第16章

BookXI。OftheLawsWhichEstablishPoliticalLiberty，withRegardtotheConstitution1。AgeneralIdea。Imakeadistinctionbetweenthelawsthatestablishpoliticalliberty，asitrelatestotheconstitution，andthosebywhichitisestablished，asitrelatestothecitizen。Theformershallbethesubjectofthisbook；thelatterIshallexamineinthenext。

2。DifferentSignificationsofthewordLiberty。Thereisnowordthatadmitsofmorevarioussignifications，andhasmademorevariedimpressionsonthehumanmind，thanthatofliberty。Somehavetakenitasameansofdeposingapersononwhomtheyhadconferredatyrannicalauthority；othersforthepowerofchoosingasuperiorwhomtheyareobligedtoobey；othersfortherightofbearingarms，andofbeingtherebyenabledtouseviolence；others，infine，fortheprivilegeofbeinggovernedbyanativeoftheirowncountry，orbytheirownlaws。[1]Acertainnationforalongtimethoughtlibertyconsistedintheprivilegeofwearingalongbeard。[2]Somehaveannexedthisnametooneformofgovernmentexclusiveofothers：thosewhohadarepublicantasteappliedittothisspeciesofpolity；thosewholikedamonarchicalstategaveittomonarchy。[3]Thustheyhaveallappliedthenameoflibertytothegovernmentmostsuitabletotheirowncustomsandinclinations：andasinrepublicsthepeoplehavenotsoconstantandsopresentaviewofthecausesoftheirmisery，andasthemagistratesseemtoactonlyinconformitytothelaws，hencelibertyisgenerallysaidtoresideinrepublics，andtobebanishedfrommonarchies。Infine，asindemocraciesthepeopleseemtoactalmostastheyplease，thissortofgovernmenthasbeendeemedthemostfree，andthepowerofthepeoplehasbeenconfoundedwiththeirliberty。

3。InwhatLibertyconsists。Itistruethatindemocraciesthepeopleseemtoactastheyplease；butpoliticallibertydoesnotconsistinanunlimitedfreedom。Ingovernments，thatis，insocietiesdirectedbylaws，libertycanconsistonlyinthepowerofdoingwhatweoughttowill，andinnotbeingconstrainedtodowhatweoughtnottowill。

Wemusthavecontinuallypresenttoourmindsthedifferencebetweenindependenceandliberty。Libertyisarightofdoingwhateverthelawspermit，andifacitizencoulddowhattheyforbidhewouldbenolongerpossessedofliberty，becauseallhisfellow—citizenswouldhavethesamepower。

4。ThesameSubjectcontinued。Democraticandaristocraticstatesarenotintheirownnaturefree。Politicallibertyistobefoundonlyinmoderategovernments；andevenintheseitisnotalwaysfound。Itisthereonlywhenthereisnoabuseofpower。Butconstantexperienceshowsusthateverymaninvestedwithpowerisapttoabuseit，andtocarryhisauthorityasfarasitwillgo。Isitnotstrange，thoughtrue，tosaythatvirtueitselfhasneedoflimits？

Topreventthisabuse，itisnecessaryfromtheverynatureofthingsthatpowershouldbeachecktopower。Agovernmentmaybesoconstituted，asnomanshallbecompelledtodothingstowhichthelawdoesnotobligehim，norforcedtoabstainfromthingswhichthelawpermits。

5。OftheEndorViewofdifferentGovernments。Thoughallgovernmentshavethesamegeneralend，whichisthatofpreservation，yeteachhasanotherparticularobject。IncreaseofdominionwastheobjectofRome；

war，thatofSparta；religion，thatoftheJewishlaws；commerce，thatofMarseilles；publictranquillity，thatofthelawsofChina：[4]

navigation，thatofthelawsofRhodes；naturalliberty，thatofthepolicyoftheSavages；ingeneral，thepleasuresoftheprince，thatofdespoticstates；thatofmonarchies，theprince’sandthekingdom’sglory；theindependenceofindividualsistheendaimedatbythelawsofPoland，thenceresultstheoppressionofthewhole。[5]

Onenationthereisalsointheworldthathasforthedirectendofitsconstitutionpoliticalliberty。Weshallpresentlyexaminetheprinciplesonwhichthislibertyisfounded；iftheyaresound，libertywillappearinitshighestperfection。

Todiscoverpoliticallibertyinaconstitution，nogreatlabourisrequisite。Ifwearecapableofseeingitwhereitexists，itissoonfound，andweneednotgofarinsearchofit。

6。OftheConstitutionofEngland。Ineverygovernmenttherearethreesortsofpower：thelegislative；theexecutiveinrespecttothingsdependentonthelawofnations；andtheexecutiveinregardtomattersthatdependonthecivillaw。

Byvirtueofthefirst，theprinceormagistrateenactstemporaryorperpetuallaws，andamendsorabrogatesthosethathavebeenalreadyenacted。Bythesecond，hemakespeaceorwar，sendsorreceivesembassies，establishesthepublicsecurity，andprovidesagainstinvasions。Bythethird，hepunishescriminals，ordeterminesthedisputesthatarisebetweenindividuals。Thelatterweshallcallthejudiciarypower，andtheothersimplytheexecutivepowerofthestate。

Thepoliticallibertyofthesubjectisatranquillityofmindarisingfromtheopinioneachpersonhasofhissafety。Inordertohavethisliberty，itisrequisitethegovernmentbesoconstitutedasonemanneednotbeafraidofanother。

Whenthelegislativeandexecutivepowersareunitedinthesameperson，orinthesamebodyofmagistrates，therecanbenoliberty；becauseapprehensionsmayarise，lestthesamemonarchorsenateshouldenacttyrannicallaws，toexecutetheminatyrannicalmanner。

Again，thereisnoliberty，ifthejudiciarypowerbenotseparatedfromthelegislativeandexecutive。Wereitjoinedwiththelegislative，thelifeandlibertyofthesubjectwouldbeexposedtoarbitrarycontrol；

forthejudgewouldbethenthelegislator。Wereitjoinedtotheexecutivepower，thejudgemightbehavewithviolenceandoppression。

Therewouldbeanendofeverything，werethesamemanorthesamebody，whetherofthenoblesorofthepeople，toexercisethosethreepowers，thatofenactinglaws，thatofexecutingthepublicresolutions，andoftryingthecausesofindividuals。

MostkingdomsinEuropeenjoyamoderategovernmentbecausetheprincewhoisinvestedwiththetwofirstpowersleavesthethirdtohissubjects。InTurkey，wherethesethreepowersareunitedintheSultan’sperson，thesubjectsgroanunderthemostdreadfuloppression。

IntherepublicsofItaly，wherethesethreepowersareunited，thereislesslibertythaninourmonarchies。HencetheirgovernmentisobligedtohaverecoursetoasviolentmethodsforitssupportaseventhatoftheTurks；witnessthestateinquisitors，[6]andthelion’smouthintowhicheveryinformermayatallhoursthrowhiswrittenaccusations。

Inwhatasituationmustthepoorsubjectbeinthoserepublics！Thesamebodyofmagistratesarepossessed，asexecutorsofthelaws，ofthewholepowertheyhavegiventhemselvesinqualityoflegislators。Theymayplunderthestatebytheirgeneraldeterminations；andastheyhavelikewisethejudiciarypowerintheirhands，everyprivatecitizenmayberuinedbytheirparticulardecisions。

Thewholepowerishereunitedinonebody；andthoughthereisnoexternalpompthatindicatesadespoticsway，yetthepeoplefeeltheeffectsofiteverymoment。

HenceitisthatmanyoftheprincesofEurope，whoseaimhasbeenlevelledatarbitrarypower，haveconstantlysetoutwithunitingintheirownpersonsallthebranchesofmagistracy，andallthegreatofficesofstate。

IallowindeedthatthemerehereditaryaristocracyoftheItalianrepublicsdoesnotexactlyanswertothedespoticpoweroftheEasternprinces。Thenumberofmagistratessometimesmoderatesthepowerofthemagistracy；thewholebodyofthenoblesdonotalwaysconcurinthesamedesign；anddifferenttribunalsareerected，thattempereachother。ThusatVenicetlielegislativepowerisinthecouncil，theexecutiveinthepregadi，andthejudiciaryinthequarantia。Butthemischiefis，thatthesedifferenttribunalsarecomposedofmagistratesallbelongingtothesamebody；whichconstitutesalmostoneandthesamepower。

Thejudiciarypoweroughtnottobegiventoastandingsenate；itshouldbeexercisedbypersonstakenfromthebodyofthepeople[7]atcertaintimesoftheyear，andconsistentlywithaformandmannerprescribedbylaw，inordertoerectatribunalthatshouldlastonlysolongasnecessityrequires。

Bythismethodthejudicialpower，soterribletomankind，notbeingannexedtoanyparticularstateorprofession，becomes，asitwere，invisible。Peoplehavenotthenthejudgescontinuallypresenttotheirview；theyfeartheoffice，butnotthemagistrate。

Inaccusationsofadeepandcriminalnature，itisproperthepersonaccusedshouldhavetheprivilegeofchoosing，insomemeasure，hisjudges，inconcurrencewiththelaw；oratleastheshouldhavearighttoexceptagainstsogreatanumberthattheremainingpartmaybedeemedhisownchoice。

Theothertwopowersmaybegivenrathertomagistratesorpermanentbodies，becausetheyarenotexercisedonanyprivatesubject；onebeingnomorethanthegeneralwillofthestate，andtheothertheexecutionofthatgeneralwill。

Butthoughthetribunalsoughtnottobefixed，thejudgmentsought；andtosuchadegreeastobeeverconformabletotheletterofthelaw。

Weretheytobetheprivateopinionofthejudge，peoplewouldthenliveinsociety，withoutexactlyknowingthenatureoftheirobligations。

Thejudgesoughtlikewisetobeofthesamerankastheaccused，or，inotherwords，hispeers；totheendthathemaynotimagineheisfallenintothehandsofpersonsinclinedtotreathimwithrigour。

Ifthelegislatureleavestheexecutivepowerinpossessionofarighttoimprisonthosesubjectswhocangivesecurityfortheirgoodbehaviour，thereisanendofliberty；unlesstheyaretakenup，inordertoanswerwithoutdelaytoacapitalcrime，inwhichcasetheyarereallyfree，beingsubjectonlytothepowerofthelaw。

Butshouldthelegislaturethinkitselfindangerbysomesecretconspiracyagainstthestate，orbyacorrespondencewithaforeignenemy，itmightauthorisetheexecutivepower，forashortandlimitedtime，toimprisonsuspectedpersons，whointhatcasewouldlosetheirlibertyonlyforawhile，topreserveitforever。

AndthisistheonlyreasonablemethodthatcanbesubstitutedtothetyrannicalmagistracyoftheEphori，andtothestateinquisitorsofVenice，whoarealsodespotic。

Asinacountryofliberty，everymanwhoissupposedafreeagentoughttobehisowngovernor；thelegislativepowershouldresideinthewholebodyofthepeople。Butsincethisisimpossibleinlargestates，andinsmallonesissubjecttomanyinconveniences，itisfitthepeopleshouldtransactbytheirrepresentativeswhattheycannottransactbythemselves。

Theinhabitantsofaparticulartownaremuchbetteracquaintedwithitswantsandintereststhanwiththoseofotherplaces；andarebetterjudgesofthecapacityoftheirneighboursthanofthatoftherestoftheircountrymen。Themembers，therefore，ofthelegislatureshouldnotbechosenfromthegeneralbodyofthenation；butitisproperthatineveryconsiderableplacearepresentativeshouldbeelectedbytheinhabitants。[8]

Thegreatadvantageofrepresentativesis，theircapacityofdiscussingpublicaffairs。Forthisthepeoplecollectivelyareextremelyunfit，whichisoneofthechiefinconveniencesofademocracy。

Itisnotatallnecessarythattherepresentativeswhohavereceivedageneralinstructionfromtheirconstituentsshouldwaittobedirectedoneachparticularaffair，asispractisedinthedietsofGermany。Trueitisthatbythiswayofproceedingthespeechesofthedeputiesmightwithgreaterproprietybecalledthevoiceofthenation；but，ontheotherhand，thiswouldoccasioninfinitedelays；wouldgiveeachdeputyapowerofcontrollingtheassembly；and，onthemosturgentandpressingoccasions，thewheelsofgovernmentmightbestoppedbythecapriceofasingleperson。

Whenthedeputies，asMr。Sidneywellobserves，representabodyofpeople，asinHolland，theyoughttobeaccountabletotheirconstituents；butitisadifferentthinginEngland，wheretheyaredeputedbyboroughs。

Alltheinhabitantsoftheseveraldistrictsoughttohavearightofvotingattheelectionofarepresentative，exceptsuchasareinsomeanasituationastobedeemedtohavenowilloftheirown。

Onegreatfaulttherewasinmostoftheancientrepublics，thatthepeoplehadarighttoactiveresolutions，suchasrequiresomeexecution，athingofwhichtheyareabsolutelyincapable。Theyoughttohavenoshareinthegovernmentbutforthechoosingofrepresentatives，whichiswithintheirreach。Forthoughfewcantelltheexactdegreeofmen’scapacities，yettherearenonebutarecapableofknowingingeneralwhetherthepersontheychooseisbetterqualifiedthanmostofhisneighbours。

Neitheroughttherepresentativebodytobechosenfortheexecutivepartofgovernment，forwhichitisnotsofit；butfortheenactingoflaws，ortoseewhetherthelawsinbeingaredulyexecuted，athingsuitedtotheirabilities，andwhichnoneindeedbutthemselvescanproperlyperform。

Insuchastatetherearealwayspersonsdistinguishedbytheirbirth，riches，orhonours：butweretheytobeconfoundedwiththecommonpeople，andtohaveonlytheweightofasinglevoteliketherest，thecommonlibertywouldbetheirslavery，andtheywouldhavenointerestinsupportingit，asmostofthepopularresolutionswouldbeagainstthem。Thesharetheyhave，therefore，inthelegislatureoughttobeproportionedtotheirotheradvantagesinthestate；whichhappensonlywhentheyformabodythathasarighttocheckthelicentiousnessofthepeople，asthepeoplehavearighttoopposeanyencroachmentoftheirs。

Thelegislativepoweristhereforecommittedtothebodyofthenobles，andtothatwhichrepresentsthepeople，eachhavingtheirassembliesanddeliberationsapart，eachtheirseparateviewsandinterests。

Ofthethreepowersabovementioned，thejudiciaryisinsomemeasurenexttonothing：thereremain，therefore，onlytwo；andasthesehaveneedofaregulatingpowertomoderatethem，thepartofthelegislativebodycomposedofthenobilityisextremelyproperforthispurpose。

Thebodyofthenobilityoughttobehereditary。Inthefirstplaceitissoinitsownnature；andinthenexttheremustbeaconsiderableinteresttopreserveitsprivileges——privilegesthatinthemselvesareobnoxioustopopularenvy，andofcourseinafreestatearealwaysindanger。

Butasahereditarypowermightbetemptedtopursueitsownparticularinterests，andforgetthoseofthepeople，itisproperthatwhereasingularadvantagemaybegainedbycorruptingthenobility，asinthelawsrelatingtothesupplies，theyshouldhavenoothershareinthelegislationthanthepowerofrejecting，andnotthatofresolving。

BythepowerofresolvingImeantherightofordainingbytheirownauthority，orofamendingwhathasbeenordainedbyothers。BythepowerofrejectingIwouldbeunderstoodtomeantherightofannullingaresolutiontakenbyanother；whichwasthepowerofthetribunesatRome。Andthoughthepersonpossessedoftheprivilegeofrejectingmaylikewisehavetherightofapproving，yetthisapprobationpassesfornomorethanadeclarationthatheintendstomakenouseofhisprivilegeofrejecting，andisderivedfromthatveryprivilege。

Theexecutivepoweroughttobeinthehandsofamonarch，becausethisbranchofgovernment，havingneedofdespatch，isbetteradministeredbyonethanbymany：ontheotherhand，whateverdependsonthelegislativepowerisoftentimesbetterregulatedbymanythanbyasingleperson。

Butiftherewerenomonarch，andtheexecutivepowershouldbecommittedtoacertainnumberofpersonsselectedfromthelegislativebody，therewouldbeanendthenofliberty；byreasonthetwopowerswouldbeunited，asthesamepersonswouldsometimespossess，andwouldbealwaysabletopossess，ashareinboth。

Werethelegislativebodytobeaconsiderabletimewithoutmeeting，thiswouldlikewiseputanendtoliberty。Foroftwothingsonewouldnaturallyfollow：eitherthattherewouldbenolongeranylegislativeresolutions，andthenthestatewouldfallintoanarchy；orthattheseresolutionswouldbetakenbytheexecutivepower，whichwouldrenderitabsolute。

Itwouldbeneedlessforthelegislativebodytocontinuealwaysassembled。Thiswouldbetroublesometotherepresentatives，and，moreover，wouldcutouttoomuchworkfortheexecutivepower，soastotakeoffitsattentiontoitsoffice，andobligeittothinkonlyofdefendingitsownprerogatives，andtherightithastoexecute。

Again，werethelegislativebodytobealwaysassembled，itmighthappentobekeptuponlybyfillingtheplacesofthedeceasedmemberswithnewrepresentatives；andinthatcase，ifthelegislativebodywereoncecorrupted，theevilwouldbepastallremedy。Whendifferentlegislativebodiessucceedoneanother，thepeoplewhohaveabadopinionofthatwhichisactuallysittingmayreasonablyentertainsomehopesofthenext：butwereittobealwaysthesamebody，thepeopleuponseeingitoncecorruptedwouldnolongerexpectanygoodfromitslaws；andofcoursetheywouldeitherbecomedesperateorfallintoastateofindolence。

Thelegislativebodyshouldnotmeetofitself。Forabodyissupposedtohavenowillbutwhenitismet；andbesides，wereitnottomeetunanimously，itwouldbeimpossibletodeterminewhichwasreallythelegislativebody；thepartassembled，ortheother。Andifithadarighttoprorogueitself，itmighthappennevertobeprorogued；whichwouldbeextremelydangerous，incaseitshouldeverattempttoencroachontheexecutivepower。Besides，thereareseasons，somemoreproperthanothers，forassemblingthelegislativebody：itisfit，therefore，thattheexecutivepowershouldregulatethetimeofmeeting，aswellasthedurationofthoseassemblies，accordingtothecircumstancesandexigenciesofastateknowntoitself。

Weretheexecutivepowernottohavearightofrestrainingtheencroachmentsofthelegislativebody，thelatterwouldbecomedespotic；

forasitmightarrogatetoitselfwhatauthorityitpleased，itwouldsoondestroyalltheotherpowers。

Butitisnotproper，ontheotherhand，thatthelegislativepowershouldhavearighttostaytheexecutive。Forastheexecutionhasitsnaturallimits，itisuselesstoconfineit；besides，theexecutivepowerisgenerallyemployedinmomentaryoperations。Thepower，therefore，oftheRomantribuneswasfaulty，asitputastopnotonlytothelegislation，butlikewisetotheexecutivepartofgovernment；

whichwasattendedwithinfinitemischief。

Butifthelegislativepowerinafreestatehasnorighttostaytheexecutive，ithasarightandoughttohavethemeansofexamininginwhatmanneritslawshavebeenexecuted；anadvantagewhichthisgovernmenthasoverthatofCreteandSparta，wheretheCosmi[9]andtheEphori[10]gavenoaccountoftheiradministration。

Butwhatevermaybetheissueofthatexamination，thelegislativebodyoughtnottohaveapowerofarraigningtheperson，nor，ofcourse，theconduct，ofhimwhoisentrustedwiththeexecutivepower。Hispersonshouldbesacred，becauseasitisnecessaryforthegoodofthestatetopreventthelegislativebodyfromrenderingthemselvesarbitrary，themomentheisaccusedortriedthereisanendofliberty。

Inthiscasethestatewouldbenolongeramonarchy，butakindofrepublic，thoughnotafreegovernment。Butasthepersonentrustedwiththeexecutivepowercannotabuseitwithoutbadcounsellors，andsuchashavethelawsasministers，thoughthelawsprotectthemassubjects，thesemenmaybeexaminedandpunished——anadvantagewhichthisgovernmenthasoverthatofGnidus，wherethelawallowedofnosuchthingascallingtheAmymones[11]toanaccount，evenaftertheiradministration；[12]andthereforethepeoplecouldneverobtainanysatisfactionfortheinjuriesdonethem。

Though，ingeneral，thejudiciarypoweroughtnottobeunitedwithanypartofthelegislative，yetthisisliabletothreeexceptions，foundedontheparticularinterestofthepartyaccused。

Thegreatarealwaysobnoxioustopopularenvy；andweretheytobejudgedbythepeople，theymightbeindangerfromtheirjudges，andwould，moreover，bedeprivedoftheprivilegewhichthemeanestsubjectispossessedofinafreestate，ofbeingtriedbyhispeers。Thenobility，forthisreason，oughtnottobecitedbeforetheordinarycourtsofjudicature，butbeforethatpartofthelegislaturewhichiscomposedoftheirownbody。

Itispossiblethatthelaw，whichisclearsightedinonesense，andblindinanother，might，insomecases，betoosevere。Butaswehavealreadyobserved，thenationaljudgesarenomorethanthemouththatpronouncesthewordsofthelaw，merepassivebeings，incapableofmoderatingeitheritsforceorrigour。Thatpart，therefore，ofthelegislativebody，whichwehavejustnowobservedtobeanecessarytribunalonanotheroccasion，isalsoanecessarytribunalinthis；itbelongstoitssupremeauthoritytomoderatethelawinfavourofthelawitself，bymitigatingthesentence。

Itmightalsohappenthatasubjectentrustedwiththeadministrationofpublicaffairsmayinfringetherightsofthepeople，andbeguiltyofcrimeswhichtheordinarymagistrateseithercouldnotorwouldnotpunish。But，ingeneral，thelegislativepowercannottrycauses：andmuchlesscanittrythisparticularcase，whereitrepresentsthepartyaggrieved，whichisthepeople。Itcanonly，therefore，impeach。Butbeforewhatcourtshallitbringitsimpeachment？Mustitgoanddemeanitselfbeforetheordinarytribunals，whichareitsinferiors，and，beingcomposed，moreover，ofmenwhoarechosenfromthepeopleaswellasitself，willnaturallybeswayedbytheauthorityofsopowerfulanaccuser？No：inordertopreservethedignityofthepeople，andthesecurityofthesubject，thelegislativepartwhichrepresentsthepeoplemustbringinitschargebeforethelegislativepartwhichrepresentsthenobility，whohaveneitherthesameinterestsnorthesamepassions。

Hereisanadvantagewhichthisgovernmenthasovermostoftheancientrepublics，wherethisabuseprevailed，thatthepeoplewereatthesametimebothjudgeandaccuser。