第14章

32。Amongothers，DeLange’saccount。

33。OftheFamilyofSourniama，EdifyingLetters，coll。xviii。

34。SeeinFatherDuHaldehowthemissionariesavailedthemselvesoftheauthorityofCanhitosilencethemandarins，whoconstantlydeclaredthatbythelawsofthecountrynoforeignworshipcouldbeestablishedintheempire。

35。SeeLettrespersanes，210。

36。SeetheorderofTsongtoufortillingtheland，intheEdifyingLetters，coll。xxi。

BookIX。OfLawsintheRelationTheyBeartoaDefensiveForce1。InwhatMannerRepublicsprovidefortheirSafety。Ifarepublicbesmall，itisdestroyedbyaforeignforce；ifitbelarge，itisruinedbyaninternalimperfection。

Tothistwofoldinconveniencedemocraciesandaristocraciesareequallyliable，whethertheybegoodorbad。Theevilisintheverythingitself，andnoformcanredressit。

Itis，therefore，veryprobablethatmankindwouldhavebeen，atlength，obligedtoliveconstantlyunderthegovernmentofasingleperson，hadtheynotcontrivedakindofconstitutionthathasalltheinternaladvantagesofarepublican，togetherwiththeexternalforceofamonarchical，government。Imeanaconfederaterepublic。

Thisformofgovernmentisaconventionbywhichseveralpettystatesagreetobecomemembersofalargerone，whichtheyintendtoestablish。

Itisakindofassemblageofsocieties，thatconstituteanewone，capableofincreasingbymeansoffurtherassociations，tilltheyarriveatsuchadegreeofpowerastobeabletoprovideforthesecurityofthewholebody。

ItwastheseassociationsthatsolongcontributedtotheprosperityofGreece。BythesetheRomansattackedthewholeglobe，andbythesealonethewholeglobewithstoodthem；forwhenRomehadarrivedatherhighestpitchofgrandeur，itwastheassociationsbeyondtheDanubeandtheRhine——associationsformedbytheterrorofherarms——thatenabledthebarbarianstoresisther。

HenceitproceedsthatHolland，[1]Germany，andtheSwisscantonsareconsideredinEuropeasperpetualrepublics。

Theassociationsofcitieswereformerlymorenecessarythaninourtimes。Aweak，defencelesstownwasexposedtogreaterdanger。Byconquestitwasdeprivednotonlyoftheexecutiveandlegislativepower，asatpresent，butmoreoverofallhumanproperty。[2]

Arepublicofthiskind，abletowithstandanexternalforce，maysupportitselfwithoutanyinternalcorruption；theformofthissocietypreventsallmannerofinconveniences。

Ifasinglemembershouldattempttousurpthesupremepower，hecouldnotbesupposedtohaveanequalauthorityandcreditinalltheconfederatestates。Werehetohavetoogreataninfluenceoverone，thiswouldalarmtherest；werehetosubdueapart，thatwhichwouldstillremainfreemightopposehimwithforcesindependentofthosewhichhehadusurped，andoverpowerhimbeforehecouldbesettledinhisusurpation。

Shouldapopularinsurrectionhappeninoneoftheconfederatestates，theothersareabletoquellit。Shouldabusescreepintoonepart，theyarereformedbythosethatremainsound。Thestatemaybedestroyedononeside，andnotontheother；theconfederacymaybedissolved，andtheconfederatespreservetheirsovereignty。

Asthisgovernmentiscomposedofpettyrepublics，itenjoystheinternalhappinessofeach；andwithregardtoitsexternalsituation，bymeansoftheassociation，itpossessesalltheadvantagesoflargemonarchies。

2。ThataconfederateGovernmentoughttobecomposedofStatesofthesameNature，especiallyoftherepublicanKind。TheCanaanitesweredestroyedbyreasonthattheywerepettymonarchies，thathadnounionorconfederacyfortheircommondefence；and，indeed，aconfederacyisnotagreeabletothenatureofpettymonarchies。

AstheconfederaterepublicofGermanyconsistsoffreecities，andofpettystatessubjecttodifferentprinces，experienceshowsusthatitismuchmoreimperfectthanthatofHollandandSwitzerland。

Thespiritofmonarchyiswarandenlargementofdominion：peaceandmoderationarethespiritofarepublic。Thesetwokindsofgovernmentcannotnaturallysubsistinaconfederaterepublic。

Thusweobserve，intheRomanhistory，thatwhentheVeienteshadchosenaking，theywereimmediatelyabandonedbyalltheotherpettyrepublicsofTuscany。GreecewasundoneassoonasthekingsofMacedonobtainedaseatamongtheAmphyktyons。

TheconfederaterepublicofGermany，composedofprincesandfreetowns，subsistsbymeansofachief，whois，insomerespects，themagistrateoftheunion，inothers，themonarch。

3。OtherRequisitesinaconfederateRepublic。IntherepublicofHollandoneprovincecannotconcludeanalliancewithouttheconsentoftheothers。Thislaw，whichisanexcellentone，andevennecessaryinaconfederaterepublic，iswantingintheGermanicconstitution，whereitwouldpreventthemisfortunesthatmayhappentothewholeconfederacy，throughtheimprudence，ambition，oravariceofasinglemember。A

republicunitedbyapoliticalconfederacyhasgivenitselfentirelyup，andhasnothingmoretoresign。

Itisdifficultfortheunitedstatestobeallofequalpowerandextent。TheLycian[3]republicwasanassociationoftwenty—threetowns；

thelargeoneshadthreevotesinthecommoncouncil，themiddlingonestwo，andthesmalltownsone。TheDutchrepublicconsistsofsevenprovincesofdifferentextentofterritory，whichhaveeachonevoice。

ThecitiesofLycia[4]contributedtotheexpensesofthestate，accordingtotheproportionofsuffrages。TheprovincesoftheUnitedNetherlandscannotfollowthisproportion；theymustbedirectedbythatoftheirpower。

InLycia[5]thejudgesandtownmagistrateswereelectedbythecommoncouncil，andaccordingtotheproportionalreadymentioned。IntherepublicofHollandtheyarenotchosenbythecommoncouncil，buteachtownnamesitsmagistrates。WereItogiveamodelofanexcellentconfederaterepublic，IshouldpitchuponthatofLycia。

4。InwhatMannerdespoticGovernmentsprovidefortheirSecurity。Asrepublicsprovidefortheirsecuritybyuniting，despoticgovernmentsdoitbyseparating，andbykeepingthemselves，asitwere，single。Theysacrificeapartofthecountry；andbyravaginganddesolatingthefrontierstheyrendertheheartoftheempireinaccessible。

Itisareceivedaxiomingeometrythatthegreatertheextentofbodies，themoretheircircumferenceisrelativelysmall。Thispractice，therefore，oflayingthefrontierswasteismoretolerableinlargethaninmiddlingstates。

Adespoticgovernmentdoesallthemischieftoitselfthatcouldbecommittedbyacruelenemy，whosearmsitwereunabletoresist。

Itpreservesitselflikewisebyanotherkindofseparation，whichisbyputtingthemostdistantprovincesintothehandsofagreatvassal。TheMogul，thekingofPersia，andtheemperorsofChinahavetheirfeudatories；andtheTurkshavefoundtheiraccountinputtingtheTartars，theMoldavians，theWallachians，andformerlytheTransylvanians，betweenthemselvesandtheirenemies。

5。InwhatManneraMonarchicalGovernmentprovidesforitsSecurity。A

monarchyneverdestroysitselflikeadespoticgovernment。Butakingdomofamoderateextentisliabletosuddeninvasions：itmustthereforehavefortressestodefenditsfrontiers；andtroopstogarrisonthosefortresses。Theleastspotofgroundisdisputedwithmilitaryskillandresolution。Despoticstatesmakeincursionsagainstoneanother；itismonarchiesonlythatwagewar。

Fortressesareproperformonarchies；despoticgovernmentsareafraidofthem。Theydarenotentrusttheirofficerswithsuchacommand，asnoneofthemhaveanyaffectionfortheprinceorhisgovernment。

6。OfthedefensiveForceofStatesingeneral。Topreserveastateinitsdueforce，itmusthavesuchanextentastoadmitofaproportionbetweentheceleritywithwhichitmaybeinvaded，andthatwithwhichitmaydefeattheinvasion。Asaninvadermayappearoneveryside，itisrequisitethatthestateshouldbeabletomakeoneverysideitsdefence；consequentlyitshouldbeofamoderateextent，proportionedtothedegreeofvelocitythatnaturehasgiventoman，toenablehimtomovefromoneplacetoanother。

FranceandSpainareexactlyofaproperextent。Theyhavesoeasyacommunicationfortheirforcesastobeabletoconveythemimmediatelytowhatparttheyhaveamind；thearmiesuniteandpasswithrapidityfromonefrontiertoanother，withoutanyapprehensionofsuchdifficultiesasrequiretimetoremove。

ItisextremelyhappyforFrancethatthecapitalstandsneartothedifferentfrontiersinproportiontotheirweakness；andtheprincehasabetterviewofeachpartofhiscountryaccordingasitismoreexposed。

Butwhenavastempire，likePersia，isattacked，itisseveralmonthsbeforethetroopsareassembledinabody；andthentheyarenotabletomakesuchforcedmarches，forthatspaceoftime，astheycouldforfifteendays。Shouldthearmyonthefrontiersbedefeated，itissoondispersed，becausethereisnoneighbouringplaceofretreat。Thevictor，meetingwithnoresistance，advanceswithallexpedition，sitsdownbeforethecapital，andlayssiegetoit，whenthereisscarcelytimesufficienttosummonthegovernorsoftheprovincestoitsrelief。

Thosewhoforeseeanapproachingrevolutionhastenitbytheirdisobedience。Formenwhosefidelityisentirelyowingtothedangerofpunishmentareeasilycorruptedassoonasitbecomesdistant；theiraimistheirownprivateinterest。Theempireissubverted，thecapitaltaken，andtheconquerordisputestheseveralprovinceswiththegovernors。

Therealpowerofaprincedoesnotconsistsomuchinthefacilityhemeetswithinmakingconquestsasinthedifficultyanenemyfindsinattackinghim，and，ifImaysospeak，intheimmutabilityofhiscondition。Buttheincreaseofterritoryobligesagovernmenttolayitselfmoreopentoanenemy。

Asmonarchsthereforeoughttobeenduedwithwisdominordertoincreasetheirpower，theyoughtlikewisetohaveanequalshareofprudencetoconfineitwithinbounds。Uponremovingtheinconveniencesoftoosmallaterritory，theyshouldhavetheireyeconstantlyontheinconvenienceswhichattenditsextent。

7。AReflection。Theenemiesofagreatprince，whosereignwasprotractedtoanunusuallength，haveveryoftenaccusedhim，rather，I

believe，fromtheirownfearsthanuponanysolidfoundation，ofhavingformedandcarriedonaprojectofuniversalmonarchy。Hadheattainedhisaim，nothingwouldhavebeenmorefataltohissubjects，tohimself，tohisfamily，andtoallEurope。Heaven，thatknowsourtrueinterests，favouredhimmorebypreventingthesuccessofhisarmsthanitcouldhavedonebycrowninghimwithvictories。InsteadofraisinghimtobetheonlysovereigninEurope，itmadehimhappierbyrenderinghimthemostpowerful。

Thesubjectsofthisprince，whointravellingabroadareneveraffectedbutwithwhattheyhaveleftathome；whoonquittingtheirownhabitationslookupongloryastheirchiefobject，andindistantcountriesasanobstacletotheirreturn；whodisgustyouevenbytheirgoodqualities，becausetheyaretaintedwithsomuchvanity；whoarecapableofsupportingwounds，perils，andfatigues，butnotofforegoingtheirpleasures；whoaresupremelyfondofgaiety，andcomfortthemselvesforthelossofabattlebyasonguponthegeneral：thosesubjects，Isay，wouldneverhavethesolidityrequisiteforanenterpriseofthiskind，whichifdefeatedinonecountrywouldbeunsuccessfuleverywhereelse；andifonceunsuccessful，wouldbesoforever。

8。AparticularCaseinwhichthedefensiveForceofaStateisinferiortotheoffensive。ItwasasayingoftheLordofCoucytoKingCharlesV

thattheEnglishareneverweaker，normoreeasilyovercome，thanintheirowncountry。ThesamewasobservedoftheRomans；thesameoftheCarthaginians；andthesamewillhappentoeverypowerthatsendsarmiestodistantcountries，inordertoreunitebydisciplineandmilitaryforcethosewhoaredividedamongthemselvesbypoliticalorcivilinterests。Thestatefindsitselfweakenedbythedisorderthatstillcontinues，andmoresobytheremedy。

TheLordofCoucy’smaximisanexceptiontothegeneralrule，whichdisapprovesofwarsagainstdistantcountries。Andthisexceptionconfirmslikewisetherulebecauseittakesplaceonlywithregardtothosebywhomsuchwarsareundertaken。

9。OftherelativeForceofStates。Allgrandeur，force，andpowerarerelative。Carethereforemustbetakenthatinendeavouringtoincreasetherealgrandeur，therelativebenotdiminished。

DuringthereignofLouisXIVFrancewasatitshighestpitchofrelativegrandeur。Germanyhadnotyetproducedsuchpowerfulprincesashavesinceappearedinthatcountry。Italywasinthesamecase。EnglandandScotlandwerenotyetformedintooneunitedkingdom。AragonwasnotjoinedtoCastile：thedistantbranchesoftheSpanishmonarchywereweakenedbyit，andweakeneditintheirturn；andMuscovywasaslittleknowninEuropeasCrimTartary。

10。OftheWeaknessofneighbouringStates。Whensoeverastateliescontiguoustoanotherthathappenstobeinitsdecline，theformeroughttotakeparticularcarenottoprecipitatetheruinofthelatter，becausethisisthehappiestsituationimaginable；nothingbeingsoconvenientasforoneprincetobenearanother，whoreceivesforhimalltherebuffsandinsultsoffortune。Anditseldomhappensthatbysubduingsuchastatetherealpoweroftheconquerorisasmuchincreasedastherelativeisdiminished。

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1。Itiscomposedofaboutfiftydifferentrepublics，alldifferentfromoneanother。——M。Janisson，StateoftheUnitedProvinces。

2。Civilliberty，goods，wives，children，temples，andevenburying—places。

3。Strabo，xiv。

4。Ibid。

5。Ibid。

BookX。OfLawsintheRelationTheyBeartoOffensiveForce1。OfoffensiveForce。Offensiveforceisregulatedbythelawofnations，whichisthepoliticallawofeachcountryconsideredinitsrelationtoeveryother。

2。OfWar。Thelifeofgovernmentsislikethatofman。Thelatterhasarighttokillincaseofnaturaldefence：theformerhavearighttowagewarfortheirownpreservation。

InthecaseofnaturaldefenceIhavearighttokill，becausemylifeisinrespecttomewhatthelifeofmyantagonististohim：inthesamemannerastatewageswarbecauseitspreservationislikethatofanyotherbeing。

Withindividualstherightofnaturaldefencedoesnotimplyanecessityofattacking。Insteadofattackingtheyneedonlyhaverecoursetopropertribunals。Theycannotthereforeexercisethisrightofdefencebutinsuddencases，whenimmediatedeathwouldbetheconsequenceofwaitingfortheassistanceofthelaw。Butwithstatestherightofnaturaldefencecarriesalongwithitsometimesthenecessityofattacking；asforinstance，whenonenationseesthatacontinuanceofpeacewillenableanothertodestroyher，andthattoattackthatnationinstantlyistheonlywaytopreventherowndestruction。

Thenceitfollowsthatpettystateshaveoftenerarighttodeclarewarthangreatones，becausetheyareoftenerinthecaseofbeingafraidofdestruction。

Therightofwar，therefore，isderivedfromnecessityandstrictjustice。Ifthosewhodirecttheconscienceorcouncilsofprincesdonotabidebythismaxim，theconsequenceisdreadful：whentheyproceedonarbitraryprinciplesofglory，convenience，andutility，torrentsofbloodmustoverspreadtheearth。

But，aboveall，letthemnotpleadsuchanidlepretextasthegloryoftheprince：hisgloryisnothingbutpride；itisapassion，andnotalegitimateright。

Itistruethefameofhispowermightincreasethestrengthofhisgovernment；butitmightbeequallyincreasedbythereputationofhisjustice。

3。OftheRightofConquest。Fromtherightofwarcomesthatofconquest；whichistheconsequenceofthatright，andoughtthereforetofollowitsspirit。

Therighttheconquerorhasoveraconqueredpeopleisdirectedbyfoursortsoflaws：thelawofnature，whichmakeseverythingtendtothepreservationofthespecies；thelawofnaturalreason，whichteachesustodotootherswhatwewouldhavedonetoourselves；thelawthatformspoliticalsocieties，whosedurationnaturehasnotlimited；and，infine，thelawderivedfromthenatureofthethingitself。Conquestisanacquisition，andcarrieswithitthespiritofpreservationanduse，notofdestruction。

Theinhabitantsofaconqueredcountryaretreatedbytheconquerorinoneofthefourfollowingways：Eitherhecontinuestorulethemaccordingtotheirownlaws，andassumestohimselfonlytheexerciseofthepoliticalandcivilgovernment；orhegivesthemnewpoliticalandcivilgovernment；orhedestroysanddispersesthesociety；or，infine，heexterminatesthepeople。

Thefirstwayisconformabletothelawofnationsnowfollowed；thefourthismoreagreeabletothelawofnationsfollowedbytheRomans：

inrespecttowhichIleavethereadertojudgehowfarwehaveimprovedupontheancients。Wemustgiveduecommendationstoourmodernrefinementsinreason，religion，philosophy，andmanners。

Theauthorsofourpubliclaw，guidedbyancienthistories，withoutconfiningthemselvestocasesofstrictnecessity，havefallenintoverygreaterrors。Theyhaveadoptedtyrannicalandarbitraryprinciples，bysupposingtheconquerorstobeinvestedwithIknownotwhatrighttokill：thencetheyhavedrawnconsequencesasterribleastheveryprinciple，andestablishedmaximswhichtheconquerorsthemselves，whenpossessedoftheleastgrainofsense，neverpresumedtofollow。Itisaplaincasethatwhentheconquestiscompleted，theconquerorhasnolongerarighttokill，becausehehasnolongerthepleaofnaturaldefenceandself—preservation。

Whathasledthemintothismistakeis，thattheyimaginedaconquerorhadarighttodestroythestate；whencetheyinferredthathehadarighttodestroythementhatcomposeit：awrongconsequencefromafalseprinciple。Forfromthedestructionofthestateitdoesnotatallfollowthatthepeoplewhocomposeitoughttobealsodestroyed。

Thestateistheassociationofmen，andnotthementhemselves；thecitizenmayperish，andthemanremain。

Fromtherightofkillinginthecaseofconquest，politicianshavedrawnthatofreducingtoslavery——aconsequenceasill—groundedastheprinciple。

Thereisnosuchthingasarightofreducingpeopletoslavery，savewhenitbecomesnecessaryforthepreservationoftheconquest。

Preservation，andnotservitude，istheendofconquest；thoughservitudemayhappensometimestobeanecessarymeansofpreservation。

Eveninthatcaseitiscontrarytothenatureofthingsthattheslaveryshouldbeperpetual。Thepeopleenslavedoughttoberenderedcapableofbecomingsubjects。Slaveryinconquestsisanaccidentalthing。Whenaftertheexpirationofacertainspaceoftimeallthepartsoftheconqueringstateareconnectedwiththeconquerednation，bycustom，marriages，laws，associations，andbyacertainconformityofdisposition，thereoughttobeanendoftheslavery。Fortherightsoftheconquerorarefoundedentirelyontheoppositionbetweenthetwonationsinthoseveryarticles，whenceprejudicesarise，andthewantofmutualconfidence。

Aconqueror，therefore，whoreducestheconqueredpeopletoslavery，oughtalwaystoreservetohimselfthemeans（formeanstherearewithoutnumber）ofrestoringthemtotheirliberty。

Thesearefarfrombeingvagueanduncertainnotions。Thusourancestorsacted，thoseancestorswhoconqueredtheRomanempire。Thelawstheymadeintheheatandtransportofpassionandintheinsolenceofvictoryweregraduallysoftened；thoselawswereatfirstsevere，butwereafterwardsrenderedimpartial。TheBurgundians，Goths，andLombardswouldhavetheRomanscontinueaconqueredpeople；butthelawsofEuric，Gundebald，andRotharismadetheRomansandbarbariansfellow—citizens。[1]

Charlemagne，totametheSaxons，deprivedthemoftheirlibertyandproperty。LouistheDebonnairemadethemafreepeople，[2]andthiswasoneofthemostprudentregulationsduringhiswholereign。Timeandservitudehadsoftenedtheirmanners，andtheyeverafteradheredtohimwiththegreatestfidelity。

4。SomeAdvantagesofaconqueredPeople。Insteadofinferringsuchdestructiveconsequencesfromtherightofconquest，muchbetterwouldithavebeenforpoliticianstomentiontheadvantageswhichthisveryrightmaysometimesgivetoaconqueredpeople——advantageswhichwouldbemoresensiblyandmoreuniversallyexperiencedwereourlawofnationsexactlyfollowed，andestablishedineverypartoftheglobe。

Conqueredcountriesare，generallyspeaking，degeneratedfromtheiroriginalinstitution。Corruptionhascreptin，theexecutionofthelawshasbeenneglected，andthegovernmenthasgrownoppressive。Whocanquestionbutsuchastatewouldbeagainer，andderivesomeadvantagesfromtheveryconquestitself，ifitdidnotprovedestructive？Whenagovernmenthasarrivedatthatdegreeofcorruptionastobeincapableofreformingitself，itwouldnotlosemuchbybeingnewlymoulded。A