第4章

Itisanessentialpointtofixthenumberofcitizenswhoaretoformthepublicassemblies；otherwiseitwouldbeuncertainwhetherthewhole，oronlyapartofthepeople，hadgiventheirvotes。AtSpartathenumberwasfixedattenthousand。ButRome，designedbyProvidencetorisefromtheweakestbeginningstothehighestpitchofgrandeur；

Rome，doomedtoexperienceallthevicissitudesoffortune；Rome，whohadsometimesallherinhabitantswithoutherwalls，andsometimesallItalyandaconsiderablepartoftheworldwithinthem；Rome，Isay，neverfixedthenumber[3]andthiswasoneoftheprincipalcausesofherruin。

Thepeople，inwhomthesupremepowerresides，oughttohavethemanagementofeverythingwithintheirreach：thatwhichexceedstheirabilitiesmustbeconductedbytheirministers。

Buttheycannotproperlybesaidtohavetheirministers，withoutthepowerofnominatingthem：itis，therefore，afundamentalmaximinthisgovernment，thatthepeopleshouldchoosetheirministers——thatis，theirmagistrates。

Theyhaveoccasion，aswellasmonarchs，andevenmoreso，tobedirectedbyacouncilorsenate。Buttohaveaproperconfidenceinthese，theyshouldhavethechoosingofthemembers；whethertheelectionbemadebythemselves，asatAthens，orbysomemagistratedeputedforthatpurpose，asoncertainoccasionswascustomaryatRome。

Thepeopleareextremelywellqualifiedforchoosingthosewhomtheyaretoentrustwithpartoftheirauthority。Theyhaveonlytobedeterminedbythingstowhichtheycannotbestrangers，andbyfactsthatareobvioustosense。Theycantellwhenapersonhasfoughtmanybattles，andbeencrownedwithsuccess；theyare，therefore，capableofelectingageneral。Theycantellwhenajudgeisassiduousinhisoffice，givesgeneralsatisfaction，andhasneverbeenchargedwithbribery：thisissufficientforchoosingapr？tor。Theyarestruckwiththemagnificenceorrichesofafellow—citizen；nomoreisrequisiteforelectinganedile。Thesearefactsofwhichtheycanhavebetterinformationinapublicforumthanamonarchinhispalace。Butaretheycapableofconductinganintricateaffair，ofseizingandimprovingtheopportunityandcriticalmomentofaction？No；thissurpassestheirabilities。

Shouldwedoubtthepeople’snaturalcapacity，inrespecttothediscernmentofmerit，weneedonlycastaneyeontheseriesofsurprisingelectionsmadebytheAtheniansandRomans；whichnoonesurelywillattributetohazard。

WeknowthatthoughthepeopleofRomeassumedtherightofraisingplebeianstopublicoffices，yettheyneverwouldexertthispower；andthoughatAthensthemagistrateswereallowed，bythelawofAristides，tobeelectedfromallthedifferentclassesofinhabitants，thereneverwasacase，saysXenophon，[4]whenthecommonpeoplepetitionedforemploymentswhichcouldendangereithertheirsecurityortheirglory。

Asmostcitizenshavesufficientabilitytochoose，thoughunqualifiedtobechosen，sothepeople，thoughcapableofcallingotherstoanaccountfortheiradministration，areincapableofconductingtheadministrationthemselves。

Thepublicbusinessmustbecarriedonwithacertainmotion，neithertooquicknortooslow。Butthemotionofthepeopleisalwayseithertooremissortooviolent。Sometimeswithahundredthousandarmstheyoverturnallbeforethem；andsometimeswithahundredthousandfeettheycreeplikeinsects。

Inapopularstatetheinhabitantsaredividedintocertainclasses。Itisinthemannerofmakingthisdivisionthatgreatlegislatorshavesignalisedthemselves；anditisonthisthedurationandprosperityofdemocracyhaveeverdepended。

ServiusTulliusfollowedthespiritofaristocracyinthedistributionofhisclasses。WefindinLivy[5]andinDionysiusHalicarnassus，[6]inwhatmannerhelodgedtherightofsuffrageinthehandsoftheprincipalcitizens。HehaddividedthepeopleofRomeinto193

centuries，whichformedsixclasses；andrankingtherich，whowereinsmallernumbers，inthefirstcenturies，andthoseinmiddlingcircumstances，whoweremorenumerous，inthenext，heflungtheindigentmultitudeintothelast；andaseachcenturyhadbutonevote[7]itwaspropertyratherthannumbersthatdecidedtheelection。

SolondividedthepeopleofAthensintofourclasses。Inthishewasdirectedbythespiritofdemocracy，hisintentionnotbeingtofixthosewhoweretochoose，butsuchaswereeligible：therefore，leavingtoeverycitizentherightofelection，hemade[8]thejudgeseligiblefromeachofthosefourclasses；butthemagistratesheorderedtobechosenonlyoutofthefirstthree，consistingofpersonsofeasyfortunes。[9]

Asthedivisionofthosewhohavearightofsuffrageisafundamentallawinrepublics，sothemannerofgivingthissuffrageisanotherfundamental。

Thesuffragebylotisnaturaltodemocracy；asthatbychoiceistoaristocracy。[10]

Thesuffragebylotisamethodofelectingthatoffendsnoone，butanimateseachcitizenwiththepleasinghopeofservinghiscountry。

Yetasthismethodisinitselfdefective，ithasbeentheendeavourofthemosteminentlegislatorstoregulateandamendit。

SolonmadealawatAthensthatmilitaryemploymentsshouldbeconferredbychoice；butthatsenatorsandjudgesshouldbeelectedbylot。

Thesamelegislatorordainedthatcivilmagistracies，attendedwithgreatexpense，shouldbegivenbychoice；andtheothersbylot。

Inorder，however，toamendthesuffragebylot，hemadearulethatnonebutthosewhopresentedthemselvesshouldbeelected；thatthepersonelectedshouldbeexaminedbyjudges[11]andthateveryoneshouldhavearighttoaccusehimifhewereunworthyoftheoffice：[12]

thisparticipatedatthesametimeofthesuffragebylot，andofthatbychoice。Whenthetimeoftheirmagistracyhadexpired，theywereobligedtosubmittoanotherjudgmentinregardtotheirconduct。

Personsutterlyunqualifiedmusthavebeenextremelybackwardingivingintheirnamestobedrawnbylot。

Thelawwhichdeterminesthemannerofgivingsuffrageislikewisefundamentalinademocracy。Itisaquestionofsomeimportancewhetherthesuffragesoughttobepublicorsecret。Ciceroobserves[13]thatthelaws[14]whichrenderedthemsecrettowardsthecloseoftherepublicwerethecauseofitsdecline。Butasthisisdifferentlypractisedindifferentrepublics，Ishallofferheremythoughtsconcerningthissubject。

Thepeople’ssuffragesoughtdoubtlesstobepublic[15]andthisshouldbeconsideredasafundamentallawofdemocracy。Thelowerclassoughttobedirectedbythoseofhigherrank，andrestrainedwithinboundsbythegravityofeminentpersonages。Hence，byrenderingthesuffragessecretintheRomanrepublic，allwaslost；itwasnolongerpossibletodirectapopulacethatsoughtitsowndestruction。Butwhenthebodyofthenoblesaretovoteinanaristocracy[16]orinademocracythesenate[17]asthebusinessisthenonlytopreventintrigues，thesuffragescannotbetoosecret。

Intriguinginasenateisdangerous；itisdangerousalsoinabodyofnobles；butnotsoamongthepeople，whosenatureistoactthroughpassion。Incountrieswheretheyhavenoshareinthegovernment，weoftenseethemasmuchinflamedonaccountofanactorasevertheycouldbeforthewelfareofthestate。Themisfortuneofarepubliciswhenintriguesareatanend；whichhappenswhenthepeoplearegainedbybriberyandcorruption：inthiscasetheygrowindifferenttopublicaffairs，andavaricebecomestheirpredominantpassion。Unconcernedaboutthegovernmentandeverythingbelongingtoit，theyquietlywaitfortheirhire。

Itislikewiseafundamentallawindemocracies，thatthepeopleshouldhavethesolepowertoenactlaws。Andyetthereareathousandoccasionsonwhichitisnecessarythesenateshouldhavethepowerofdecreeing；nay，itisfrequentlypropertomakesometrialofalawbeforeitisestablished。TheconstitutionsofRomeandAthenswereexcellent。Thedecreesofthesenate[18]hadtheforceoflawsforthespaceofayear，butdidnotbecomeperpetualtilltheywereratifiedbytheconsentofthepeople。

3。OftheLawsinrelationtotheNatureofAristocracy。Inanaristocracythesupremepowerislodgedinthehandsofacertainnumberofpersons。Theseareinvestedbothwiththelegislativeandexecutiveauthority；andtherestofthepeopleare，inrespecttothem，thesameasthesubjectsofamonarchyinregardtothesovereign。

Theydonotvoteherebylot，forthiswouldbeproductiveofinconveniencesonly。Andindeed，inagovernmentwherethemostmortifyingdistinctionsarealreadyestablished，thoughtheyweretobechosenbylot，stilltheywouldnotceasetobeodious；itisthenoblemantheyenvy，andnotthemagistrate。

Whenthenobilityarenumerous，theremustbeasenatetoregulatetheaffairswhichthebodyofthenoblesareincapableofdeciding，andtoprepareothersfortheirdecision。Inthiscaseitmaybesaidthatthearistocracyisinsomemeasureinthesenate，thedemocracyinthebodyofthenobles，andthepeopleareacipher。

Itwouldbeaveryhappythinginanaristocracyifthepeople，insomemeasure，couldberaisedfromtheirstateofannihilation。ThusatGenoa，thebankofSt。Georgebeingadministeredbythepeople[19]givesthemacertaininfluenceinthegovernment，whencetheirwholeprosperityisderived。

Thesenatorsoughtbynomeanstohavetherightofnamingtheirownmembers；forthiswouldbetheonlywaytoperpetuateabuses。AtRome，whichinitsearlyyearswasakindofaristocracy，thesenatedidnotfillupthevacantplacesintheirownbody；thenewmemberswerenominatedbythecensors。[20]

Inarepublic，thesuddenriseofaprivatecitizentoexorbitantpowerproducesmonarchy，orsomethingmorethanmonarchy。Inthelatterthelawshaveprovidedfor，orinsomemeasureadaptedthemselvesto，theconstitution；andtheprincipleofgovernmentchecksthemonarch：butinarepublic，whereaprivatecitizenhasobtainedanexorbitantpower，[21]theabuseofthispowerismuchgreater，becausethelawsforesawitnot，andconsequentlymadenoprovisionagainstit。

Thereisanexceptiontothisrule，whentheconstitutionissuchastohaveimmediateneedofamagistrateinvestedwithextraordinarypower。

SuchwasRomewithherdictators，suchisVenicewithherstateinquisitors；theseareformidablemagistrates，whorestore，asitwerebyviolence，thestatetoitsliberty。Buthowcomesitthatthesemagistraciesaresoverydifferentinthesetworepublics？ItisbecauseRomesupportedtheremainsofheraristocracyagainstthepeople；

whereasVeniceemploysherstateinquisitorstomaintainheraristocracyagainstthenobles。TheconsequencewasthatatRomethedictatorshipcouldbeonlyofshortduration，asthepeopleactedthroughpassionandnotwithdesign。Itwasnecessarythatamagistracyofthiskindshouldbeexercisedwithlustreandpomp，thebusinessbeingtointimidate，andnottopunish，themultitude。Itwasalsoproperthatthedictatorshouldbecreatedonlyforsomeparticularaffair，andforthisonlyshouldhaveanunlimitedauthority，ashewasalwayscreateduponsomesuddenemergency。Onthecontrary，atVenicetheyhaveoccasionforapermanentmagistracy；forhereitisthatschemesmaybesetonfoot，continued，suspended，andresumed；thattheambitionofasinglepersonbecomesthatofafamily，andtheambitionofonefamilythatofmany。

Theyhaveoccasionforasecretmagistracy，thecrimestheypunishbeinghatchedinsecrecyandsilence。Thismagistracymusthaveageneralinquisition，fortheirbusinessisnottoremedyknowndisorders，buttopreventtheunknown。Inaword，thelatterisdesignedtopunishsuspectedcrimes；whereastheformerusedrathermenacesthanpunishmentevenforcrimesthatwereopenlyavowed。

Inallmagistracies，thegreatnessofthepowermustbecompensatedbythebrevityoftheduration。Thismostlegislatorshavefixedtoayear；

alongerspacewouldbedangerous，andashorterwouldbecontrarytothenatureofgovernment。Forwhoisitthatinthemanagementevenofhisdomesticaffairswouldbethusconfined？AtRagusa[22]thechiefmagistrateoftherepublicischangedeverymonth，theotherofficerseveryweek，andthegovernorofthecastleeveryday。Butthiscantakeplaceonlyinasmallrepublicenvironed[23]byformidablepowers，whomighteasilycorruptsuchpettyandinsignificantmagistrates。

Thebestaristocracyisthatinwhichthosewhohavenoshareinthelegislaturearesofewandinconsiderablethatthegoverningpartyhavenointerestinoppressingthem。Thuswhen[24]AntipatermadealawatAthensthatwhosoeverwasnotworthtwothousanddrachmsshouldhavenopowertovote，heformedbythismethodthebestaristocracypossible；

becausethiswassosmallasumastoexcludeveryfew，andnotoneofanyrankorconsiderationinthecity。

Aristocraticfamiliesoughttherefore，asmuchaspossible，tolevelthemselvesinappearancewiththepeople。Themoreanaristocracybordersondemocracy，theneareritapproachesperfection：and，inproportionasitdrawstowardsmonarchy，themoreisitimperfect。

Butthemostimperfectofallisthatinwhichthepartofthepeoplethatobeysisinastateofcivilservitudetothosewhocommand，asthearistocracyofPoland，wherethepeasantsareslavestothenobility。

4。OftheRelationofLawstotheNatureofMonarchicalGovernment。Theintermediate，subordinate，anddependentpowersconstitutethenatureofmonarchicalgovernment；Imeanofthatinwhichasinglepersongovernsbyfundamentallaws。Isaidtheintermediate，subordinate，anddependentpowers。Andindeed，inmonarchiestheprinceisthesourceofallpower，politicalandcivil。Thesefundamentallawsnecessarilysupposetheintermediatechannelsthroughwhichthepowerflows：foriftherebeonlythemomentaryandcapriciouswillofasinglepersontogovernthestate，nothingcanbefixed，andofcoursethereisnofundamentallaw。

Themostnatural，intermediate，andsubordinatepoweristhatofthenobility。Thisinsomemeasureseemstobeessentialtoamonarchy，whosefundamentalmaximis：nomonarch，nonobility；nonobility，nomonarch；buttheremaybeadespoticprince。

TherearemenwhohaveendeavouredinsomecountriesinEuropetosuppressthejurisdictionofthenobility，notperceivingthattheyweredrivingattheverythingthatwasdonebytheparliamentofEngland。

Abolishtheprivilegesofthelords，theclergyandcitiesinamonarchy，andyouwillsoonhaveapopularstate，orelseadespoticgovernment。

ThecourtsofaconsiderablekingdominEuropehave，formanyages，beenstrikingatthepatrimonialjurisdictionofthelordsandclergy。Wedonotpretendtocensurethesesagemagistrates；butweleaveittothepublictojudgehowfarthismayaltertheconstitution。FaramIfrombeingprejudicedinfavouroftheprivilegesoftheclergy；however，I

shouldbegladiftheirjurisdictionwereoncefixed。Thequestionisnotwhethertheirjurisdictionwasjustlyestablished；butwhetheritbereallyestablished；whetheritconstitutesapartofthelawsofthecountry，andisineveryrespectinrelationtothoselaws：whetherbetweentwopowersacknowledgedindependent，theconditionsoughtnottobereciprocal；andwhetheritbenotequallythedutyofagoodsubjecttodefendtheprerogativeoftheprince，andtomaintainthelimitswhichfromtimeimmemorialhavebeenprescribedtohisauthority。

Thoughtheecclesiasticpowerbesodangerousinarepublic，yetitisextremelyproperinamonarchy，especiallyoftheabsolutekind。WhatwouldbecomeofSpainandPortugal，sincethesubversionoftheirlaws，wereitnotforthisonlybarrieragainsttheincursionsofarbitrarypower？Abarriereverusefulwhenthereisnoother：forsinceadespoticgovernmentisproductiveofthemostdreadfulcalamitiestohumannature，theveryevilthatrestrainsitisbeneficialtothesubject。

Inthesamemannerastheocean，threateningtooverflowthewholeearth，isstoppedbyweedsandpebblesthatliescatteredalongtheshore，somonarchs，whosepowerseemsunbounded，arerestrainedbythesmallestobstacles，andsuffertheirnaturalpridetobesubduedbysupplicationandprayer。

TheEnglish，tofavourtheirliberty，haveabolishedalltheintermediatepowersofwhichtheirmonarchywascomposed。Theyhaveagreatdealofreasontobejealousofthisliberty；weretheyevertobesounhappyastoloseit，theywouldbeoneofthemostservilenationsuponearth。

Mr。Law，throughignorancebothofarepublicanandmonarchicalconstitution，wasoneofthegreatestpromotersofabsolutepowereverknowninEurope。Besidestheviolentandextraordinarychangesowingtohisdirection，hewouldfainsuppressalltheintermediateranks，andabolishthepoliticalcommunities。Hewasdissolving[25]themonarchybyhischimericalreimbursements，andseemedasifheevenwantedtoredeemtheconstitution。

Itisnotenoughtohaveintermediatepowersinamonarchy；theremustbealsoadepositaryofthelaws。Thisdepositarycanonlybethejudgesofthesupremecourtsofjustice，whopromulgatethenewlaws，andrevivetheobsolete。Thenaturalignoranceofthenobility，theirindolenceandcontemptofcivilgovernment，requirethatthereshouldbeabodyinvestedwiththepowerofrevivingandexecutingthelaws，whichwouldbeotherwiseburiedinoblivion。Theprince’scouncilarenotaproperdepositary。Theyarenaturallythedepositaryofthemomentarywilloftheprince，andnotofthefundamentallaws。Besides，theprince’scounciliscontinuallychanging；itisneitherpermanentnornumerous；neitherhasitasufficientshareoftheconfidenceofthepeople；consequentlyitiscapableofsettingthemrightindifficultconjunctures，orofreducingthemtoproperobedience。

Despoticgovernments，wheretherearenofundamentallaws，havenosuchkindofdepositary。Henceitisthatreligionhasgenerallysomuchinfluenceinthosecountries，becauseitformsakindofpermanentdepositary；andifthiscannotbesaidofreligion，itmayofthecustomsthatarerespectedinsteadoflaws。

5。OftheLawsinrelationtotheNatureofadespoticGovernment。Fromthenatureofdespoticpoweritfollowsthatthesingleperson，investedwiththispower，commitstheexecutionofitalsotoasingleperson。A

manwhomhissensescontinuallyinformthathehimselfiseverythingandthathissubjectsarenothing，isnaturallylazy，voluptuous，andignorant。Inconsequenceofthis，heneglectsthemanagementofpublicaffairs。Butwerehetocommittheadministrationtomany，therewouldbecontinualdisputesamongthem；eachwouldformintriguestobehisfirstslave；andhewouldbeobligedtotakethereinsintohisownhands。Itis，therefore，morenaturalforhimtoresignittoavizir，[26]andtoinvesthimwiththesamepowerashimself。Thecreationofavizirisafundamentallawofthisgovernment。

Itisrelatedofapopethathehadstartedaninfinitenumberofdifficultiesagainsthiselection，fromathoroughconvictionofhisincapacity。Atlengthhewasprevailedontoacceptofthepontificate，andresignedtheadministrationentirelytohisnephew。Hewassoonstruckwithsurprise，andsaid，"Ishouldneverhavethoughtthatthesethingsweresoeasy。"ThesamemaybesaidoftheprincesoftheEast，who，beingeducatedinaprisonwhereeunuchscorrupttheirheartsanddebasetheirunderstandings，andwheretheyarefrequentlykeptignorantevenoftheirhighrank，whendrawnforthinordertobeplacedonthethrone，areatfirstconfounded：butassoonastheyhavechosenavizir，andabandonedthemselvesintheirseragliotothemostbrutalpassions；pursuing，inthemidstofaprostitutedcourt，everycapriciousextravagance，theywouldneverhavedreamedthattheycouldfindmatterssoeasy。

Themoreextensivetheempire，thelargertheseraglio；andconsequentlythemorevoluptuoustheprince。Hencethemorenationssuchasovereignhastorule，thelessheattendstothecaresofgovernment；themoreimportanthisaffairs，thelesshemakesthemthesubjectofhisdeliberations。

______

1。CompareAristotle，Politics，vi。2。

2。Declamations，17，18。

3。SeetheConsiderationsontheCausesoftheGrandeurandDeclineoftheRomans，9。

4。Pp。691，693，ed。Wechel，1596。

5。Bk。i。

6。Bk。iv，art。15etseq。

7。SeeintheConsiderationsontheCausesoftheGrandeurandDeclineoftheRomans，9，howthisspiritofServiusTulliuswaspreservedintherepublic。

8。DionysiusHalicarnassus，EulogiumofIsocrates，ii，p。97，ed。

Wechel。Pollux，viii。10，art。130。

9。SeeAristotle’sPolitics，ii。12。

10。Ibid，iv。9。

11。SeetheorationofDemosthenes，DeFalsalegat。，andtheorationagainstTimarchus。

12。Theyusedeventodrawtwoticketsforeachplace，onewhichgavetheplace，andtheotherwhichnamedthepersonwhowastosucceed，incasethefirstwasrejected。

13。DeLeg。，i，iii。

14。Theywerecalledlegestabulares；twotabletswerepresentedtoeachcitizen，thefirstmarkedwithanA，forAntique，orIforbidit；andtheotherwithanUandanR，forUtirogas，orBeitasyoudesire。

15。AtAthensthepeopleusedtoliftuptheirhands。

16。AsatVenice。

17。ThethirtytyrantsatAthensorderedthesuffragesoftheAreopagitestobepublic，inordertomanagethemastheypleased。——

Lysias，Orat。contraAgorat。8。

18。SeeDionysiusHalicarnassus，iv，ix。

19。SeeMr。Addison，TravelstoItaly，p。16。

20。Theywerenamedatfirstbytheconsuls。

21。ThisiswhatruinedtherepublicofRome。SeeConsiderationsontheCausesoftheGrandeurandDeclineoftheRomans，14，16。

22。Tournefort，Voyages。

23。AtLuccathemagistratesarechosenonlyfortwomonths。

24。Diodorus，xviii，p。601，ed。Rhodoman。

25。Ferdinand，kingofAragon，madehimselfgrandmasteroftheorders，andthatalonechangedtheconstitution。

26。TheEasternkingsareneverwithoutvizirs，saysSirJohnChardin。

BookIII。OfthePrinciplesoftheThreeKindsofGovernment1。DifferencebetweentheNatureandPrincipleofGovernment。Havingexaminedthelawsinrelationtothenatureofeachgovernment，wemustinvestigatethosewhichrelatetoitsprinciple。

Thereisthisdifferencebetweenthenatureandprinciple[1]ofgovernment，thattheformeristhatbywhichitisconstituted，thelatterthatbywhichitismadetoact。Oneisitsparticularstructure，andtheotherthehumanpassionswhichsetitinmotion。

Now，lawsoughtnolesstorelatetotheprinciplethantothenatureofeachgovernment。Wemust，therefore，inquireintothisprinciple，whichshallbethesubjectofthisthirdbook。

2。OfthePrincipleofdifferentGovernments。Ihavealreadyobservedthatitisthenatureofarepublicangovernmentthateitherthecollectivebodyofthepeople，orparticularfamilies，shouldbepossessedofthesupremepower；ofamonarchy，thattheprinceshouldhavethispower，butintheexecutionofitshouldbedirectedbyestablishedlaws；ofadespoticgovernment，thatasinglepersonshouldruleaccordingtohisownwillandcaprice。Thisenablesmetodiscovertheirthreeprinciples；whicharethencenaturallyderived。Ishallbeginwitharepublicangovernment，andinparticularwiththatofdemocracy。

3。OfthePrincipleofDemocracy。Thereisnogreatshareofprobitynecessarytosupportamonarchicalordespoticgovernment。Theforceoflawsinone，andtheprince’sarmintheother，aresufficienttodirectandmaintainthewhole。Butinapopularstate，onespringmoreisnecessary，namely，virtue。

WhatIhavehereadvancedisconfirmedbytheunanimoustestimonyofhistorians，andisextremelyagreeabletothenatureofthings。Foritisclearthatinamonarchy，wherehewhocommandstheexecutionofthelawsgenerallythinkshimselfabovethem，thereislessneedofvirtuethaninapopulargovernment，wherethepersonentrustedwiththeexecutionofthelawsissensibleofhisbeingsubjecttotheirdirection。

Clearisitalsothatamonarchwho，throughbadadviceorindolence，ceasestoenforcetheexecutionofthelaws，mayeasilyrepairtheevil；

hehasonlytofollowotheradvice；ortoshakeoffthisindolence。Butwhen，inapopulargovernment，thereisasuspensionofthelaws，asthiscanproceedonlyfromthecorruptionoftherepublic，thestateiscertainlyundone。

AverydrollspectacleitwasinthelastcenturytobeholdtheimpotenteffortsoftheEnglishtowardstheestablishmentofdemocracy。Astheywhohadashareinthedirectionofpublicaffairswerevoidofvirtue；

astheirambitionwasinffamedbythesuccessofthemostdaringoftheirmembers；[2]astheprevailingpartiesweresuccessivelyanimatedbythespiritoffaction，thegovernmentwascontinuallychanging：thepeople，amazedatsomanyrevolutions，invainattemptedtoerectacommonwealth。Atlength，whenthecountryhadundergonethemostviolentshocks，theywereobligedtohaverecoursetotheverygovernmentwhichtheyhadsowantonlyproscribed。

WhenSyllathoughtofrestoringRometoherliberty，thisunhappycitywasincapableofreceivingthatblessing。Shehadonlythefeebleremainsofvirtue，whichwerecontinuallydiminishing。InsteadofbeingrousedfromherlethargybyC？sar，Tiberius，CaiusClaudius，Nero，andDomitian，sherivetedeverydayherchains；ifshestrucksomeblows，heraimwasatthetyrant，notatthetyranny。