestatewasweakenedmorethantheprerogative；theywantedrivals，andtheycreatedenemies。

TwokingsweretolerablenowherebutatSparta；heretheydidnotform，butwereonlyapartoftheconstitution。

11。OftheKingsoftheheroicTimesofGreece。IntheheroictimesofGreece，akindofmonarchyarosethatwasnotoflongduration。[17]

Thosewhohadbeeninventorsofarts，whohadfoughtintheircountry’scause，whohadestablishedsocieties，ordistributedlandsamongthepeople，obtainedtheregalpower，andtransmittedittotheirchildren。

Theywerekings，priests，andjudges。ThiswasoneofthefivespeciesofmonarchymentionedbyAristotle；[18]andtheonlyonethatcangiveusanyideaofthemonarchicalconstitution。Buttheplanofthisconstitutionisoppositetothatofourmodernmonarchies。

Thethreepowersweretheredistributedinsuchamannerthatthepeoplewerethelegislature，[19]andthekinghadtheexecutivetogetherwiththejudiciarypower；whereasinmodernmonarchiestheprinceisinvestedwiththeexecutiveandlegislativepowers，oratleastwithpartofthelegislative，butdoesnotactinajudiciarycapacity。

Inthegovernmentofthekingsoftheheroictimes，thethreepowerswereill—distributed。Hencethosemonarchiescouldnotlongsubsist。Forassoonasthepeoplegotthelegislativepowerintotheirhands，theymight，astheyeverywheredid，upontheveryleastcaprice，subverttheregalauthority。

Amongafreepeoplepossessedofthelegislativepower，andenclosedwithinwalls，whereeverythingtendingtowardsoppressionappearsstillmoreodious，itisthemasterpieceoflegislationtoknowwheretoplaceproperlythejudiciarypower。Butitcouldnotbeinworsehandsthaninthoseofthepersontowhomtheexecutivepowerhadbeenalreadycommitted。Fromthatveryinstantthemonarchbecameterrible。Butatthesametimeashehadnoshareinthelegislature，hecouldmakenodefenceagainstit，thushispowerwasinonesensetoogreat，inanothertoolittle。

Theyhadnotasyetdiscoveredthatthetruefunctionofaprincewastoappointjudges，andnottositasjudgehimself。Theoppositepolicyrenderedthegovernmentofasinglepersoninsupportable。Henceallthesekingswerebanished。TheGreekshadnonotionoftheproperdistributionofthethreepowersinthegovernmentofoneperson；theycouldseeitonlyinthatofmany；andthiskindofconstitutiontheydistinguishedbythenameofPolity。[20]

12。OftheGovernmentoftheKingsofRome，andinwhatMannerthethreePowersweretheredistributed。ThegovernmentofthekingsofRomehadsomerelationtothatofthekingsoftheheroictimesofGreece。Itssubversion，likethelatter’s，wasowingtoitsgeneraldefect，thoughinitsownparticularnatureitwasexceedinglygood。

Inordertogiveanadequateideaofthisgovernment，Ishalldistinguishthatofthefirstfivekings，thatofServiusTullius，andthatofTarquin。

Thecrownwaselective，andunderthefirstfivekingsthesenatehadthegreatestshareintheelection。

Upontheking’sdeceasethesenateexaminedwhethertheyshouldcontinuetheestablishedformofgovernment。Iftheythoughtpropertocontinueit，theynamedamagistrate[21]takenfromtheirownbody，whochoseaking；thesenateweretoapproveoftheelection，thepeopletoconfirmit，andtheaugurstodeclaretheapprobationofthegods。Ifanyofthesethreeconditionswaswanting，theywereobligedtoproceedtoanotherelection。

Theconstitutionwasamixtureofmonarchy，aristocracy，anddemocracy；

andsuchwastheharmonyofpowerthattherewasnoinstanceofjealousyordisputeinthefirstreigns。Thekingcommandedthearmies，andhadthedirectionofthesacrifices：hehadthepowerofdetermining[22]

civilandcriminal[23]causes；hecalledthesenatetogether，convenedthepeople，laidsomeaffairsbeforethelatter，andregulatedtherestwiththesenate。[24]

Theauthorityofthesenatewasverygreat。Thekingsoftentimespitcheduponsenatorswithwhomtheysatinjudgment；andtheyneverlaidanyaffairbeforethepeopletillithadbeenpreviouslydebated[25]inthataugustassembly。

Thepeoplehadtherightofchoosing[26]magistrates，ofconsentingtothenewlaws，and，withtheking’spermission，ofmakingwarandpeace；

buttheyhadnotthejudicialpower。WhenTulliusHostiliusreferredthetrialofHoratiustothepeople，hehadhisparticularreasons，whichmaybeseeninDionysiusHalicarnassus。[27]

Theconstitutionalteredunder[28]ServiusTullius。Thesenatehadnoshareinhiselection；hecausedhimselftobeproclaimedbythepeople；

heresignedthepowerofhearingcivilcauses，[29]reservingnonetohimselfbutthoseofacriminalnature；helaidallaffairsdirectlybeforethepeople，easedthemofthetaxes，andimposedthewholeburdenonthepatricians。Henceinproportionasheweakenedtheregaltogetherwiththesenatorialpower，heaugmentedthatoftheplebeians。[30]

Tarquinwouldneitherbechosenbythesenatenorbythepeople；heconsideredServiusTulliusasausurper，andseizedthecrownashishereditaryright。Hedestroyedmostofthesenators；thosewhoremainedheneverconsulted；nordidheevensomuchassummonthemtoassistathisdecisions。[31]Thushispowerincreased：buttheodiumofthatpowerreceivedanewaddition，byusurpingalsotheauthorityofthepeople，againstwhoseconsentheenactedseverallaws。Thethreepowerswerebythesemeansre—unitedinhisperson；butthepeopleatacriticalminuterecollectedthattheywerelegislators，andtherewasanendofTarquin。

13。GeneralReflectionsontheStateofRomeaftertheExpulsionofitsKings。ItisimpossibletobetiredofsoagreeableasubjectasancientRome：thusstrangersatpresentleavethemodernpalacesofthatcelebratedcapitaltovisittheruins；andthustheeye，afterrecreatingitselfwiththeviewofflowerymeads，ispleasedwiththewildprospectofrocksandmountains。

Thepatricianfamilieswereatalltimespossessedofgreatprivileges。

Thesedistinctions，whichwereconsiderableunderthekings，becamemuchmoreimportantaftertheirexpulsion。Hencearosethejealousyoftheplebeians，whowantedtoreducethem。Theconteststruckattheconstitution，withoutweakeningthegovernment；foritwasveryindifferentastowhatfamilywerethemagistrates，providedthemagistracypreserveditsauthority。

Anelectivemonarchy，likethatofRome，necessarilysupposesapowerfularistocraticbodytosupportit，withoutwhichitchangesimmediatelyintotyrannyorintoapopularstate。Butapopularstatehasnoneedofthisdistinctionoffamiliestomaintainitself。Tothisitwasowingthatthepatricians，whowereanecessarypartoftheconstitutionundertheregalgovernment，becameasuperfluousbranchundertheconsuls；thepeoplecouldsuppressthemwithouthurtingthemselves，andchangetheconstitutionwithoutcorruptingit。

AfterServiusTulliushadreducedthepatricians，itwasnaturalthatRomeshouldfallfromtheregalhandsintothoseofthepeople。Butthepeoplehadnooccasiontobeafraidofrelapsingunderaregalpowerbyreducingthepatricians。

Astatemayalterintwodifferentways，eitherbytheamendmentorbythecorruptionoftheconstitution。Ifithaspreserveditsprinciplesandtheconstitutionchanges，thisisowingtoitsamendment；ifuponchangingtheconstitutionitsprinciplesarelost，thisisbecauseithasbeencorrupted。

ThegovernmentofRome，aftertheexpulsionofthekings，shouldnaturallyhavebeenademocracy。Thepeoplehadalreadythelegislativepowerintheirhands；itwastheirunanimousconsentthathadexpelledtheTarquins；andiftheyhadnotcontinuedsteadytothoseprinciples，theTarquinsmighteasilyhavebeenrestored。Topretendthattheirdesigninexpellingthemwastorenderthemselvesslavestoafewfamiliesisquiteabsurd。ThesituationthereforeofthingsrequiredthatRomeshouldhaveformedademocracy，andyetthisdidnothappen。

Therewasanecessitythatthepoweroftheprincipalfamiliesshouldbetempered，andthatthelawsshouldhaveabiastodemocracy。

Theprosperityofstatesisfrequentlygreaterintheinsensibletransitionfromoneconstitutiontoanotherthanineitherofthoseconstitutions。Thenitisthatallthespringsofgovernmentareuponthestretch，thatthecitizensasserttheirclaims，thatfriendshipsorenmitiesareformedamongstthejarringparties，andthatthereisanobleemulationbetweenthosewhodefendtheancientandthosewhoarestrenuousinpromotingthenewconstitution。

14。InwhatMannertheDistributionofthethreePowersbegantochangeaftertheExpulsionoftheKings。TherewerefourthingsthatgreatlyprejudicedthelibertyofRome。Thepatricianshadengrossedtothemselvesallpublicemploymentswhatever；anexorbitantpowerwasannexedtotheconsulate；thepeoplewereofteninsulted；and，infine，theyhadscarcelyanyinfluenceatallleftinthepublicsuffrages。

Thesefourabuseswereredressedbythepeople。

1st。Itwasregulatedthattheplebeiansmightaspiretosomemagistracies；andbydegreestheywererenderedcapableofthemall，exceptthatofInter—rex。

2nd。Theconsulatewasdissolvedintoseveralothermagistracies；[32]

pr？torswerecreated，onwhomthepowerwasconferredoftryingprivatecauses；qu？stors[33]werenominatedfordeterminingthoseofacriminalnature；？dileswereestablishedfortheciviladministration；

treasurers[34]weremadeforthemanagementofthepublicmoney；and，infine，bythecreationofcensorstheconsulsweredivestedofthatpartofthelegislativepowerwhichregulatesthemoralsofthecitizensandthetransientpolityofthedifferentbodiesofthestate。Thechiefprivilegesleftthemweretopresideinthegreatmeetings[35]ofthepeople，toassemblethesenate，andtocommandthearmies。

3rd。Thesacredlawsappointedtribunes，whohadapowerofcheckingtheencroachmentsofthepatricians，andpreventednotonlyprivatebutlikewisepublicinjuries。

Infine，theplebeiansincreasedtheirinfluenceinthegeneralassemblies。ThepeopleofRomeweredividedinthreedifferentmanners——bycenturies，bycuri？，andbytribes；andwhenevertheygavetheirvotes，theywereconvenedinoneofthosethreeways。

Inthefirstthepatricians，theleadingmen，therichandthesenate，whichwasverynearlythesamething，hadalmostthewholeauthority；inthesecondtheyhadless；andlessstillinthethird。

ThedivisionintocenturieswasadivisionratherofestatesandfortunesthanofpersonsThewholepeopleweredistributedintoahundredandninety—threecenturies，[36]whichhadeachasinglevote。

Thepatriciansandleadingmencomposedthefirstninety—eightcenturies；andtheotherninety—fiveconsistedoftheremainderofthecitizens。Inthisdivisionthereforethepatriciansweremastersofthesuffrages。

Inthedivisionintocuri？，[37]thepatricianshadnotthesameadvantages；some，however，theyhad，foritwasnecessarytoconsulttheaugurs，whowereunderthedirectionofthepatricians；andnoproposalcouldbemadetheretothepeopleunlessithadbeenpreviouslylaidbeforethesenate，andapprovedofbyasenatus—consultum。But，inthedivisionintotribestheyhadnothingtodoeitherwiththeaugursorwiththedecreesofthesenate；andthepatricianswereexcluded。

Nowthepeopleendeavouredconstantlytohavethosemeetingsbycuri？

whichhadbeencustomarybycenturies，andbytribes，thosetheyusedtohavebeforebycuri？；bywhichmeansthedirectionofpublicaffairssoondevolvedfromthepatricianstotheplebeians。

Thuswhentheplebeiansobtainedthepoweroftryingthepatricians——apowerwhichcommencedintheaffairofCoriolanus，[38]theyinsisteduponassemblingbytribes，[39]andnotbycenturies；andwhenthenewmagistracies[40]oftribunesand？dileswereestablishedinfavourofthepeople，thelatterobtainedthattheyshouldmeetbycuri？inordertonominatethem；andaftertheirpowerwasquitesettled，theygained[41]sofartheirpointastoassemblebytribestoproceedtothisnomination。

15。InwhatMannerRome，intheflourishingStateofthatRepublic，suddenlylostitsLiberty。Intheheatofthecontestsbetweenthepatriciansandtheplebeians，thelatterinsisteduponhavingfixedlaws，totheendthatthepublicjudgmentsshouldnolongerbetheeffectofcapriciouswillorarbitrarypower。Thesenate，afteragreatdealofresistance，acquiesced；anddecemvirswerenominatedtocomposethoselaws。Itwasthoughtpropertograntthemanextraordinarypower，becausetheyweretogivelawstopartieswhoseviewsandinterestitwasalmostimpossibletounite。Thenominationofallmagistrateswassuspended；andthedecemvirswerechoseninthecomitiasoleadministratorsoftherepublic。Thustheyfoundthemselvesinvestedwiththeconsularandthetribunitionpower。Byonetheyhadtheprivilegeofassemblingthesenate，bytheotherthatofconveningthepeople；buttheyassembledneithersenatenorpeople。Tenmenonlyoftherepublichadthewholelegislative，thewholeexecutive，andthewholejudiciarypower。RomesawherselfenslavedbyascruelatyrannyasthatofTarquin。WhenTarquintrampledonthelibertyofthatcity，shewasseizedwithindignationatthepowerhehadusurped；whenthedecemvirsexercisedeveryactofoppression，shewasastonishedattheextraordinarypowershehadgranted。

Whatastrangesystemoftyranny——atyrannycarriedonbymenwhohadobtainedthepoliticalandmilitarypower，merelyfromtheirknowledgeincivilaffairs，andwhoatthatveryjuncturestoodinneedofthecourageofthosecitizenstoprotectthemabroadwhosotamelysubmittedtodomesticoppression！

ThespectacleofVirginia’sdeath，whomherfatherimmolatedtochastityandliberty，putanendtothepowerofthedecemvirs。Everymanbecamefree，becauseeverymanhadbeeninjured；eachshowedhimselfacitizenbecauseeachhadatieoftheparent。Thesenateandthepeopleresumedalibertywhichhadbeencommittedtoridiculoustyrants。

NopeopleweresoeasilymovedbypublicspectaclesastheRomans。ThatoftheempurpledbodyofLucretiaputanendtotheregalgovernment。

Thedebtorwhoappearedintheforumcoveredwithwoundscausedanalterationintherepublic。ThedecemvirsowedtheirexpulsiontothetragedyofVirginia。TocondemnManlius，itwasnecessarytokeepthepeoplefromseeingtheCapitol。C？sar’sbloodygarmentflungRomeagainintoslavery。

16。OfthelegislativePowerintheRomanRepublic。Therewerenorightstocontestunderthedecemvirs：butupontherestorationofliberty，jealousiesrevived；andsolongasthepatricianshadanyprivilegesleft，theyweresuretobestrippedofthembytheplebeians。

Themischiefwouldnothavebeensogreathadtheplebeiansbeensatisfiedwiththissuccess；buttheyalsoinjuredthepatriciansascitizens。Whenthepeopleassembledbycuri？orcenturies，theywerecomposedofsenators，patricians，andplebeians；intheirdisputestheplebeiansgainedthispoint，[42]thattheyalonewithoutpatriciansorsenateshouldenactthelawscalledPlebiscita；andtheassembliesinwhichtheyweremadehadthenameofcomitiabytribes。Thustherewerecasesinwhichthepatricians[43]hadnoshareinthelegislativepower，but[44]weresubjecttothelegislationofanotherbodyofthestate。

Thiswastheextravaganceofliberty。Thepeople，toestablishademocracy，actedagainsttheveryprinciplesofthatgovernment。Onewouldhaveimaginedthatsoexorbitantapowermusthavedestroyedtheauthorityofthesenate。ButRomehadadmirableinstitutions。Twoofthesewereespeciallyremarkable：onebywhichthelegislativepowerofthepeoplewasestablished，andtheotherbywhichitwaslimited。